

**When Parties Meet Voters: Assessing Political Linkages through  
Partisan Networks and Distributive Expectations in Argentina and Chile**

**Ernesto Calvo**  
University of Maryland  
3144F Tydings Hall  
College Park MD 20742

**Maria Victoria Murillo**  
Columbia University  
420 W.118th Street, office 832  
New York, NY 10027

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**ABSTRACT**

This article provides a new comparative methodology for the study of party-voter linkages from the perspective of voters where the critical question that distinguishes clientelistic from programmatic parties is *access* to publicly provided benefits. In the former case, partisan networks mediate access to goods. In the latter, beneficiaries are defined by policy and access is independent from partisan distribution networks. We show that these different access mechanisms shape voters' distributive expectations and the nature of their linkages to political parties by developing a unique methodology to measure party networks. We test it using original survey data from Argentina and Chile and show variation both across and within countries on party-voter linkages based on differential access to benefits and parties' organizational capacity.

keywords: networks, political parties, clientelism, patronage, political linkages.

## 1. Introduction

This article provides a new framework for the comparative study of programmatic and non-programmatic party-voter linkages. From the perspective of voters, the critical question that distinguishes clientelistic from programmatic linkages is how recipients become eligible to access publicly provided benefits. In the former case, activist networks screen *deserving* from *undeserving* voters and mediate access to goods. In the latter case, the group of beneficiaries is defined by policy and access is independent from partisan distribution networks. In this article we study how the type of access to goods shapes the distributive expectations of voters, uncovering distinctive party and country level effects in the process. We measure the effect of party-voter linkages on the distributive expectations of voters and introduce a novel methodology for the study of partisan networks that can be broadly applied in a wide range of comparative settings.

The widespread democratization of countries since the 1970s has generated a reassessment of the literature on party-voter linkages. In recent times, it has become apparent that the assumptions of organizational encapsulation<sup>1</sup> and programmatic party linkages that characterize the Western European sociological tradition do not adequately reflect the behavior of voters and the dynamics of party competition in most new democracies (Keefer and Vlaicu 2008; Kitschelt 2000; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros, and Estevez 2007). To provide a theoretical framework that explains the nature of representation in recently democratized countries, a broad literature has emerged contrasting the organizational characteristics of programmatic vs. clientelistic parties.<sup>2</sup> The resulting framework presumes that programmatic party elites are responsive to voters with whom they share an ideological affinity and, consequently, will enact policies that redistribute public goods to the benefit of their constituencies. Meanwhile, clientelistic parties specialize in the delivery of private goods to a restricted menu of voters. Most of the emerging literature on distributive politics in new democracies, therefore, distinguishes programmatic or clientelistic parties by the type of *public* or *private* goods they deliver to voters.

However, distinguishing programmatic and clientelistic parties by the types of goods they deliver is problematic. As noted by Kitschelt (2000), it is difficult to classify the clientelistic or programmatic intent of the delivery of public, club, or private goods. This subjective assessment hinders within and across country comparisons of party-voter linkages. Access to unemployment insurance, for example, could be mediated by party brokers in one country and by bureaucratic agencies in another. Public sector posts could be filled by open searches under civil service rules or at the discretion of senior party figures. Enrolment in targeted cash transfer programs may result from personal referrals and direct access to party brokers or based on bureaucratically defined rules that identify a deserving target population. In other words, the same public or private goods may serve diverse political goals in different political environments.

First, rather than focusing on the type of goods delivered by party elites, we study whether voters perceive that partisan networks mediate benefit access. We understand partisan networks as social structures composed of individuals (nodes describing party members and voters) and personal ties (edges describing acquaintance status). We consider a larger number of ties between a voter and party members as reflective of higher proximity to a party. Therefore, we propose to measure partisan networks and assess the importance that voters attach to the type of venue used to access publicly-funded excludable goods (e.g. handouts, jobs, and public works). To this end, we provide a novel methodology for measuring how voters perceive partisan networks and for estimating the number of ties or connections between voters and party members. Using this unique methodology, we compare the effects of proximity to party members (e.g., the structure of partisan networks) and ideological affinity on voters' expectations of accessing excludable benefits in the future. Using this measure, we are able to assess the character of party-voter linkages—either programmatic or clientelistic—across political parties and party systems.

To measure ties between voters and party members, we take advantage of recent developments in social network analysis that use indirect survey questions of the form “how many X’s do you know” to estimate the size of hard-to-count populations and to uncover social structure in individual-level data (McCarty et al. 2000; Zheng, Salganik, and Gelman 2006). This methodology provides a unique strategy

for the study of political networks, where respondents supply information that describes their partisan environments by reporting counts of individuals they know across a range of social categories. By analyzing the effect of political networks on the voter's distributive expectations, we are able to identify clientelistic linkages with a measure that can be broadly applied in comparative research.

The remainder of the article has five sections. The next two sections describe our theoretical framework, methodological design, and research strategy. Section four applies the proposed methodology to study political networks in Argentina and Chile. Section five tests the effect of ideological and network proximity on the distributive expectations of voters, and section six concludes.

## **2. Political Networks and Party-Voter Linkages**

Our research explains the distributive expectations of voters who are embedded in a complex web of individual, social, and political networks. We acknowledge that these voters have heterogeneous distributive preferences and that they develop expectations about the capacity of party elites and party activists to deliver excludable goods, such as handouts, public sector jobs, and public works.

We define linkages as either clientelistic or programmatic based on the voter's expectation of accessing benefits through partisan networks or programmatic policies. These expectations are informed by the voters' prior interactions with party members and by their knowledge of parties' programmatic offerings. These prior interactions and policy knowledge explain the importance that voters attach to either partisan networks or programmatic policy when developing distributive expectations. Consequently, whereas socio-economic traits such as income, class, or education may explain the demands for redistribution, we contend that distributive *expectations* are shaped by prior experiences in accessing benefits through partisan networks and/or programmatic policies.

### ***Political Networks and Party Linkages***

Earlier research on mass political parties in advanced democracies highlighted the essential role of partisan networks for explaining party-voter linkages. This literature hypothesized that parties would eventually supersede clientelistic networks as local attachments faded and electoral competition became

effectively nationalized (Panebianco 1988; Kirchheimer 1966). *Responsible party* scholars, consequently, expected that modern political parties would bundle issue positions into platforms and that nationally oriented constituents would make use of ideological cues to reach informed electoral decisions. While it is unclear how well the responsible party model describes consolidated democracies today, widespread democratization in the developing world has been accompanied by the rise of non-programmatic parties that rely heavily on the distribution of clientelistic resources to satisfy the demands of ideologically uncommitted voters. Consequently, current research in democratizing countries has prompted renewed interests on political networks and modern party machines.<sup>3</sup>

Partisan networks serve different functions beyond the delivery of excludable goods. Political networks allow politicians to gather critical information about the voters' moods, needs, and desires while presenting a local party face for the dissemination of ideas and policy goals. However, in the particular case of clientelistic parties, networks serve the critical purpose of screening prospective clients (Ujhelyi and Calvo 2010), enrolling beneficiaries, and reducing dead weight losses in the distribution of goods (Dixit and Londregan 1996; Szwarcberg 2008). Hence, while both programmatic and clientelistic parties may finance extensive partisan networks, we expect only the latter to generate distributive expectations among their voters.

### ***The Distributive Expectations of Voters***

We characterize the distributive expectations of voters based on three main components. First, voters have different preferences for distribution, which are largely explained by socio-economic traits that determine the marginal value of the goods they seek to receive from parties (Cox 2007; Diaz-Cayeros 2008; Dixit and Londregan 1996). However, distributive expectations are not simply derived from each voter's needs, but also from assessments about the ability of parties to deliver goods. Therefore, they include two other components. The second component shaping the distributive expectation of voters is the weight that individual voters attach to the probability of receiving benefits based on their ideological proximity to parties. In this case, targeted distribution is the result of policies that voters perceive as beneficial to their group category. Finally, the third component is the importance that each individual

voter attaches to his/her proximity to party members in developing expectations for accessing benefits. That is, how much weight does each voter assign to his/her contact with members of each party organization who are in a position to distribute excludable goods. We treat all three of these components as independent and exogenous determinants of the voters' distributive expectations.<sup>4</sup>

It is important to note that proximity to partisan networks is not simply need-based. Even if a voter is eager to receive private goods from a clientelistic party, she/he may not be connected to party members who are in a position to provide those goods. Hence, whereas ideological affinity is defined by voters' attitudes and the policy offer of the party, the connection to political networks is a function of both the size of an individual's personal network, the organizational reach of each party, and the specific ties that connect voters to members of each party.

We expect that voters will perceive dense organizational networks as an asset for accessing clientelistic goods and thin organizational networks as a liability. Therefore, positive distributive expectations for parties that lack organizational capacity will be restricted to programmatic assessments and ideological affinity. We expect perceived differences in organizational capacity and programmatic affinity to shape the distributive expectations of voters and their assessment of the different venues to access goods. If voters perceive networks as a crucial venue for accessing benefits, distributive expectations will be more significantly explained by the number of ties that connects them to party members. By contrast, perceived differences in policy capacity will increase the weight or importance that voters attach to ideological proximity when forming expectations about the future distribution of benefits by parties. Whereas the former process will reinforce clientelistic linkages between parties and voters, the latter will contribute to fostering programmatic linkages.

This conceptual framework leads us to expect variation in distributive expectations as a function of political linkages that vary within and across political systems. We expect variation in political linkages across political parties within the same polity because parties differ in their perceived organizational capacity to access and deliver resources. We also expect variation across political systems,

as different historical developments and institutional constraints enter into the voters' assessments of the organizational capacity and policy intent of parties.

### **3. A Statistical Model to Measure Political Networks**

To test our model of clientelistic linkages and distributive expectations we require survey instruments that measure how voters perceive the distinct organizational capacity of parties. That is, we need measures of organizational capacity that voters observe and may use to form clientelistic and programmatic distributive expectations. To this end, we take advantage of a survey strategy first proposed by Christopher McCarthy (2000) that can be used to estimate the prevalence of groups that are sparsely represented in the population.

#### ***Using Survey Data to Measure the Size of Political Networks***

To measure the size and structure of political networks, we use a survey design that considers every respondent in the sample as an *observer* who discloses information about the number of ties between him/her and various party member categories. The survey is designed with questions of the form "how many X do you know," asking each respondent to provide counts of groups whose frequencies in the population are known ("How many individuals do you know whose name is *Silvia*?") and counts of groups whose frequencies in the population we seek to estimate ("How many activists from the Socialist Party do you know?"). We instructed respondents that *knowing* someone means that "you know them, they know you, that you may contact them by phone, letter, or in person and that you have had some contact during the last two years." A tie or connection between the voter and a member of the target group, consequently, implies that there is an acquaintance relationship and that some type of interaction has occurred within the last two years.

In this survey design, we use the information about the known groups as *offsets* to rescale the parameters that measure the size of the respondents' personal networks. For example, if a respondent knows two *Silvias*, given that the relative prevalence of the name *Silvia* in the population in Argentina is 0.86 per cent, a naïve estimate of the respondent's personal network would be approximately  $\approx 232$

individuals ( $N_p = \frac{2}{.0086}$ ). Using a battery of questions about populations whose frequencies we know, and a slightly more sophisticated statistical model, we can estimate the size of each respondent's personal network.<sup>5</sup>

Once we estimate the size of the respondents' personal networks, a different set of questions asks about populations whose frequencies we are interested in retrieving, such as the number of activists or candidates from each relevant political party. We can use this information both to estimate the prevalence of each group in the population and to estimate how closely connected voters are to each group. For example, if the same respondent who knows two *Silvias* also knows one UCR (Radical Civic Union) activist, we could measure the relative prevalence of UCR activists as a fraction of the respondent's personal network ( $Activist_{UCR} = \frac{1}{Personal\ Network}$ ). Given that we previously estimated the respondent's personal network to be  $\approx 232$ , we could then estimate the number of UCR activists to be  $\approx 0.43$  percent of the Argentine population ( $Activist_{UCR} = \frac{1}{232}$ ), approximately 166,000 activists. The primary advantage of this survey strategy is the ability to retrieve valid samples from populations that are poorly represented among adult voters. It is important to notice that we expect that the reference categories (i.e. "Silvia") will not be correlated with the substantive group categories we are trying to analyze. By knowing the frequency distribution of name categories across different localities and populations we may retrieve proper estimates of personal network size. By contrast, we do not expect the frequencies of partisans to be the same across electoral districts and socio-economic categories. Proper estimates of the personal network, consequently, allow us to explore such substantive variation in the size, structure, and territorial distribution of the substantive network categories.<sup>6</sup>

### ***The Statistical Strategy: An Over-Dispersed Poisson Model***

Once we collect reported data on the raw counts of each subgroup for each respondent, we need a statistical model that will estimate all the parameters of interest. Zheng, Salganik and Gelman (2006) propose an overdispersed Poisson model that estimates both the size of the personal network and also allows us to explore the social structure in the data. The model estimates three sets of parameters: the



relative size of each respondent's personal network, the relative prevalence of each group in the population, and a parameter that explores individual-level deviations from the personal network and group prevalence. The over-dispersed Poisson model uses the count of individuals known to each respondent as the dependent variable and estimates three sets of latent parameters:

$$y_{ik} \sim \text{Poisson}(e^{\alpha_i + \beta_k + \delta_{ik}})$$

where  $\alpha_i$  describes the size of the personal network of respondent  $i$ ,  $\beta_k$  describes the expected prevalence of group  $k$  in the population, and the overdispersion parameter  $\delta_{ik}$  estimates a multiplicative factor with individual and group-level deviations from the personal network  $\alpha_i$  and group prevalence  $\beta_k$  (Gelman and Hill 2007). The vector of over-dispersed parameters,  $\delta_{1k}, \dots, \delta_{nk}$ , provides *critical information about individual-level deviations from the overall group prevalence*, allowing us to study the social structure of networks—how different political categories relate to each other— by comparing the over-dispersion parameters of individuals for different groups. That is, we can assess whether respondents with more ties to a party network, conditional on the size of their personal network, are also associated with other political attitudes that we want to explore (e.g. such as their ideological distance from a political party).<sup>7</sup>

#### **4. Ideology and Partisan Networks in Chile and Argentina**

We conducted surveys in Chile and Argentina to measure the size and structure of partisan networks as well as to assess the effect of programmatic and network linkages on the distributive expectations of voters. We selected Chile and Argentina because these countries have party systems that have been characterized as predominantly programmatic and clientelistic, respectively. Chile and Argentina also allow us to control for the effect of other contextual variables that have been theorized to affect voter-party linkages. Both countries have democratized recently—1983 and 1990, respectively—and have well-established mass-parties, which rely on clearly identifiable party labels and on their power over candidate nominations. Both countries have a Presidential executive, multiparty environment, similar levels of economic development, and common ethnic, religious and cultural legacies.

We conducted two nationally representative surveys with 2800 cases each, sampling individuals in cities with populations over 40,000 in Chile and 10,000 in Argentina. The survey contains three modules, including questions designed to measure the (i) size of political networks, (ii) political behavior of voters, and (iii) socio-demographic status of respondents.

The first module was subdivided into two parts. The first part asked respondents about populations with known frequencies (i.e. names, professions, life events) that satisfy three criteria: they have to be easily and unambiguously identified by voters, reduce variation within electoral districts, and have prevalence ranges between 0.1% and 2% in the overall population (ideally around 0.5%) to minimize recall distortions. We chose these rates because respondents tend to under-recall categories that are very common in the population and over-recall group categories that are very uncommon (Gelman and Hill 2007; McCarty et al. 2000). Based on those criteria, we used approximately fifteen questions referring to categories for which we knew the prevalence rate.<sup>8</sup>

The second part of the first module asked for counts of populations whose frequencies we were interested in retrieving, such as the number of political activists from the most important parties and the number of individuals receiving handouts from each party. The following two modules center on political attitudes, including ideological self-placement and ideological placement of the main political parties whereas the last module includes questions about socio-demographic characteristics that should affect distributive preferences. The survey, thus, allowed us to retrieve the main variables of interest to measure the impact of ideological distance, partisan networks, and skill endowments on voters' distributive expectations in Chile and Argentina.

### ***Ideology and Party-Voter Linkages***

The existing comparative literature suggests that Chilean voters can more easily identify the ideology of political parties than Argentine voters (Kitschelt et al. 2010). In Chile, scholars recognize two well-defined ideological coalitions that have characterized elections since the plebiscite that preceded democratization in 1988. The center-left coalition, *Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia* (Coalition of Parties for Democracy), which won the first four democratic presidential elections since

1989 and lost one in 2010, includes three main parties: the Socialist Party (PS), the Christian Democratic Party (DC), and the Party for Democracy (PPD). The center-right coalition, *Alianza por Chile* (Alliance for Chile), includes two parties: the National Renovation (RN), heir to the old conservative party called National Party, and the Independent Democratic Union (UDI) created in 1987 by close associates of Pinochet's military regime (Huneus 2007). Although RN and UDI ran separate campaigns in the 2005 election, they coordinated their legislative races and presented a joint presidential candidate in all other elections, including the 2010 election, when they won the presidency.

Descriptive results from our survey provide support for this view. The Chilean voters in our survey could readily identify the ideological location of parties in a dominant left-right dimension. As shown in Figure 1, a majority identifies the PS on the left of the political spectrum, with seventy percent of respondents placing the party as outright left (40.3 percent) or center-left (30 percent). Seventy-six percent of respondents identify the DC in the center and locate the PPD as center-left, between the PS and the DC. Respondents also clearly identify the RN and UDI by their ideological placement on the right of the political spectrum.

**<<Insert Figure 1>>**

By contrast, our survey confirms the difficulty of Argentine voters for the ideological placement of the two main Argentine political parties. Both the Radical Civic Union (UCR), born in the 1890s, and the *Partido Justicialista* (PJ), created by Juan Perón in the 1940s, were established as catch-all parties appealing to broad multi-class coalitions. As a result, neither party established clear ideological niches — even though the PJ has more extensive labor-based roots. Voters' perceptions in our survey reflect their ill-defined ideological features. The ideological mode of the PJ, located in a centrist position, only includes 21 percent of respondents; this increases to 47 percent if we combine the categories of center, center-left, and center-right. Similarly, the UCR mode includes only 18.4 percent of respondents, increasing to 45 percent if we include the categories of center, center-left, and center-right. The survey also reported a high number of non-responses to the ideology questions, with 36 percent of non-responses for the PJ and 40 percent for the UCR. Two newer but politically relevant parties are also described in

Figure 1. The Alliance for a Republic of Equality (ARI) and Republican Proposal (PRO) display better defined ideological profiles, catered to voters on the center-left and center-right, respectively. Overall, ideological cues are more useful for identifying the distributive behavior of parties for Chilean rather than Argentine voters.

### ***Party Organization and Party-Voter Linkages***

In assessing the impact of partisan networks on voters' distributive expectations, we first measure the size of party organization for the main political parties in both countries and found that the total number of political activists was quite similar, comprising roughly  $\approx 1.4$  percent of the population in Argentina and  $\approx 1.2$  percent in Chile (table 1). However, we found that the five Chilean political parties analyzed have organizations of similar size whereas the playing field was quite uneven in Argentina. That is, estimates from the respondents counts of partisans shows that all Chilean political parties have roughly similar contingents of activists. The Socialist Party has the largest network, including approximately 45,000 activists (0.356 percent of the Chilean population). The PS, however, is not much larger than their competitors, the Christian Democrats (0.299 percent), the PPD (0.2 percent), the UDI (0.2 percent), and the smaller RN (0.147 percent). By contrast, the number of Peronists (PJ) activists is considerable larger than all other parties in Argentina. The PJ has around 291,000 activists (0.766 percent of the population), which is twice as many as the number of UCR activists ( $\approx 160,000$  or 0.42 percent of the population), and both the PJ and the UCR are several times larger than the PRO and ARI.<sup>9</sup> In sum, our survey suggests that although parties in both countries had political organizations that they could deploy for either programmatic or clientelistic strategies, in Argentina, the PJ, and to a lesser extent, the UCR, have an advantage vis-à-vis their competitors in reaching constituencies. As voters have difficulties using ideological cues for identifying those parties, the capacity of these networks to deliver benefits should be crucial in shaping voters' distributive expectations.

**<<Insert Table 1>>**

Table 1 also reports the estimated size of handout recipients for all political parties.<sup>10</sup> This number is considerably larger for recipients of handout delivered by Peronists (0.48 percent of the

population). The number of individuals receiving handouts from the Peronists is two and half times larger than those receiving handouts from the UCR (0.19 percent of the population) and many times larger than those of all other parties. The data also shows that partisan networks grow and decay slowly over time, as shown by UCR networks that are considerably larger than expected given their weak electoral performances since 2001. As described by UCR Senator and former presidential candidate Leopoldo Moreau:

*“...the Radicalism is a party that keeps its organization. Because it is true that each town has a priest...it is a network that was developed in more than a hundred years, it cannot collapse overnight. It can have ups and downs, it can go forward or backward, but it does not disappear overnight”*

*Leopoldo Moreau, personal interview with the authors, 2009.*

Partisan networks in Chile have roughly similar sizes, with the PS enjoying a small advantage in reported number of activists and the UDI enjoying a small advantage in reported number of handout recipients. Our findings fall in line with recent research that describes the UDI as the Chilean party that most actively distributes clientelistic goods during elections (Luna 2010). Still, the network of handout distribution of the UDI is significantly smaller than those of the PJ and the UCR. Consequently, the ratio of partisan networks to distribution networks in Chile is significantly smaller than that observed for the UCR, and especially the PJ in Argentina.

### ***Political Parties and Distributive Practices***

Our theory posits that the type of party-voter linkage explains differences in voters' distributive expectations. In the previous section we describe a number of within and across country similarities in the size and structure of partisan networks in Argentina and Chile. In particular, we have shown the relatively even competition among the main Chilean political parties in contrast to the broader reach of the UCR and especially the PJ networks of activists in Argentina. Additionally, significant differences exist in how voters perceive the programmatic stance of parties. Our survey results show the difficulties of Argentine voters to place the PJ and the UCR in their ideological space --as opposed to the two newer parties. By contrast, Chilean respondents in our survey more readily placed the different parties on the policy spectrum.

In addition to the organizational and ideological differences among political parties, cross-national variations among institutions that shape politicians' ability to appropriate resources for distribution to their constituencies further affects the formation of voters' distributive expectations. Due to existing institutional constraints, Chilean parties are more tightly regulated and face significant difficulties in allocating publicly funded goods through their political networks.<sup>11</sup> Furthermore, civil service rules in Chile should also inform voters that public sector jobs are excludable goods whose access is not mediated by networks (Bau Aedo 2005; Rehren 2000). As a result, we expect that Chilean voters will, on average, report a lower probability of receiving clientelistic goods through partisan networks.

By contrast, Guiraudi (2007) and Weitz-Shapiro (2006; 2008) provide evidence of significant discretion by Argentine public officials in the distribution of unemployment benefits and food assistance. Similarly, public sector jobs in Argentina are heavily politicized and depend on political contacts, thereby shaping voters' perceptions that the likelihood of obtaining a public sector job increases with their proximity to partisan networks (Szwarcberg 2008; Kemahlioglu 2006). These different practices in the implementation of the distribution of publicly-funded resources should thereby reinforce voters' perceptions about the role of networks in accessing benefits.

In sum, we expect variation both across and within political systems. At the country level, we expect that institutional constraints will inform the distributive expectations of voters, such that Chilean respondents will weigh down the role of partisan networks compared to respondents in the Argentine survey. Additionally, we expect that Chilean voters of all five parties will be more likely to develop distributive expectations that are informed by their ideological affinity to parties, which is unconstrained by partisan networks and reinforced by their prior historical experiences. Meanwhile, we expect Argentine voters to be less likely to rely on ideological affinity and more on connections to party networks when informing their distributive expectations vis-à-vis the PJ and UCR. By contrast, ideological cues should be more useful in informing such expectations with regards to the PRO and the ARI. We now turn to empirical tests of these expectations based on the methodology described above.

## 5. Political Linkages and Voters' Distributive Expectations

In this section we test the influence of ideological affinity and proximity to party members on voters' expectations of receiving excludable goods. We take advantage of three survey questions asking voters about the likelihood of receiving handouts, such as clothing, food, other material benefits (*clientelism*); being offered a job in the public sector (*patronage*); or witnessing increased public investment in her/his community (*pork*) if a given party wins the election. The first question asked respondents to indicate on a ten-point scale, "how likely would it be that, after winning the election, [Party  $j$ ] would provide him or her with food, clothing, money, or other material benefits?" A similarly worded question asked "how likely would it be that, after winning the election, [Party  $j$ ] would provide him or her with a job in the public sector?" (*patronage*). Finally, the third question asked "how likely would it be that, after winning the election, [Party  $j$ ] would invest in the public works required by the community?" (*pork*). We include a question on attitudes about delivering by parties each of these private goods in order to control for the bias of individuals regarding such distribution. Using the responses to these questions as dependent variables, we run ordered beta regression models for each party and estimate whether ideological distance and proximity to party members explains the perceived propensity to receive goods, jobs, or public works.<sup>12</sup>

We test for the effect of our two main independent variables: (i) the relative proximity of voters to party activists, and (ii) the self-reported ideological distance between voters and parties. The proximity of voters to political activists is measured by the *relative* number of ties between voters and party activists. We define this as a relative rather than an absolute measure of proximity, given that it adjusts for difference in personal network size for each respondent and group prevalence in the population. Such information is captured by the overdispersion parameters  $\delta'_{ik}$  in equation (4), which measures logged deviations from the average number of ties once we adjust for the size of the respondent's personal network and the prevalence of each party group in the population. For example, an estimate of the respondent's proximity to a Peronist activists of  $\delta'_{i,pj} = \exp(0.69) = 2$ , indicates that the respondent

knows twice as many Peronist activists as one would expect given the group prevalence and his/her personal network size. We also include as an independent variable the parameter measuring proximity between each respondent and candidates of each party. While we estimate all models using the normalized distance to each party networks, results using the raw counts by respondents produce substantively similar result.<sup>13</sup>

In testing for the determinants of the distributive expectations of voters, we measure the effects of two main sets of independent variables. Our first independent variable tests for the effect that proximity to the network of activists and candidates has on distributive expectations. We expect the relationship to be positive, with higher proximity to partisan networks increasing the perceived probability of receiving goods. However, we anticipate this effect to be stronger among Argentine respondents and in particular for the PJ and UCR partisan networks. We expect that network proximity will be a weaker predictor of distributive expectations among Chilean voters and for the newer Argentine political parties with less extensive organizations.

Our second independent variable measures the ideological distance from respondents to parties. This variable is measured by taking the absolute distance between the self-reported ideological location of each respondent and the respondent reported location of each party:  $Ideology(k) = |x_i - s_k|$ . We expect ideological distance to have a negative effect on the distributive expectations of respondents —with voters that are more distant from the reported ideological location of a party resulting in lower expectation of perceiving benefits. However, we expect this effect to be stronger in Chile and for the smaller Argentine parties due to the already mentioned differences in the importance of ideology as an informational shortcut.

We also add as controls a number of independent variables that shape the marginal returns of respondents to the distribution of excludable goods. We include as controls a battery of respondent specific variables measuring personal network size ( $ln$ ), the educational level of the respondents, socio-economic status, age ( $ln$ ), and gender. We use education and income to assess socio-economic traits of respondents. Lower education and income are expected to increase the marginal utility of the perceiving



benefits. Consistent with existing research, we expect the effect of education on the utility of a public sector jobs to increase at lower levels of education and to decrease at higher levels of education. We have no clear expectations about the effect of education on the expected benefits from higher investment in public works. We hold no particular theoretical expectations about the respondent's age, gender or gregariousness either.

Beyond the pocketbook benefits of distribution for each respondent in the sample, we also expect sociotropic evaluations in regards to the desirability of distributing goods. Because voters have different perceptions of how appropriate it is that parties distribute handouts, public jobs and public works; we include an independent variable that asks respondents to express their positive or negative feelings in regards to the distribution of handouts, public sector jobs, and public works.<sup>14</sup> To assess the impact of institutional differences in the distribution of publicly-funded benefits mentioned above, we include the proximity of respondents to the network of beneficiaries for two workfare programs with similar design and locally decentralized implementation: *Chile Solidario* (Chile) and *Jefes y Jefas* (Argentina). Because these are cash-transfer programs, we expect they should have a positive effect on distributive expectations regarding handouts. Due to cross national differences in the delivery of publicly-funded benefits, however, we expect these effects to be significant in Argentina, but not in Chile. We also control for proximity of individuals to party members involved in the party primaries. We expect that proximity to individuals involved in primaries will have a positive effect on distributive expectations because the literature on Argentina associates clientelism with participation in primaries, given that it is easier to monitor turnout than in the general elections where vote is compulsory.

### ***Empirical Results***

Tables 2 and 3 present the estimates of the beta regression models for Chile and Argentina. All coefficient estimates of the beta regression models can be interpreted as OLS coefficients, with a one unit of variation in the independent variable leading to the estimated coefficient change in the reported likelihood of receiving handouts, a public sector job, or the public works that the community needs.<sup>15</sup> For example, a one point increase in ideological distance from the PS in Chile would result in a 3.46%

decrease in the likelihood of receiving a handout from that party. In both tables the first set of five columns describes model estimates measuring the expectations of receiving handouts from each of the main five parties; the second set of five columns describes the expectation of being offered a public sector job; and the third set of five columns describes the expectation that parties will invest in the public works that the community requires. We discuss the results comparing distributive expectations for each type of good in both countries in order to assess the weight of programmatic and clientelistic linkages.

The statistical results provide a wealth of information, broadly supporting the hypotheses detailed before. A visual comparison of the effect of ideological distance and network proximity on the expectations of receiving goods (Figure 2) shows that proximity to party activists of the PJ is a statistically significant predictor of the respondents' expectation of receiving handouts, a public sector job, and public works from that same party. Similarly, proximity to the UCR network of activists increases the expectations for receiving handouts, jobs and public works among UCR voters. The figures show no evidence that proximity to activists of the smaller parties in Argentina raises the expectation of receiving handouts.

**<<Insert Figure 2>>**

Figure 2 also shows that proximity to party activists has no effect on the distributive expectations of handout delivery among Chilean voters whereas ideological distance remains a strong predictor for all three Concertación parties. Differences between large and small parties in Argentine and across respondents from Argentina and Chile are more noticeable in regards to the delivery of handouts and patronage jobs. By contrast, in both countries results show that both ideological distance and network proximity are important determinants of the expectations of receiving the “public works that the community needs” (although the magnitude of the effect is weaker for the Argentine PJ).

**<<Insert Table 2>>**

**<<Insert Table 3>>**

As shown in Table 2, ideological distance is statistically significant (and in the expected negative direction) when explaining the voter's expectation of being offered handouts by parties from the

*Concertación* in Chile. The greater the ideological distance to the voter, the less likely s/he expects to receive targeted benefits. The effect of ideological distance is statistically significant for all parties of the *Concertación*, leading to a decline of  $\approx 3.5\%$  in the expectation of receiving handouts from the PS or the DC for every unit of increase in ideological distance measured in a ten point scale. The effect is more moderate for the of PPD ( $\approx 2$ ) and statistically insignificant for the parties on the right, UDI and the DC, consistent with a political discourse that deemphasizes distribution in favor of market coordination. Proximity to party activists, by contrast, has no statistically significant effect on the distributive expectation of receiving handouts from any of the five political parties in Chile. Against our expectations, socioeconomic status and education fail to achieve statistical significance among Chilean voters. This result is consistent, though, with qualitative work showing that Chilean parties distribute different types of goods and services catering to populations of different socioeconomic status.<sup>16</sup> By contrast, as expected, neither the proximity to beneficiaries of *Chile Solidario* nor to individuals participating in party primaries increase the perceived likelihood of receiving handouts among Chilean voters. Finally, the respondent's view of redistribution has the expected positive effect whereas population density has a significant positive effect for all parties, thus suggesting the targeting of voters in larger cities.

Table 3 shows that in Argentina, by contrast, ideological distance has no significant effect on the respondents' expectations of receiving handouts from the PJ or the UCR, while proximity to party activists has a strong and positive effect both for the PJ and the UCR. Neither ideology nor proximity to activists explains the distributive expectations of ARI voters, while ideology to party activists is a significant predictor of distributive expectations for the PRO. As expected, we also found a significant effect from proximity to beneficiaries of the Jefes & Jefas program for the PJ. Other control variables have the expected effects. A more positive view of the distribution of handouts is associated with higher expectations of receiving these goods and proximity to the individuals involved in party primaries increases distributive expectations of receiving handouts from the PJ among respondents. In contrast to Chile, we find that population density has a negative effect suggesting the targeting of smaller localities in line with earlier findings by Brusco et al. (2004). Finally, in Argentina higher socioeconomic status has

both a negative and statistically significant effect on expected benefits perceived from all parties (with the poorest category of voters as the baseline).

Distributive expectations regarding public sector jobs show similar patterns to those of handouts. The perceived likelihood of being offered a job in the public sector decreases with ideological distance for all five Chilean parties and increases with socioeconomic status for the PPD and UDI—the effect is positive but not significant for the DC, PS and RN. Proximity to party activists has a statistically significant effect only in regards to the PS and the PPD.

In Argentina the perceived likelihood of being offered a public job increases as respondents are more connected to the networks of both activists and candidates of the PJ and UCR. The effect is also stronger for jobs than for handouts. These results suggests that jobs are more likely than handouts to go to core supporters who serve as brokers getting votes for the party rather than being persuaded to cast a ballot in return for handouts. For the PJ, knowing one standard deviation more activists than the prevalence rate increases the expectation of being offered a public sector job by 8.65%. The effect is more moderate for the UCR, producing an increase of 5.26% if the respondent knows one standard deviation more activists than the prevalence rate. Control variables have the expected effects. As with handouts, proximity to the network of PJ primaries has a positive and significant effect. Population density has a significant negative effect as well for both the PJ and the UCR, in line with the literature that shows the dependence of the population of less urbanized provinces on public employment in Argentina (Gibson and Calvo 2000).

Lastly, we analyze expectations about the delivery of public works if a party wins the respondent's district. Our expectations were less clear in this case due to the non-excludable nature of public works at the local level, and we find voters in both countries identify both networks and ideology as mechanisms for perceiving the distribution of public goods. In both Chile and Argentina, ideological distance and proximity to party members have the expected effects—although the effect of networks is not significant for the Chilean DC and RN. In Chile, the effect of socioeconomic status is positive although its significance varies. In line with that, the impact of the workfare program *Chile Solidario* is

negative and significant for the three Concertación parties. In Argentina, it is worth noting the decline in the importance of socio-economic variables and the positive effect of education except for the PJ. That is, socioeconomic status seems to have no effect on the expectations of voters about receiving public works in their communities, but less educated voters with traditional ties to Peronists perceive the PJ as more likely to deliver on pork for their localities. Finally, the network of primary participants has a positive effect for the Concertación parties in Chile and for the Argentine PJ. This association of public works with political participation in primaries is consistent with the literature on Argentina showing that participation in Peronist primaries (and public meetings) can easily be monitored by majors and rewarded through the allocation of public works, especially during election time. However, it has not been previously identified for Chile, even though it affected the three incumbent parties at the time.

In sum, Chilean voters consistently use ideological cues when forming their distributive expectations for all types of goods—even handouts for the Concertación parties. Meanwhile Argentine voters rely more heavily on their proximity to PJ and UCR activists when forming their distributive expectations for handouts and jobs, whereas the effect declines for public work, which is the least excludable of all three types of goods at the local level. Ideological distance shapes distributive expectations from the PRO for the three types of goods. That is, in Argentina, the impact of political networks is different for the two more established political parties due to their more extensive organizational capacity and the difficulties to locate these parties ideologically. These results suggest that even though both countries rely extensively on political networks, such networks play a larger role in defining the distributive expectations for Argentine voters regarding the PJ and UCR. Our findings confirm cross-national predictions regarding the different types of party-voter linkages (programmatic or clientelistic), despite the recent debate among Chilean scholars in regards to the increasing influence of clientelism. Although we find evidence of clientelism in Chile in line with recent work (Luna 2010), our results show that Chilean voters continue to rely on ideological cues even when defining their expectations about handouts. The fact that we do not find this effect for the UDI regarding handouts further confirms Luna’s argument that their ideological constituencies finance the distribution of handouts

to ideologically distant voters. Finally, our results show that both partisan networks and ideology influence the distributive expectations regarding public works in both countries due to their less excludable character at the local level.

## **V. Conclusion**

In this article we propose a new conceptualization of programmatic or clientelistic political linkages based on the distributive expectations of voters. From the point of view of voters, we argued, clientelistic and programmatic parties differ in how different types of goods are delivered. In the former case, voters expect handouts, public sector jobs, and public works will be delivered through activist networks. In the latter case, voters anticipate that goods will be delivered by public policy when parties that are ideologically proximate have access to public resources. To test our model, we propose a new methodology that measures party-voter linkages both in ideological and organizational terms. This contribution to the comparative study of political parties is then tested in two countries, showing variation both across and within party systems.

The main contributions of this study are twofold. First, it emphasizes the value of focusing on “access” to publicly funded benefits to assess the “voter side” of party-voter linkages and predict patterns of variation in such linkages. In particular, it explores how organizational capacity and ideological identification (across parties) and institutional constraints on policy discretion (across countries) shape those linkages. Second, it provides a new comparative methodology for measuring party-voter linkages that can be applied to other cases and could also be extended to non-partisan distributive networks.

This article provides an important contribution for assessing party-voter linkages from the perspective of voters by focusing on the type of access to excludable goods. Political parties provide a portfolio of both non-excludable and excludable goods to voters. However, the mechanisms determining access to excludable goods—either through some general policy criteria or through political networks—shape voters’ perceptions of subsequent iterations in benefit distribution. Voters need to define their own

distributive expectations regarding both types of goods in order to act upon those expectations when casting their ballots.

It is important to emphasize that it is the imprint of *access* to excludable benefits that shapes voters' expectations by generating predictability in distribution patterns. However, differences in access to benefits are not only defined at the level of institutional constraints that generate variation across political system, but also by differences in the organizational capacity and endowment of fiscal resources within political systems. Hence, in classifying party-voter linkages it is important to consider that parties provide different types of good, and voters will value access to both non-excludable and excludable goods, depending on their own experiences and the marginal value of the benefit for them.

Moreover, we present an innovative methodology that allows cross-sectional comparisons on party-voter linkages based on patterns of access to publicly funded benefits. This methodology allows us to measure the size and structure of partisan networks as well as to estimate the effect of network and ideological proximity on voters' distributive expectations. The estimates we derive provide a crucial comparative tool in measuring the nature of party-voter linkages across different contexts. This methodology can be applied in other contexts to uncover political linkages between parties and voters. Moreover, it can also be applied to non-party networks. For instance, in contexts where the origin of networks for distribution of publicly-provided benefits is not a political party but a religious or ethnic organization, we expect this methodology to be able to assess the impact of such networks on voters' distributive expectations. Indeed, this methodology could be used to test whether the electoral impact of such ascriptive categories is based on descriptive identification or access to excludable benefits, which is a critical debate in the extant literature on identity politics.

To conclude, this article provides a new way of understanding party-voter linkages by showing that parties generate different distributive expectations for voters, who have different sensitivities to their proximity to party members. We believe that future work on distributive politics needs to devote effort to exploring not only differences in the voters' distributive demands based on the impact of different types of access to such benefits, but also on the effect that access to benefits has on the determinants of

individual vote choice. Future work should focus on the electoral strategies of political parties given different voters' expectations, institutional constraints, and diverse endowments of organizational capacity and fiscal resources.



**Table 1: Rate of Prevalence of Political Group as a Share of the Population & in Absolute Numbers in Chile and Argentina**

POLITICAL NETWORK				POLITICAL NETWORK			
Total Number of Members				Percentage of the Population			
CHILE		ARGENTINA		CHILE		ARGENTINA	
Candidates PS	26,711	Candidates PJ	125,376	Candidates PS	0.177	Candidates PJ	0.330
Activists PS	53,880	Activist PJ	290,930	Activists PS	0.356	Activists PJ	0.766
Candidates DC	21,074	Candidates UCR	69,532	Candidates DC	0.139	Candidates UCR	0.183
Activists DC	45,221	Activists UCR	159,684	Activists DC	0.299	Activists UCR	0.420
Candidates PPD	15,077	Candidates ARI	9,908	Candidates PPD	0.100	Candidates ARI	0.026
Activists PPD	30,257	Activists ARI	21,463	Activists PPD	0.200	Activists ARI	0.056
Candidates UDI	16,022	Candidates PRO	4,257	Candidates UDI	0.106	Candidates PRO	0.011
Activists UDI	30,031	Activists PRO	10,853	Activists UDI	0.199	Activists PRO	0.029
Candidates RN	13,130	Candidates PPP	18,060	Candidates RN	0.087	Candidates PPP	0.048
Activists RN	22,283	Activists PPP	41,079	Activists RN	0.147	Activists PPP	0.108
Recipients of Handouts PS	17,249	Recipients of Handouts PJ	185,052	Recipients of Handouts PS	0.114	Recipients of Handouts PJ	0.487
Recipients of Handouts DC	19,485	Recipients of Handouts UCR	72,472	Recipients of Handouts DC	0.129	Recipients of Handouts UCR	0.191
Recipients of Handouts PPD	11,614	Recipients of Handouts PRO	10,074	Recipients of Handouts PPD	0.077	Recipients of Handouts PRO	0.027
Recipients of Handouts UDI	23,377	Recipients of Handouts ARI	6,535	Recipients of Handouts UDI	0.155	Recipients of Handouts ARI	0.017
Recipients of Handouts RN	16,479	Recipients of Handouts PPP	23,893	Recipients of Handouts RN	0.109	Recipients of Handouts PPP	0.063

**Table 2: Distributive Expectations, Ideological Distance, and Proximity to Party Members in Chile**

	"Expects to Receive Goods, Money or other material"					"Expects to Receive a Public Sector Job"					"Expects public works in the Community"				
	PS	DC	PPD	UDI	RN	PS	DC	PPD	UDI	RN	PS	DC	PPD	UDI	RN
Constant	0.8824 (1.750)	-0.5458 (1.748)	-0.0905 (1.738)	0.6315 (1.858)	1.2317 (1.846)	0.9566 (1.734)	0.3669 (1.718)	0.8525 (1.695)	-0.9143 (1.740)	-0.817 (1.718)	0.7732 (1.891)	-0.798 (1.821)	-0.8582 (1.833)	-1.4121 (1.864)	-1.6033 (1.865)
Ideology	<b>-0.0346***</b> (0.007)	<b>-0.0354***</b> (0.008)	<b>-0.0212***</b> (0.008)	-0.0032 (0.007)	-0.0055 (0.007)	<b>-0.0424***</b> (0.007)	<b>-0.0389***</b> (0.008)	<b>-0.0266***</b> (0.007)	<b>-0.0191***</b> (0.007)	<b>-0.0188***</b> (0.007)	<b>-0.0531***</b> (0.008)	<b>-0.047***</b> (0.008)	<b>-0.0384***</b> (0.008)	<b>-0.0301***</b> (0.007)	<b>-0.0306***</b> (0.007)
Network of Candidates	0.0084 (0.036)	0.0068 (0.038)	0.0521 (0.045)	-0.0174 (0.047)	-0.0553 (0.050)	0.0182 (0.035)	0.0076 (0.037)	-0.0187 (0.044)	-0.0108 (0.043)	-0.0446 (0.045)	0.0391 (0.038)	0.0171 (0.039)	<b>0.1125**</b> (0.046)	<b>0.1177**</b> (0.046)	<b>0.08*</b> (0.048)
Network of Activists	0.0348 (0.027)	0.0219 (0.028)	0.0232 (0.032)	0.0478 (0.034)	0.0199 (0.038)	<b>0.0503*</b> (0.027)	0.0375 (0.028)	<b>0.0972***</b> (0.030)	-0.0023 (0.032)	0.033 (0.035)	<b>0.0832***</b> (0.029)	-0.0059 (0.029)	<b>0.0809**</b> (0.033)	<b>0.0894***</b> (0.033)	0.0485 (0.038)
Age	-1.1127 (0.943)	-0.3609 (0.941)	-0.5803 (0.936)	-0.9701 (1.001)	-1.2792 (0.994)	-1.0585 (0.935)	-0.905 (0.925)	-1.0634 (0.913)	-0.1705 (0.937)	-0.3067 (0.925)	-0.7866 (1.018)	-0.1313 (0.979)	-0.0357 (0.986)	0.1529 (1.003)	0.2183 (1.003)
Age Sq	0.1243 (0.127)	0.0256 (0.126)	0.0511 (0.126)	0.1102 (0.134)	0.1504 (0.133)	0.1049 (0.125)	0.0942 (0.124)	0.1107 (0.123)	-0.0014 (0.126)	0.0184 (0.124)	0.0794 (0.136)	0.002 (0.131)	-0.0214 (0.132)	-0.036 (0.134)	-0.0415 (0.134)
Women	0.012 (0.035)	0.0348 (0.035)	0.0232 (0.035)	0.034 (0.037)	0.0319 (0.037)	0.0221 (0.035)	0.0519 (0.034)	0.0377 (0.034)	-0.0091 (0.035)	0.0065 (0.034)	0.0272 (0.037)	0.0376 (0.036)	0.021 (0.036)	0.0361 (0.037)	0.0263 (0.037)
Personal Network	<b>0.0463*</b> (0.024)	<b>0.0405*</b> (0.024)	0.0348 (0.024)	0.0164 (0.025)	0.019 (0.025)	<b>0.0543**</b> (0.024)	<b>0.0668***</b> (0.024)	0.0341 (0.023)	<b>0.0402*</b> (0.024)	<b>0.0521**</b> (0.023)	<b>0.0528**</b> (0.026)	<b>0.0691***</b> (0.025)	<b>0.0688***</b> (0.025)	<b>0.0687***</b> (0.025)	<b>0.0639**</b> (0.025)
Network of Chile Solidarios	-0.032 (0.022)	-0.0271 (0.022)	-0.0243 (0.021)	-0.0208 (0.023)	-0.027 (0.023)	<b>-0.0429**</b> (0.022)	-0.0181 (0.021)	-0.0238 (0.021)	-0.0058 (0.021)	-0.0045 (0.021)	<b>-0.0948***</b> (0.023)	<b>-0.0507**</b> (0.022)	<b>-0.0884***</b> (0.023)	-0.0365 (0.023)	-0.0283 (0.023)
Network of Primaries	0.0017 (0.025)	0.0134 (0.025)	0.0011 (0.024)	0.0337 (0.025)	0.039 (0.025)	0.0397 (0.025)	0.0327 (0.024)	<b>0.0456**</b> (0.023)	0.0102 (0.024)	0.0108 (0.023)	<b>0.0846***</b> (0.027)	<b>0.1074***</b> (0.025)	<b>0.0684***</b> (0.025)	0.0188 (0.025)	0.0293 (0.025)
Education (High School)	-0.0055 (0.011)	0.0112 (0.011)	0.0144 (0.011)	<b>0.0243**</b> (0.011)	<b>0.0194*</b> (0.011)	0.0041 (0.011)	0.015 (0.011)	<b>0.0178*</b> (0.010)	<b>0.0175*</b> (0.011)	0.0172 (0.011)	0.0186 (0.011)	<b>0.0212*</b> (0.011)	<b>0.0249**</b> (0.011)	<b>0.0297***</b> (0.011)	<b>0.0269**</b> (0.011)
Status high	-0.0335 (0.044)	-0.0219 (0.044)	-0.021 (0.044)	-0.0315 (0.046)	-0.0263 (0.046)	0.0005 (0.044)	0.012 (0.043)	0.0269 (0.042)	-0.0305 (0.043)	-0.0335 (0.043)	0.0584 (0.047)	0.0312 (0.045)	0.0599 (0.045)	0.0276 (0.046)	0.0237 (0.046)
Status Medium	0.0067 (0.056)	-0.0587 (0.056)	-0.0636 (0.056)	<b>-0.1063*</b> (0.060)	-0.0597 (0.059)	-0.0048 (0.056)	-0.047 (0.055)	-0.0123 (0.055)	-0.0251 (0.056)	-0.0243 (0.055)	0.0015 (0.060)	-0.0083 (0.058)	0.0031 (0.059)	<b>0.1311**</b> (0.059)	<b>0.1393**</b> (0.059)
Status Low	<b>0.1399*</b> (0.074)	0.0943 (0.073)	<b>0.1297*</b> (0.073)	0.0814 (0.078)	0.0873 (0.078)	0.0938 (0.073)	0.0891 (0.072)	0.1093 (0.071)	0.0867 (0.073)	0.0722 (0.073)	0.012 (0.080)	0.0539 (0.076)	0.0848 (0.077)	<b>0.1461*</b> (0.078)	<b>0.1469*</b> (0.078)
View of Redistribution	<b>0.1181***</b> (0.014)	<b>0.1085***</b> (0.014)	<b>0.1175***</b> (0.014)	<b>0.0755***</b> (0.015)	<b>0.0664***</b> (0.015)	<b>0.115***</b> (0.014)	<b>0.0807***</b> (0.011)	<b>0.0835***</b> (0.011)	<b>0.0742***</b> (0.011)	<b>0.0755***</b> (0.011)	<b>0.1242***</b> (0.012)	<b>0.1195***</b> (0.011)	<b>0.1238***</b> (0.011)	<b>0.0968***</b> (0.011)	<b>0.1016***</b> (0.011)
Size of Locality	<b>0.0338***</b> (0.010)	<b>0.0252**</b> (0.010)	<b>0.0206**</b> (0.010)	<b>0.0289***</b> (0.011)	<b>0.0203*</b> (0.011)	<b>0.0266***</b> (0.010)	<b>0.0174*</b> (0.010)	0.0128 (0.010)	0.0091 (0.010)	<b>0.0169*</b> (0.010)	-0.0078 (0.011)	-0.0091 (0.010)	-0.0061 (0.011)	0.001 (0.011)	0.0018 (0.011)
Phi (Precision)	<b>4.7028***</b> (0.122)	<b>4.738***</b> (0.123)	<b>4.8471***</b> (0.126)	<b>3.8008***</b> (0.097)	<b>3.9047***</b> (0.100)	<b>4.8175***</b> (0.125)	<b>5.0292***</b> (0.131)	<b>5.2746***</b> (0.138)	<b>4.9191***</b> (0.128)	<b>5.1564***</b> (0.135)	<b>3.4088***</b> (0.085)	<b>3.875***</b> (0.097)	<b>3.8049***</b> (0.095)	<b>3.6462***</b> (0.092)	<b>3.6496***</b> (0.092)
LogLik	1329.832	1316.382	1362.825	1105.984	1141.971	1405.434	1474.961	1432.353	1487.347	655.328	776.107	795.306	800.742	634.122	700.844
N	2718	2718	2718	2718	2718	2718	2718	2718	2718	2718	2718	2718	2718	2718	2718


Note: Beta regression model with a dependent variable ranging from 0 (not likely) to 1 (extremely likely).

**Table 3: Distributive Expectations, Ideological Distance, and Proximity to Party Members in Argentina**


	"Expects to Receive Goods, Money or other material"					"Expects to Receive a Public Sector Job"					"Expects public works in the Community"				
	PJ	UCR	ARI	PRO	PPP	PJ	UCR	ARI	PRO	PPP	PJ	UCR	ARI	PRO	PPP
Constant	-1.16 (1.092)	-0.932 (0.950)	-1.043 (0.889)	-1.345 (0.937)	-1.105 (0.940)	-0.406 (1.012)	-0.694 (0.880)	-1.124 (0.782)	<b>-1.362*</b> (0.802)	-1.008 (0.792)	-0.509 (1.059)	-0.975 (1.005)	-0.929 (0.951)	-0.657 (0.996)	-0.407 (0.970)
Ideology	0.001 (0.009)	0.001 (0.007)	0.008 (0.007)	<b>-0.018**</b> (0.007)	<b>-0.013*</b> (0.007)	-0.004 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.007)	0.008 (0.007)	<b>-0.017***</b> (0.006)	-0.005 (0.006)	<b>-0.024***</b> (0.009)	<b>-0.043***</b> (0.008)	<b>-0.042***</b> (0.008)	<b>-0.045***</b> (0.007)	<b>-0.052***</b> (0.007)
Network of Candidates	0.005 (0.026)	<b>0.075***</b> (0.025)	0 (0.033)	-0.019 (0.038)	<b>0.077**</b> (0.031)	<b>0.068***</b> (0.025)	<b>0.112***</b> (0.023)	-0.005 (0.030)	-0.004 (0.032)	<b>0.059**</b> (0.027)	<b>0.046*</b> (0.026)	<b>0.122***</b> (0.026)	-0.007 (0.035)	<b>0.174***</b> (0.040)	<b>0.093***</b> (0.032)
Network of Activists	0.426 (0.022)	0.403 (0.020)	0.264 (0.027)	0.468 (0.030)	0.498 (0.026)	0.058 (0.021)	0.153 (0.019)	0.095 (0.024)	0.243 (0.025)	0.096 (0.023)	0.102 (0.021)	0.641 (0.021)	0.269 (0.028)	0.135 (0.032)	0.118 (0.027)
Age	0.607 (0.607)	0.529 (0.529)	0.495 (0.495)	0.522 (0.522)	0.524 (0.524)	0.562 (0.562)	0.490 (0.490)	0.436 (0.436)	0.447 (0.447)	0.441 (0.441)	0.588 (0.588)	0.559 (0.559)	0.529 (0.529)	0.554 (0.554)	0.540 (0.540)
Age Sq	-0.098 (0.084)	-0.092 (0.073)	-0.063 (0.068)	-0.093 (0.072)	-0.105 (0.072)	-0.06 (0.078)	-0.055 (0.068)	-0.038 (0.060)	-0.058 (0.062)	-0.041 (0.061)	-0.034 (0.081)	-0.107 (0.077)	-0.046 (0.073)	-0.027 (0.076)	-0.036 (0.075)
Women	<b>0.066*</b> (0.040)	0.032 (0.035)	0.03 (0.033)	0.032 (0.034)	0.032 (0.034)	0.025 (0.038)	0.021 (0.033)	0.016 (0.030)	0.004 (0.030)	0.007 (0.030)	0.011 (0.039)	0.033 (0.037)	-0.025 (0.035)	-0.028 (0.037)	-0.027 (0.036)
Personal Network	<b>0.064**</b> (0.027)	0.002 (0.024)	<b>-0.037*</b> (0.022)	-0.028 (0.023)	-0.037 (0.023)	<b>0.067***</b> (0.026)	0.016 (0.023)	-0.009 (0.020)	-0.009 (0.020)	-0.001 (0.020)	<b>0.107***</b> (0.026)	0.013 (0.025)	-0.004 (0.023)	-0.016 (0.025)	0.025 (0.024)
Network of Jefes	<b>0.047**</b> (0.020)	<b>0.032*</b> (0.017)	0.007 (0.016)	0.009 (0.017)	0.003 (0.017)	-0.004 (0.019)	0.007 (0.017)	-0.013 (0.015)	-0.011 (0.015)	-0.014 (0.015)	0.001 (0.019)	-0.024 (0.018)	-0.008 (0.017)	-0.011 (0.018)	-0.022 (0.018)
Network of Primaries	<b>0.064***</b> (0.022)	-0.005 (0.019)	-0.001 (0.017)	-0.009 (0.018)	0.004 (0.018)	<b>0.045**</b> (0.021)	-0.007 (0.018)	-0.019 (0.015)	-0.01 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.016)	<b>0.088***</b> (0.022)	0.002 (0.019)	-0.012 (0.018)	-0.028 (0.019)	-0.01 (0.019)
Education (College)	-0.031 (0.069)	0.096 (0.061)	0.076 (0.057)	0.088 (0.059)	0.05 (0.060)	-0.079 (0.066)	<b>0.099*</b> (0.058)	0.037 (0.052)	0.03 (0.052)	0.007 (0.052)	0.014 (0.068)	<b>0.155**</b> (0.064)	<b>0.203***</b> (0.061)	<b>0.12*</b> (0.064)	0.101 (0.062)
Education (High School)	-0.015 (0.053)	0.036 (0.046)	0.044 (0.044)	0.04 (0.045)	0.02 (0.045)	-0.055 (0.050)	0.014 (0.045)	0.01 (0.039)	0.018 (0.039)	0.009 (0.040)	0.008 (0.052)	<b>0.084*</b> (0.049)	<b>0.103**</b> (0.047)	<b>0.091*</b> (0.049)	0.049 (0.048)
Status Low	<b>-0.217**</b> (0.095)	<b>-0.186**</b> (0.083)	<b>-0.177**</b> (0.078)	<b>-0.162**</b> (0.081)	<b>-0.218***</b> (0.081)	<b>-0.236***</b> (0.090)	<b>-0.179**</b> (0.079)	<b>-0.12*</b> (0.071)	-0.095 (0.071)	<b>-0.145**</b> (0.071)	0.111 (0.094)	0.063 (0.089)	-0.041 (0.085)	0 (0.089)	-0.071 (0.087)
Status Medium Low	<b>-0.262***</b> (0.101)	<b>-0.245***</b> (0.088)	<b>-0.188**</b> (0.082)	<b>-0.186**</b> (0.085)	<b>-0.234***</b> (0.086)	<b>-0.281***</b> (0.095)	<b>-0.192**</b> (0.084)	<b>-0.126*</b> (0.075)	-0.107 (0.075)	<b>-0.151**</b> (0.075)	0.113 (0.099)	0.013 (0.094)	-0.011 (0.089)	0.011 (0.094)	-0.05 (0.092)
Status Medium	<b>-0.316***</b> (0.104)	<b>-0.313***</b> (0.091)	<b>-0.214**</b> (0.085)	<b>-0.209**</b> (0.088)	<b>-0.282***</b> (0.089)	<b>-0.266***</b> (0.099)	<b>-0.21**</b> (0.087)	-0.122 (0.077)	-0.114 (0.077)	<b>-0.167**</b> (0.078)	0.083 (0.103)	0.064 (0.097)	-0.027 (0.092)	0.038 (0.097)	-0.076 (0.095)
Status Medium High	<b>-0.43***</b> (0.115)	<b>-0.355***</b> (0.101)	<b>-0.25***</b> (0.094)	<b>-0.269***</b> (0.098)	<b>-0.309***</b> (0.098)	<b>-0.343***</b> (0.109)	<b>-0.235**</b> (0.096)	-0.138 (0.085)	-0.13 (0.085)	<b>-0.164*</b> (0.086)	0.066 (0.113)	0.017 (0.107)	0.011 (0.102)	0.171 (0.107)	-0.003 (0.104)
Status high	<b>-0.463***</b> (0.133)	<b>-0.425***</b> (0.116)	<b>-0.313***</b> (0.109)	<b>-0.314***</b> (0.113)	<b>-0.4***</b> (0.114)	<b>-0.28**</b> (0.126)	<b>-0.298***</b> (0.111)	-0.157 (0.098)	-0.151 (0.098)	<b>-0.216**</b> (0.099)	0.118 (0.130)	0.074 (0.123)	0.138 (0.116)	<b>0.284**</b> (0.122)	0.063 (0.119)
View of Redistribution	<b>0.034***</b> (0.007)	<b>0.016***</b> (0.006)	<b>0.01**</b> (0.005)	0.003 (0.006)	0.005 (0.006)	<b>0.028***</b> (0.006)	<b>0.011*</b> (0.006)	<b>0.009*</b> (0.005)	0.008 (0.005)	<b>0.01**</b> (0.005)	<b>0.055***</b> (0.007)	<b>0.026***</b> (0.006)	<b>0.032***</b> (0.006)	<b>0.028***</b> (0.006)	<b>0.033***</b> (0.006)
Size of Locality	<b>-0.037**</b> (0.015)	<b>-0.085***</b> (0.014)	<b>-0.048***</b> (0.013)	<b>-0.04***</b> (0.013)	<b>-0.049***</b> (0.013)	<b>-0.04***</b> (0.015)	<b>-0.089***</b> (0.013)	<b>-0.043***</b> (0.011)	<b>-0.039***</b> (0.011)	<b>-0.049***</b> (0.012)	<b>-0.114***</b> (0.015)	<b>-0.164***</b> (0.014)	<b>-0.095***</b> (0.013)	<b>-0.079***</b> (0.014)	<b>-0.11***</b> (0.014)
Phi (Precision)	<b>3.288***</b> (0.084)	<b>5.527***</b> (0.147)	<b>7.33***</b> (0.198)	<b>6.536***</b> (0.176)	<b>6.225***</b> (0.168)	<b>4.039***</b> (0.105)	<b>6.676***</b> (0.180)	<b>10.61***</b> (0.289)	<b>10.639***</b> (0.290)	<b>10.199***</b> (0.278)	<b>3.281***</b> (0.081)	<b>4.124***</b> (0.105)	<b>5.083***</b> (0.132)	<b>4.315***</b> (0.112)	<b>4.649***</b> (0.121)
LogLik	641.765	1042.894	1294.637	1230.199	1188.455	790.610	1154.982	1611.684	1643.009	1604.477	247.631	492.715	707.125	634.122	700.844
N	2663	2663	2663	2663	2663	2663	2663	2663	2663	2663	2663	2663	2663	2663	2663

Note: Beta regression model with a dependent variable ranging from 0 (not likely) to 1 (extremely likely).

**Figure 1: Reported Ideological Location of Largest Political Parties in Chile and Argentina**



**Figure 2: Marginal Effect of Ideological Distance and Activists Networks on the Expectation of Receiving Handouts, a Public Sector Job, or Public Works for the Community**



Note: Plots describe the coefficient estimates in Tables 2 and 3, with confidence intervals at the 0.05 level (thin line) and at the .1 level (thick line).

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<sup>1</sup> As described by Lipset and Rokkan, cited by Wellhofer, organizational encapsulation is the strategy by which parties create secondary organizations to “claim allegiance of [the] voters in all social roles and therefore isolate them from disturbing cross-pressures.” (Wellhofer 1981; Lipset and Rokkan 1967).

<sup>2</sup> Early in the 1960s and 1970s, a broad literature on clientelism emerged, focusing on the notion of reciprocity (Banfield and Wilson 1963; Schmidt 1977; Scott 1972). By contrast, recent research has a more instrumental view of clientelism as a hard-to-enforce contract between independent patrons and clients (Cox and McCubbins 1986; Dixit and Londregan 1996, 1998; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Schaffer 2007; Stokes 2007).

<sup>3</sup> The recent literature has focused on the importance of networks to monitor voters (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Stokes 2005), screen likely voters (Cox and McCubbins 1986; Dixit and Londregan 1996, 1998; Cox 2007), mobilize supporters (Nichter 2008; Szwarcberg 2009), and coordinate electoral competition (Cox 2007).

<sup>4</sup> While in some contexts there may be multiplicative effects in the delivery of goods through networks and programmatic policies, the effect of ideology and proximity to party members have no statistically significant joint effect.

<sup>5</sup> For this research we selected names as reference categories that display minimum variance across electoral districts. This ensures that estimated territorial differences in the prevalence of different political categories are not a function of the distribution of names in the population. To select the names used as reference categories, we used the complete list of registered voters in both countries (approximately 18 million registered voters in Argentina and approximately 8 million voters in Chile). By knowing the distribution of the reference categories in the population, we can ensure that estimated differences in the prevalence rates of partisans are properly measure.

<sup>6</sup> An analysis of the territorial structure of partisan networks falls beyond the scope of this article. Further analyses and research on this issue can be requested from the authors.

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<sup>7</sup> It is important to note that model estimates that use the normalized proximity produced substantively similar estimates than those obtain using the raw data. In fact, the normalized results are conservative when compared to those using the raw counts of party members. Still, estimates using the raw counts carry information about differences in network size and should be expected to be biased. Consequently, we consider that the correct estimates need to be normalized as proposed by Gelman and Hill (Gelman and Hill 2007).

<sup>8</sup> The reference categories are not the same in both countries in order to minimize socio-economic and regional biases and to adjust for differences in prevalence rates. In Argentina, the names used were Silvia, Patricia, Antonio, Francisco, and Angel. Other categories included the number of individuals the respondent knows who work for the *police, as a teacher, medical doctors, receive work programs, had a son within the last year, married within the last year, or have a physical disability*. In Chile, the names were Gladys, Veronica, Marta, Sergio, Jaime, Ricardo, Eduardo, and we ask for individuals who work as *a professor, military, medical doctors, maid, receive Chile Solidario, had a son within the last year, died within the last year, married within the last year, or took their college entrance examination*. The names were taken from electoral rolls in each country while other prevalence rates were obtained from census data.

<sup>9</sup> For Argentina, all references to PPP in tables and figures correspond to the main provincial party in the province of the respondent. However, as we group all these parties together despite wide differences among them, we do not draw inferences from these findings.

<sup>10</sup> This measure is built like that of party activists using respondents as observers and thereby reduces the bias of self-reporting characteristic of measures about clientelitic distribution.

<sup>11</sup> Luna and Mardones (2009) have documented the limited discretion of Chilean politicians in the distribution of individually targeted social policies.

<sup>12</sup> We also estimated alternative models using OLS and Order Probit models, obtaining substantively similar results.

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<sup>13</sup> Results of all models using the raw counts reported by respondents are available upon request.

<sup>14</sup> In each model the independent variable measuring the positive or negative perception about parties' redistributive intent matches the type of good described by the dependent variable.

<sup>15</sup> Beta regression models also include an estimate of precision ( $\phi$ ), explaining overall variation in the dependent variable. If specified, precision can be explained by a set of covariates. In our specification, we estimate a single precision parameter per model with no covariates.

<sup>16</sup> Whereas the goods distributed range from food and medicines to farsightedness glasses for older voters, the services include those delivered by doctors, veterinarians, clowns, hairdressers and even tarot readers.