

Analyzing Legislative Success in Latin America:

The Case of Democratic Argentina¹

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Understanding the lawmaking process is important in order to make informed assessments about the distribution of political power in a democratic society. Since passing laws is a fundamental task of democratic governments, research that explains the driving forces in legislative politics helps us evaluate the performance of democratic institutions. During the last twenty years, analyses of executive-legislative relations and legislative politics in Latin America have grown exponentially.² In contrast to analyses from the 1970s, which tended to portray legislatures in developing countries as marginal actors in the lawmaking process, recent studies have portrayed Latin American legislatures as important institutional players.³ Taking advantage of new data on legislative output and sophisticated methodologies, political scientists have begun to investigate the effects of different institutional arrangements on legislative politics, including the conditions that affect the passage of legislation.⁴

The literature on legislative politics has identified numerous causes for the variation exhibited in the approval of policy proposals. Many of these hypotheses, however, remain untested in the context of Latin American presidential democracies. Understanding the forces that affect the actual passage of policy proposals is highly relevant for Latin Americanists. The potential for executive-legislative gridlock in the passage of legislation has been identified as a contributing factor in various instances of democratic breakdown, such as in the cases of Chile under Allende, Brazil under Goulart, and Peru under Belaúnde.⁵ The ability of presidents to enact their policy agenda is often associated with an effective government able to carry out the reforms of the day. The consideration of characteristics which lead Latin American legislators to be successful law initiators has been less prominent. Since individual legislators and political parties need to show policy results to advance their career and/or electoral goals, explaining the forces that make some more capable than others can also illuminate the sources of party achievements.

This study empirically examines the most prominent hypotheses about the passage of legislative proposals with a new data set which includes all bills introduced in the Argentine Congress between 1983 and 2001. Using this data, we provide a comprehensive overview of the mechanisms that drive the lawmaking process in this recently democratized country, including the determinants of the passage of legislation proposed by the president and by individual legislators.

In regards to presidential legislation, our analysis highlights the effects of public opinion, the electoral cycle, and inter-chamber differences in the likelihood that presidents will be able to push their agenda forward. Contrary to conventional expectations, we do not find a significant improvement in legislative success from achieving majority support in Congress. In the analysis of bills introduced by members of Congress, we examine individual characteristics of the proponents together with bill-specific and contextual factors. Our analysis shows significant effects from all of these categories. Particularly noteworthy are the consequences of having a fellow partisan capture the executive branch as well as achieving high tenure and a committee chairmanship.

The study is divided into five additional sections. In the next section we discuss the determinants of presidential legislative success. In section two we address the approval of bills introduced by individual representatives. In section three we present a dataset with over 30,000 bill initiatives introduced in the Argentine Congress between 1983 and 2001, and the different variables used in the statistical model. In section four we test the hypotheses presented in the first two sections using the dataset and model from section three. We conclude by discussing some general implications of our research.

1. PRESIDENTS IN THE LEGISLATIVE ARENA

The end of military dictatorships across Latin America brought about a renewed interest, among both scholars and policymakers, in the merits of different constitutional frameworks. This interest was reflected in the resurgence of the presidential-parliamentary debate during the late 1980s and early 1990s.⁶ A major theme of these studies was the “inherent problem” of presidential systems: the potential for inter-branch stalemate.⁷ The focus on the merits of each regime type soon shifted to the study of differences within presidentialism. Scholars began to explore how other variables (in addition to broad constitutional structure) affect the authority of Latin American presidents and the propensity for inter-branch conflict.⁸

Since different authors have focused on different aspects of the legislative process, it is difficult to find a comprehensive review of the disparate factors that

are thought to play a significant role. Below we summarize some of the most relevant arguments and then derive a series of testable hypotheses about the effect of several variables on the passage of presidential legislative proposals.

Presidential Support in Congress and Executive Decrees

One of the first major hypotheses to emerge from the new generation of institutionalist thought linked the composition of legislatures to the president's ability to affect policymaking. Mainwaring, in a pair of influential articles, argued that Latin America's combination of multipartism and presidentialism was particularly problematic.⁹ According to this view, presidential coalitions, unlike parliamentary ones, lacked the institutional enforcement of mutual confidence, could not count on the disciplined support of backbenchers, and provided little substantive governmental influence to non-presidential parties receiving cabinet portfolios. Minority governments were portrayed as particularly handicapped when it came to enacting the presidential agenda, with few institutional incentives to build continued legislative support. Jones, for instance, emphasized the loss of efficiency associated with moving from a situation where the president has a majority or near-majority to that of a minority president, whose "ability to govern is often blocked" by the legislature.¹⁰ The hypothesis that multipartism negatively affects the passage of the president's legislative agenda has been advanced in several other works during the last ten years.¹¹

Given that Latin American presidents commonly lack single parties in control of both branches of government, these studies suggested that most presidents would have a very difficult time persuading congress to pass their legislative agenda. One of the hypothesized consequences of this stalemate was that presidents would resort to extraordinary constitutional powers to advance policy changes.¹² The tendency of presidents to enact policies by decree was seen as an example of unilateral action and the dire consequence of questionable constitutional authority.¹³ This view was recently endorsed by Cox and Morgenstern who argue that minority presidents and those who are "politically weak" may push the envelope in "constitutionally provocative ways" when faced with grim prospects for enacting policies via ordinary laws.¹⁴ The unilateral action view, in short, hypothesizes a negative relationship between the legislative success of presidents and decree usage.

These two predictions, that stalemate is associated with minority presidents and that such presidents have a preponderance to use decrees when ordinary lawmaking is obstructed in congress, have been challenged on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Authors who have concentrated on the legislative prerogatives of presidents have argued that agenda-setting prerogatives help presidents to

advance their legislative agenda.¹⁵ As a result, institutionally powerful presidents may be able to foster advantageous compromises despite their minority status. In addition, authors have argued that despite some fundamental differences with parliamentary systems, there are sufficient incentives for coalition formation in presidential systems so that minority presidents should be able to build substantive congressional support.¹⁶ Authors working within the veto players framework argue that policy stability is related to the positional dispersion of actors whose agreement is necessary for policy change rather than the actual number of parties.¹⁷ They emphasize how the position of these veto players affects the set of proposals that can beat the status quo. Consequently, a majority president may be held back by a party divided among several factions with dissimilar positions, while a minority president may be able to find enough support from favorably positioned parties to advance a myriad of bills.¹⁸ Moreover, the overall legislative success of presidents may be unrelated to changes in the make-up of congress. If a strategic president knows that congressional actors have very different positions, he would be less willing to send proposals that are destined to be defeated and more likely to introduce compromises that would receive enough congressional support to be enacted.¹⁹ As a result, presidents will be less likely to pass more substantive policy changes that bring the status quo closer to his or her ideal policy, but this difference should not be directly reflected in overall legislative success.²⁰

Lastly, the available empirical evidence does not provide support for the notion that minority presidents confront stalemates in congress or are unable to form cross-party coalitions. Some preliminary results from cross-national analyses have found that minority presidents tend to pass a majority of the bills they introduce and that their success rates are not strikingly different from those for majority presidents.²¹ And coalition formation has been shown to be high among minority presidents, which eventually avoids congressional stalemate.²²

Several authors have also been skeptical of the hypothesis that links the propensity to use executive decrees to congressional gridlock. Carey and Shugart, for instance, argue that legislators may find executive decrees attractive as a way of expediting action on policy, overcoming collective action problems within legislatures, or furthering individual electoral goals (such as avoiding public responsibility for an unpopular measure).²³ Figueiredo and Limongi portray the executive decree as a bargaining tool employed within the presidential coalition rather than an instrument of unilateral executive action, and Reich argues that decrees can provide information and still allow legislators to influence policy.²⁴ In a recent paper, Pereira, et. al. discuss the alternative perspectives on decree usage—unilateral theory versus delegation theory—and test related implications with data from Brazil. Their results find contradictory evidence with regards

to the effect of presidential support.²⁵ On the one hand decree usage appears negatively related to the proportion of legislators following the floor voting recommendations of the leader of the pro-government coalition, and on the other, decree usage has a positive association with the size of the presidential coalition in the legislature.

Our empirical analysis presented in latter sections focuses on legislation introduced during the tenures of three Argentine presidents: Raul Alfonsín, Carlos Menem (two-terms), and Fernando De La Rúa. President Alfonsín's Radical Civil Union party (UCR) had a majority in the Chamber of Deputies from 1983 to 1987 and a plurality from 1987 to 1989. However, the *Justicialista* Party (PJ) had a plurality in the Senate throughout Alfonsín's presidency (with about 46 percent of the seats versus 39 percent for the UCR). President Menem's party, the PJ, had a majority in the Senate throughout both of his presidential terms (1989–95, 1995–1999). In the Chamber of Deputies the PJ had a plurality from 1989 to 1993 and 1997 to 1999 (46 percent), an almost-majority²⁶ from 1993 to 1995 (49.4 percent), and a majority from 1995 to 1997. President De La Rúa's party (UCR) was a minority party in both chambers from 1999 to 2001 (but formed a formal coalition with the smaller centre-left Front for a Country in Solidarity [Frepaso]).

Electoral Cycle and the President's Popularity

The institutional literature has been quite unified in emphasizing the effects of the electoral cycle on the president's performance. There is both a favorable climate for presidents immediately after election, the so-called "honeymoon effect," and a tendency to lose legislative support as their term comes to an end. Most Latin American presidents are prohibited from immediate reelection, which tends to influence the strategies of legislative parties. Lame duck presidents exert less control over legislators' career prospects (e.g. no coattails to potential supporters), and as a result face greater difficulties soliciting cooperation than presidents that can be reelected.²⁷ A tendency for presidents to lose congressional support as the term in office comes to an end has been blamed on the need for party leaders to strengthen their own identities and avoid being punished for government mistakes.²⁸

Several single-country studies published during the 1990s noted the interaction between the electoral cycle and legislative support for the president, such as Coppedge's work on Venezuela, Conaghan's on Ecuador, and Carey's on Costa Rica.²⁹ The effect of the electoral system on presidential legislative support has been portrayed as, perhaps, one of the most fundamental differences between presidential and parliamentary regimes.³⁰ A somewhat different perspective

is advanced by authors who emphasize changes in the president's popularity rather than (or in addition to) the structural effects of electoral calendars.³¹ The effect of public opinion on congressional behavior raises some interesting questions regarding the responsiveness of representatives as well as the autonomy of presidents. The central role played by the president as the most important source of political legitimacy and authority has been extensively documented, leading to the presumption that legislatures in Latin America have few incentives to be responsive to the public and have few institutional mechanisms to enforce horizontal accountability.³² The presumption that representation does not work well in the region's new democracies is so pervasive that researchers have not devoted enough resources to studying the link between public opinion and the legislative process. However, if legislators fail to approve executive bills because they expect that the lack of popular support for such initiatives would lower future support among voters, then electoral strategies do promote some form of democratic accountability, as is expected in consolidated democracies.³³ The positive association between presidential approval rates in public opinion polls and the passage of the president's legislative agenda has been highlighted by Mainwaring for Brazil, Altman for Uruguay, and Calvo for Argentina, as well as by a large body of literature on the U.S. case.³⁴

Bicameralism and Consensus

Bicameralism in Latin America has become a topic of increased interest. Yet both the effects of bicameralism on policy outcomes and the process of decision making within upper houses remain largely unexplored topics in the region.³⁵ The literature so far has been mostly descriptive and focused mainly on issues of representation.³⁶ The limited research on this topic is perplexing when one considers that half of Latin American countries have bicameral congresses. Moreover, unlike many bicameral legislatures in parliamentary regimes, the bicameral legislatures of Latin America have symmetrical chamber powers that make Senates highly relevant institutional players that can present another hurdle to the enactment of policy proposals. This is especially important when there are substantial differences in the constituencies of both chambers (incongruence), which exacerbates the division of purpose between them.

In addition to congruence and symmetry, the rules used to reach a bicameral agreement can have an influence on the type of agreement and whether an agreement is reached at all. Rules sometimes establish a conference committee (as in Chile, Colombia, or the U.S.); other countries shuttle the bill back and forth until a resolution is reached (as in Brazil or Italy), and still others have rules that give an advantage to one of the chambers (as in Argentina).³⁷ When

bicameral rules give an advantage to the chamber that initiates legislation, as is the case in the Argentine Congress, we would expect presidents to exploit these differences to their advantage.

Differences in the enactment of legislation can also arise from the different decision-making environments found in each chamber. As we note in the next section, cooperation within the Senate—which tends to have a smaller, more collegial, tenured, and cohesive membership—should be greater than within the more uncertain and divisive environment found in the Chamber of Deputies. This difference can have a substantial effect on the enactment of presidential proposals, since bills should be expected to travel a more successful path when the president has better information about the chamber's position and the initiating chamber is a more cooperative and cohesive actor.

Summary

We can summarize the preceding discussion into five hypotheses associated with presidential legislation:

- P H1:** The size of the president's legislative coalition should be positively related to the passage of presidential bills.
- P H2:** The use of executive decrees should be negatively associated with the passage of presidential legislation.
- P H3:** The presidential electoral cycle should affect the legislative success of presidents, boosting passage of legislation during the honeymoon period.
- P H4:** The public's approval of the president should be positively related to the passage of presidential bills.
- P H5:** Chamber differences should lead to a higher rate of passage for presidential bills first introduced in the more certain and cooperative environment (i.e., the Senate in Argentina).

2. LEGISLATORS AS LAWMAKERS

While there is a growing body of research analyzing presidential legislative success in Latin America, considerably less effort has been devoted to explaining approval of initiatives by individual legislators.³⁸ Many of the working hypotheses found in the Latin American literature, therefore, have been imported from comparative research in Europe and the United States. In this article we focus on four sets of variables that are used to explain legislative success: (i)

partisan-effects; (ii) bill-specific effects; (iii) institutional and contextual effects, such as the initiating chamber or the proximity of elections; and (iv) individual characteristics of the proponent such as congressional experience, gender, or committee position.

Partisan Effects

In most Latin American countries, political parties play a crucial role organizing the daily business of the legislature. Not only are parties (and party leaders) the key players in terms of control over the legislative agenda, but they are also endowed with a variety of resources to affect the behavior of individual representatives. An important mission of all parties (to varying degrees, of course) is the enactment of laws they favor and the rejection of those they dislike. But in legislatures, where power is not distributed equally, not all parties will be successful in advancing their members' lawmaking goals.

In a party-based legislature it is to be expected that bills introduced by members of the majority party would have a higher probability of passage than those introduced by members of other parties. In the time-constrained environment common to all legislatures, the party leaders with control over the scheduling of consideration of proposals should be expected to prioritize the bills of their fellow partisans. Such bills also tend to arrive on the floor with the largest *a priori* support, whereas bills introduced by members of other parties, if reported, often face higher costs in terms of floor coalition building. The literature on the U.S. Congress has emphasized membership in the majority party as the dominant explanation of legislative effectiveness.³⁹ Anderson et. al. goes on to say that the most obvious constraint (or aid) to a legislator's success is their partisan stripe.⁴⁰

The success of legislators belonging to minor parties should vary based on their ideological positions. More specifically, "extremist" parties will be less likely to make into law the policy changes they advance than more moderate parties, since such proposals will be less likely to represent the preferences of the legislature. It is generally harder for representatives of small parties of the far-left and the far-right to convince other parties to endorse their legislation. In contrast, moderate parties have a positional advantage to begin with. In addition, small centrist parties, independents, and pragmatic provincial parties can be extremely helpful to the president when specific support thresholds need to be met. As a result, members of pivotal parties should benefit from higher rates of passage while members of extremist parties should be less successful.

Perhaps more important than the size and position of the proponent's party is the interaction between partisan affiliation and control of the executive branch. Just as the president expects the support of fellow partisans in congress,

legislators expect that a fellow partisan in the executive branch will help them advance their own proposals. Consequently, bills introduced by members of the president's party should have a greater chance of enactment.

The preceding discussion leads us to three new hypotheses:

C H1: Belonging to the largest party in the chamber should improve the probability of bill approval.

C H2: Belonging to small pragmatic centrist parties should improve the probability of bill approval (i.e., provincial parties in Argentina).

C H3: Having a fellow partisan in the executive branch should improve the probability of bill approval.

Bill-specific support

Legislative research has noted that certain bills have a greater probability than others at becoming a law, independent of the partisan affiliation of the proponent. Some bills address issues considered urgent given a particular political context, and others focus on less relevant or divisive subjects. Some proposals are introduced in a more conducive institutional environment (less divided, less busy, or more resolute), while others have a harder time getting to the floor of congress for an actual vote.

Entrepreneurial legislators can potentially find “must act” issues and attempt to craft legislation that induces wide support. The diversity of co-sponsors is often cited by legislators during debates or public appearances as evidence of a bill's support;⁴¹ perceived wide endorsement for a bill can be helpful in moving a bill forward (i.e., bandwagon effects). If this is the case, then more appealing proposals, those initially carrying greater external support, should have smoother travel than proposals without co-sponsors. The evidence on co-sponsorship in the U.S. Congress has been mixed. Some authors have found no relationship between co-sponsors and a proposal's success,⁴² while others have found significant results depending on the type of proposal at hand,⁴³ and others have emphasized the indirect effects of co-sponsorship on legislative success.⁴⁴

In the highly partisan context of many Latin American legislatures, it is relevant to examine whether the effects of within-party co-sponsorship are different than those of cross-party sponsorship. Both measures are indicators of external support but they differentiate in terms of the emphasis of such support. Bills endorsed *a priori* by members of different parties can signal more consensual alternatives than individual or partisan proposals, thereby helping their chances of passage. Although cross-party sponsorship may be a signal of broad ideological consensus, it may also

by a signal of weakness—a lack of attractiveness among fellow partisans.

These arguments lead us to two additional hypotheses:

CH4: The initial support of numerous legislators (co-sponsors) should improve the probability of bill approval.

CH5: The initial support of legislators from more than one party (cross-party sponsorship) should improve the probability of bill approval.

Institutional Context

The institutional context, such as the body—both chamber and committee—that spearheads the legislation and the timing of initiation relative to the electoral calendar, also has an impact on the passage of legislators' bills. Within bicameral legislatures, for instance, we find consistent differences between upper and lower chambers for several relevant variables. Senates tend to have lower membership, higher tenure, and more consensual rules than lower chambers. In addition, lower chambers tend to be more fragmented in terms of partisan composition and representational conflict. The Argentine Congress, for instance, is a good example of these differences. The Senate has developed a series of norm-based constraints that foster cooperation and universalism, and for most of the period since democratization it has been in the control of one party with a large majority. In contrast, the Chamber of Deputies has not only had a much larger membership fragmented among several factions (with majority parties never comfortably surpassing the 50 percent threshold), but it has also organized its business in a much more partisan fashion. In addition, both chambers spend more or less the same amount of time in active sessions (i.e., similar floor time), but lower chambers typically have to deal with a much larger influx of member proposals, perhaps inevitably pushing more proposals out of the agenda.

In addition, we expect legislative parties, like the president, to be affected by the electoral calendar. Legislators should be less effective in passing their bills during an election year, when parties are focused on the electoral contest, and many legislators are campaigning for reelection or seeking alternative ways to further their political career. Moreover, congress tends to hold fewer sessions in election years, partly due to the lack of quorum.

We can summarize the preceding discussion into two additional hypotheses:

CH6: Introducing a proposal in the Senate as opposed to the Chamber of Deputies should improve the probability of bill approval.

CH7: Introducing a proposal during a legislative electoral year should worsen the probability of bill approval.

Individual Characteristics

Even in partisan legislatures, we can expect the characteristics of individual legislators to influence how effective members are at advancing their own policy proposals. This link is important because it highlights how individual representatives influence outcomes beyond partisan affiliation or other institutional fixtures. Such insights reflect an important aspect of a legislator's value as a representative.

Legislative researchers have highlighted the advantages of leaders in terms of both individual qualities and organizational resources, which allow them to craft proposals more likely to be enacted by congress.⁴⁵ In general, the leadership of the chamber and the chairs of permanent committees have a good understanding of the distribution of legislative preferences and can tailor proposals to reflect this informational advantage. They can also use the institutional advantages provided by the rules of procedure to push their own proposals. In a similar vein, we would expect more senior members to be more effective legislators than freshmen, who have yet to develop the skills necessary to craft attractive bills and the relationships necessary to navigate proposals through institutional and partisan obstacles to their passage.

Hibbing and Moore and Thomas, for instance, found that in the U.S. the legislative efficiency of members increased with the number of years they served in office.⁴⁶ A similar finding was put forth by Frantzich, noting that legislative success was the greatest among electorally safe, senior members of the majority party.⁴⁷ Anderson et. al. found that chamber authorities (committee and subcommittee chairs and leaders of the chamber) and senior members are more effective legislators than the rank-and-file.⁴⁸ They also found that freshmen legislators are less successful in advancing their bills than other members.

An important question for the literature on representation is whether certain groups like women and members of ethnic or racial minorities are more or less likely than others to pass legislation.⁴⁹ In Latin America, where many of such groups have been under-represented in the legislatures, scholars have yet to examine whether they have also been less successful at enacting the policy proposals they introduce. In the case of women's representation in the legislative branch, there has been significant progress in Latin America during the last twenty years. In Argentina, for instance, women's representation in the lower chamber jumped from 3 percent in 1983 to 31 percent in 2001. In Costa Rica we find a similar jump from 7 percent in 1974 to 35 percent in 2002.⁵⁰ What we

do not yet know is whether women have been as successful as men in advancing the legislation they introduce. There are reasons to suspect the presence of a gender effect. On the one hand, the introduction of quotas for women's representation, common to several Latin American countries, reflected dissatisfaction with the 'old boys club' partisan networks that prevented the advancement of female politicians. An implication of this perspective would be that such hurdles would spill over to negatively affect legislative success inside the chamber. On the other hand, we expect changes in the representation of women in legislatures to matter because, among other things, women tend to focus on different types of proposals than male legislators. If women concentrate on proposals that male legislators are indifferent to or unwilling to support, then this dissent should be reflected in lower rates of legislative success for women.

In the analysis presented in the next section we examine the influences of individual variables while also controlling for the representative's region.⁵¹ Surveys of political elites tend to show that legislators rank the representation of regional interests very highly. Often, these representational goals are said to overwhelm partisan and institutional characteristics, so we control for regional origins.

The preceding discussion suggests three additional hypotheses:

- C H8:** Leadership positions should be associated with higher rates of bill approval.
- C H9:** Longer tenure in office should be associated with higher rates of bill approval.
- C H10:** Bills introduced by women should be less likely to pass than those introduced by males.

3. LEGISLATION IN DEMOCRATIC ARGENTINA

We now proceed to describe the broad patterns present in the Argentine data. We begin by distinguishing between **legislative success**, which refers to the rate of approval of legislation introduced by a political actor (i.e. the president, a deputy, or a senator), and **legislative productivity**, which refers to those bills that were actually enacted into law. We present information for the two major parties, the Peronist party—called *Justicialista* (PJ) and the Radical Civic Union (UCR), both of which have won the presidency several times since 1983. We also present information on small but relatively important parties such as the centre-right Union of the Democratic Center (UCD), the centre-left Frepaso, and several provincial parties.

Table 1 shows legislative success and legislative productivity in the Argentine Congress from December 1983 to 2001. The table includes information on every bill introduced in the House or the Senate by the president, senators, and deputies. About 51 percent of substantive bills proposed by the president became law. In contrast, approval rates were lower for individual legislators, who were successful with only about 5 percent of the legislation they introduced in Congress. Individual legislators, however, initiated ten times as many bills as the president. As a result, while presidents displayed much higher rates of legislative success, executive legislative productivity was lower than that of representatives. Of course, the difference in productivity is not an indication about the relative importance of the legislation being passed.

It is also clear that success rates are considerably higher for legislation initiated in the Senate. This regularity is observed for presidential as well as legislators' initiatives, including non-Peronist parties which have never controlled a plurality of the Senate seats. While legislative success is considerably higher for proposals introduced in the Senate, legislative productivity is higher in the Chamber of Deputies—the result of a larger number of bills proposed in a chamber that has three times the number of representatives.

Descriptive information that also deserves consideration is the relatively high rate of approval of legislation initiated by the UCR. Considering the fact that in the last twenty years, the UCR has never held a plurality in the Senate and has controlled a plurality of the Chamber of Deputies for only six years, the fact that around 33 percent (402/1212) of the representative initiated legislation approved by Congress was proposed by the UCR is very significant. The PJ, consistently the largest party in the Senate and the largest in the Chamber of Deputies since 1989, has a productivity rate of around 56 percent (659/1212).

The pivotal role often played by moderate provincial parties with regards to providing the votes necessary to reach passing majorities appears to be rewarded with a comparatively high legislative success rate of 5 percent, higher than that of the UCR (4.7 percent) but lower than that of the PJ (5.5 percent). By contrast, all other minority parties—including the more ideologically off-centre Frepaso and UCD—have legislative success rates that are two to three times lower than those of the majority parties.

Since 1983, significant variation can be observed with regard to legislative success. This is the result of both the existence of political cycles in the approval of legislation and variation in the amount of legislation being proposed. As is possible to observe in Figure 1, the approval of legislation introduced by members of Congress is extremely varied while the amount of legislation being initiated has increased markedly.

TABLE 1. Legislative Success in Argentina

Proponent	Chamber of Origin	Bills Introduced	Bills Passed	Success Rate
Executive	Deputies	916	375	40.9%
	Senate	919	566	61.6%
Legislators	Deputies	20,632	780	3.8%
	Senate	5,484	432	7.9%
PJ members	Deputies	9,006	402	4.5%
	Senate	2,937	257	8.8%
UCR members	Deputies	6,666	271	4.1%
	Senate	1,818	131	7.2%
Provinciales	Deputies	935	40	4.3%
	Senate	667	44	6.6%
Frepaso	Deputies	2,102	34	1.6%
	Senate	39	0	0.0%
UCD	Deputies	590	0	0.0%
	Senate	0	0	0.0%
Others	Deputies	1300	27	2.1%
	Senate	23	0	0.0%


Note: Estimated from *Información Parlamentaria* data. Membership obtained from the entry "Bloque del Firmante" in *Mesa de Entrada*.

Statistical Analysis

To test the hypotheses enumerated earlier in the chapter we employ a random effects model with a logistic link. We are interested in the effect of variables that are specific to each bill as well as group variables that vary only across legislative periods. Given the structure of the data, a multi-level model provides the coefficients of interest with properly estimated standard errors.

We use a nominal dependent variable that takes the value of 1 if the bill was approved by both the House and the Senate and 0 otherwise. We have differently specified models for bills initiated by the executive and for bills initiated by individual representatives. Given that our dataset includes considerably more information about deputies than about senators, we run several different models: (i) two models of executive legislative success; (ii) a basic model of legislative success for both senators and deputies; and (iii) an

FIGURE 1. Bills Introduced by Members of Congress, 1983–2001



Note: Observations for congressional period 101 (1983) were added to period 102 (1984) to facilitate the reading. This congressional period only included legislation introduced in December of 1983, during the initial month of the democratic period.

extended model that only analyzes legislative success among members of the Chamber of Deputies, but which incorporates information about the political career and status of each deputy.

The models of executive success incorporate variables that test for the effect of partisan support for the president, the issuance of executive decrees, the electoral cycle, public approval of the president's performance, and the chamber where the bill was first introduced.

The independent variables include: (i) an indicator of whether the executive's party has a plurality or majority in one or two chambers;⁵² (ii) the rate of executive decrees given the total number of legislative proposals introduced by the president in that congressional period; (iii) a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the president is in his first year in office; (iv) the positive image of the president as reported by *Mora y Araujo* (1983–1988) and *Nueva Mayoría* (1988–2001); and (v) a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the bill was initiated in the Senate. We also control for: (vi) the total number of bills introduced in the congressional period (logged) and (vii) the number of House and Senate committees to which the presidential bill was sent.⁵³

The model that captures legislative success for individual legislators incorporates variables that test for the effects of parties, allegiance with the president, bill supporters, chamber of origin, electoral cycle, and gender, as well as controlling for the region of the proponent and the number of bills introduced by the proponent and by all legislators during that year.

The variables used to measure partisan effects include a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the bill proponent belongs to the largest party bloc in the chamber and 0 otherwise; five dummy variables for representatives from the PJ, the UCR, and all provincial parties; a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the current president is a Peronist and 0 otherwise; and interaction terms between having a Peronist president and the party of the proponent of the bill (to capture the effects of having an executive from the same party).

The *a priori* support of different proposals is measured by the natural log of the number of co-sponsors of the bill (an ordinal variable ranging from 1 to 62) and a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if there are members of more than one partisan bloc among the co-sponsors. The institutional measures include a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the bill was introduced by a senator and 0 if it was introduced by a deputy and another dummy that takes the value of 1 if there are legislative elections that year and 0 otherwise. Gender effects are captured by a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the representative is a woman and 0 for male representatives.

We control for the number of bills initiated by the proponent and the log of the number of bills introduced by all legislators during that year. We also include dummy variables for three regions: the metropolitan region (CABA, Buenos Aires, Cordoba, Mendoza, and Santa Fe), the Northwest (Catamarca, Chaco, Jujuy, La Rioja, San Luis, Santiago del Estero, Salta, and Tucuman), and the South (Rio Negro, Chubut, La Pampa, Neuquén, and Tierra del Fuego).

For the third model we use additional information on the background of individual deputies from a dataset collected by Jones, Saiegh, Spiller, and Tommassi.⁵⁴ In addition to the variables used in model 3, we add an ordinal variable that describes the tenure length of the deputy proposing the bill; a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the proponent is the president of an ordinary committee and 0 otherwise; and three dummy variables measuring whether the bill proponent belongs to the most important committees in the Chamber of Deputies: budget (*hacienda*), justice, and constitutional affairs.

Results for Presidential Bills

Table 2 presents the results of the legislative success model for presidential bills.

Because the president's image and the rate of decrees are highly correlated, we run two specifications of the model. Four of the variables display significant effects: the rate of decrees, the positive image of the president among voters, the honeymoon year, and the introduction of bills in the Senate.

The results show that the rate of decrees issued by the president is negatively associated with the passage of bills (**PH2**). It is also relevant to note that there is a high negative correlation between the rate of decrees and the positive image of the president, which suggests that unpopular presidents are more likely to use decrees and that this hampers their ability to win congressional passage of their bills.

Presidential bills introduced during the first year in office are more likely to become law than those introduced in later years (**PH3**). The coefficient is significant and positive (the expected direction). A presidential bill introduced in the Chamber of Deputies during the honeymoon year has about a 50 percent chance of being enacted (all other variables at their mean), while the chances for a similar bill introduced later in the term is about 10 percent lower. The effect of the honeymoon year is still significant after we introduce the variable for the public's evaluation of the president (model 2), although its impact is somewhat weakened.

There are also significant benefits to the president when public approval is high (**PH4**) and when proposals are introduced in the Senate (**PH5**). The positive association between public opinion and approval of presidential legislation is statistically and substantively significant. A more intuitive interpretation of the magnitude of the benefits from higher public approval and from introducing legislation in the senate is summarized in Figure 2, which describes the likelihood of approving a bill as a function of the increasing popularity of the executive. The upper line shows the probability for bills introduced in the Senate while the lower line shows the probability for bills introduced in the Chamber of Deputies (dashed lines show 95 percent confidence intervals). The figure shows that legislative success is close to 30 percent when bills are first presented to the Chamber of Deputies and the positive image of the president is very low. By contrast, a very high positive image, around 60 percent, increases legislative success to about 45 percent when legislation originates in the Chamber of Deputies and to about 75 percent when legislation is introduced in the Senate.

The results do not support the proposition that changes in partisan support affect legislative success (**PH1**); the estimated coefficient is insignificant and in one case it is in the opposite direction. We tried alternative specifications of this variable, such as the average share of seats controlled by the executive in the House and the Senate and a dummy for unified government, but none showed

TABLE 2. Presidential Bills and Legislative Success

Independent Variable	Model 1 (<i>dv: approved</i>)	Model 2 (<i>dv: approved</i>)
Chamber Control	0.028	-0.163
	0.202	0.188
Rate of Decrees	-2.047***	~
	0.792	
First year of Presidential Team	0.624***	0.402*
	0.213	0.241
Public Image of the President	~	1.364***
		0.503
Initiated in Senate	1.253***	1.273***
	0.157	0.158
Number of Bill Initiatives	-0.286	0.014
	0.432	0.429
Committees in Ch. of Deputies	0.032	0.032
	0.083	0.083
Committees in Senate	-0.141	-0.136
	0.103	0.103
Constant	1.269	-0.663
	1.679	1.651
Log Likelihood	-647.5248	-646.9653
N	1008	1008

Note: significance level .1 =*; .05 =**, and .01***


significant results. Lastly, the control variables included do not affect the passage of presidential bills in any significant way.

Results for Bills Initiated by Legislators

Table 3 presents the estimates for bills initiated by members of Congress. The

first results (model 3) use the full sample of legislation proposed by senators and deputies, while the second estimates (model 4) incorporate a broader number of independent variables on a sub-sample which only includes bills proposed by members of the Chamber of Deputies.

FIGURE 2. Legislative Success and Public Opinion (by chamber of origin)



The first nine variables provide information about partisan effects. The results lend support to all three partisan hypotheses. As expected, members of the largest party in the chamber have a significant advantage over others (**CH1**). The results also indicate that ideologically moderate provincial parties, which often play a pivotal role for the approval of critical legislation, have a higher rate of legislative success than other minor parties (**CH2**). This effect, however, is no longer statistically significant when we only look at initiatives from deputies (model 4). The probability of approval also increases substantively when the executive is from the same party as the proponent of the bill (**CH3**). This effect is even stronger than that of belonging to the plurality party. These results reinforce the perception by some UCR legislators that the chances of approving bill initiatives increased under the presidency of Fernando De La Rúa even though there were no drastic changes in the share of seats from the prior presidency.⁵⁵

The next two variables provide information about the effects of bill co-

TABLE 3. Legislative Success of Members of Congress

Variables	Model 3 <i>Deputies and Senators</i>	Model 4 <i>Only Deputies</i>
Member of the largest party	0.249***	0.481**
	0.097	0.217
PJ member	0.654***	0.321
	0.169	0.245
UCR member	1.177***	0.597*
	0.163	0.318
Provincial party member	0.792***	0.459
	0.157	0.297
President PJ* Proponent PJ	0.487***	0.632*
	0.179	0.327
President PJ* Proponent UCR	-0.573***	0.041
	0.192	0.360
President PJ	0.212	-0.408
	0.177	0.261
Number of Co-Sponsors	0.184***	0.128**
	0.044	0.065
Cross-Party Initiative	0.951***	1.133***
	0.090	0.117
Initiated by Senator	0.839***	~
	0.067	
Legislative Electoral Year	-0.333***	-0.325***
	0.104	0.117
Women Proponent	-0.217**	-0.087
	0.091	0.160
Number of Bills Introduced by Proponent	-0.001	-0.003***
	0.000	0.001
Total Bills Initiatives per Period	-.430***	0.091
	0.130	0.314
Region: NW	-0.106	-0.316
	0.088	0.155
Region: South	-0.062	0.000
	0.085	0.143
Region: Metro	-0.033	-0.033
	0.075	0.105

TABLE 3. (continue)

Variables	Model 3 <i>Deputies and Senators</i>	Model 4 <i>Only Deputies</i>
Committee Chair	~	0.455***
		0.112
Tenure in the House	~	0.049**
		0.022
Member of the Budget Committee	~	0.303**
		0.123
Member of the Justice Committee	~	0.354**
		0.158
Member of the Constitutional Committee	~	-0.313**
		0.160
Constant	-1.071	-4.545**
	0.970	2.320
Log-Likelihood	-4838.0641	-2208.1774
N	27406	14332

sponsors and cross-party initiatives on the approval of legislation. Both variables are statistically significant. As expected, a larger number of co-sponsors increases the chance that a bill will be approved (CH4). Similar to the US case, co-sponsorship from multiple parties is positively related to legislative success (CH5). Both results are robust to alternative specifications.

In regards to the institutional context, the results of Model 3 show that bills initiated in the Senate are more likely to be approved (CH6), as was the case with presidential initiatives. The results also reveal the effects of the electoral cycle, as bills introduced during years with legislative elections are less likely to be approved (CH7).

Of the hypotheses related to individual characteristics of bill proponents, only the gender effect can be measured with the full sample of Model 3. Gender has a statistically significant effect, with women's bills being approved less often than bills from their male counterparts (CH10). The gender difference, however, becomes statistically insignificant once we account for differences in

institutional prestige factors such as chairmanships or tenure factors. These latter effects, however, can only be measured in the reduced sample analyzed in Model 4 (for deputies only). These results suggest that appointments to positions of authority may partially explain the gender gap in legislative success. Committee chairs, for instance, have overwhelmingly gone to men during the period analyzed, and the average tenure of women is also shorter.

The results for the effects of leadership positions and tenure in office are captured by Model 4.⁵⁶ We can see that bills introduced by committee chairs and members of two of the most important committees—the crucial budget (*hacienda*) and justice committees—are more likely to pass than bills introduced by other members of Congress (CH8). Surprising, perhaps, is the negative coefficient for members of the constitutional committee, who appear to be particularly incapable of turning their bills into law. As expected, bills introduced by members with more years in Congress are significantly more likely to pass (CH9). The impact of tenure, however, is not as strong as that the effect of chairing a congressional committee.

The control variables also provide interesting information. We see that an increase in the number of bills introduced by individual legislators reduces the likelihood of success (under both specifications). There is also a negative association between success rates and the total number of legislative proposals introduced in a congressional period. This result, however, stands only for the full sample (Model 3). In regards to the regional effects, we find a negative association between passage and deputies from the (poor) Northwest, but only for the reduced sample (Model 4).

4. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS

The statistical analysis in the previous pages shows that presidential bills are more likely to pass when the president is popular and when legislation is introduced in the Senate. The results also show that approval rates for such bills appear unaffected by the level of partisan support presidents have in Congress. There is also a statistically significant negative association between the passage of presidential bills and the number of presidential decrees.

Bills introduced by members of the legislature are more likely to pass when the proponent is a member of the largest party in the chamber as well as when the proponent belongs to the president's party. Bills introduced by senators, more senior members, and committee chairs are more likely to pass than other proposals. We also show that increasing the number of co-sponsors and receiving the endorsement of legislators from multiple parties improves the chances of

a bill's passage. Timing can also hurt: bills introduced during legislative election years have a lower probability of passage.

In short, our analysis reveals significant influences from a variety of sources. Below we concentrate on three questions. In regards to presidential success, we discuss our apparently counterintuitive finding that having a larger legislative coalition does not affect presidential legislative success. We then discuss what our results suggest about executive-legislative relations. Lastly, we conclude with some comments about democratic accountability and the making of laws in Argentina.

Presidential Legislative Support – where is it?

The link between support for presidential proposals and formal partisan support in congress deserves further consideration. The analysis of presidential bills shows that the level of partisan support presidents have in the legislature does not affect approval probabilities. But how robust is this finding? Does this finding imply that patterns of approval are unaffected by a switch to unified government?

At the beginning of this study we noted three reasons why formal changes in presidential support may not affect presidential success rates: (i) institutional prerogatives give minority presidents agenda-setting power which encourages Congress to compromise, (ii) the positive influence of unified government may be weakened by a fractionalized party while the potential drawbacks of minority status may be nullified by formal and informal coalition formation, and (iii) strategic presidents may introduce proposals that reflect compromises designed to carry the congressional support of the required majority. We believe all three factors to have played a role in the case of Argentina. We also noted that some comparative analyses had also shown little variation in success rates associated with the formal levels of congressional partisan support for the president, which lends some support to our finding. In addition, the results reveal that presidential popularity affects congressional behaviour after we control for partisan stripe. This not only means that minority presidents may find legislators from other parties more willing to go along with their proposals when they are popular, but also that majority status combined with an unpopular presidential streak can make congressional support costly and less predictable. This also may have been the case in Argentina.

Although the level of partisan support in congress does not make presidential bills more likely to be approved, unified government brings a significant collective benefit to the president's party. Bills introduced by members of the president's party are more likely to pass regardless of majority status, but reaching the majority status further increases the probability that a bill will pass. As a result,

periods of unified government provide substantial benefits to the president's party. In these circumstances policy change is mostly determined by the party in power, which is led by the president.

Dominant Executive—where are you?

The results presented in this study reveal another important aspect of democratic politics in Argentina: the absence of a dominant executive. This is a negative finding—we are not proposing an alternative vision of congressional dominance, merely the absence of a president that dominates Congress. We believe the evidence is consistent with different aspects of a workable relationship between both branches of congress. Let us clarify.

We believe the results presented in this chapter show that the Argentine Congress plays a substantial role in making and passing policies. The descriptive data presented earlier showed that a majority of the bills that passed were actually introduced by individual members of Congress. Moreover, the statistical analysis showed that a fundamental benefit of achieving unified government is the greater success of partisan legislation initiated in Congress, not an increase in the approval of presidential proposals. The fact that Argentine legislators initiate just over half of all new laws may not be that impressive when compared to United States, where the president does not have the capacity to formally introduce bills, but it is highly relevant in comparison to most parliamentary countries.⁵⁷ In places like Australia, England, Ireland, and Malta, virtually all of the bills that become law originate in the executive (the cabinet).⁵⁸

We believe that the literature is generally correct in highlighting the greater policy relevance of presidential initiated bills versus individual member initiatives; however, we also believe that, at least in the case of Argentina, the conventional wisdom is incorrect in portraying congressional initiatives as of minor relevance. Alemán presented some corroborating evidence from an analysis of major policy initiated during the presidencies of Carlos Menem and Fernando De La Rúa. During Menem's administration, legislators introduced as many "major" bills as the president, including proposals to specify the autonomy of the City of Buenos Aires, to create the independent entity that participates in judicial appointments and oversight, to privatize nuclear facilities, and to change income taxes.⁵⁹ Though the number was considerably lower under De La Rúa's presidency, there were still several important laws that were introduced by individual members. Also relevant is the fact that most major presidential bills pass after receiving substantial amendments *introduced* by members of Congress.

The Making of Laws and Democratic Accountability

In contrast with much of the comparative literature which describes lawmaking in Latin America as deeply flawed, the results presented in this article depict a relatively up-beat picture of the lawmaking process in Argentina, where representatives actively draft, co-sponsor, and enact their own legislative initiatives. In this picture majority and minority parties succeed in passing legislation at rates which reflect their relative strength and key institutional factors, such as institutional authority or tenure, which are important for enacting legislation.

It is true that, as previous literature has noted, the executive plays central role in the Argentine law-making process. It is also true, however, that this is to be expected in most presidential regimes, where an institutionally powerful executive is elected independently from the legislature and where the president serves both as the head of government and the leader of a major political party. Argentine presidents, however, have to work hard in order to get their initiatives passed; they are scrutinized by voters, the media, and by Congress. In the last twenty years, presidents and their ministers have had to answer over 20,000 requests for “executive reports” (*pedido de informes*) by individual legislators or groups of legislators, have been forced to withdraw legislation, have been unable to get legislative approval in the second chamber, and have been unable to move legislation out of committee 1,237 out of 2,384 times. It is precisely because of the capacity of Congress to be an effective mechanism of horizontal accountability that different presidents have attempted to expand their presidential authority in “constitutionally provocative ways.”⁶⁰

The results of this article also lend support to the notion that the effective vertical accountability of presidents and legislators goes beyond election day. Presidential legislative success is affected by changes in the public mood, but only if legislators effectively respond to changes in public opinion when making collective decisions about proposed legislation. Such responsiveness allows minority presidents to get their initiatives approved when seats are lacking and restricts the power of presidents that control a majority of seats. Whether the responsiveness link works directly through constituency pressure or whether it is mediated by provincial party bosses remains to be studied.

Recognizing that Congress serves as an important agent of accountability, however, does not imply that no further institutional consolidation is needed. There is evidence that the relationship between the executive and Congress is not symmetric—the result of a Congress with fewer financial resources and bureaucratic expertise than its executive counterpart.⁶¹ Under the protection of a popular presidency, Nestor Kirchner (2003–2007) has advanced new legislation that both regulated the issuance of executive decrees and strengthened executive

prerogatives. It will take time to find out whether under less popular presidents the Argentine Congress will be able to reclaim some of the lost ground, increasing its capacity to modify future presidential initiatives and the rate of enactment of its own substantive legislation.

NOTES

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 31. David Altman, "The Politics of Coalition Formation and Survival in Multiparty Presidential Democracies: The Case of Uruguay (1989–1999)," *Party Politics*, Vol. 6 No. 3 (2000) pp. 259–283; Greg B. Johnson and Leslie A. Schwindt, "Presidential Popularity and the Success of Presidential-Sponsored Legislation," prepared for presentation at the meeting of the Latin American Studies Association (Las Vegas, NV: October 7–10, 2004); Ernesto Calvo, "The Responsive Legislature: Public Opinion and Law Making in a Highly Disciplined Legislature," *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 36 No. 2 (2006).
 32. Scott Mainwaring, "Introduction: Democratic Accountability in Latin America," in Scott Mainwaring and Christopher Welna, eds., *Democratic Accountability in Latin America* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003); Erika Moreno, Brian F. Crisp, and Matthew S. Shugart, "The Accountability Deficit in Latin America," in Scott Mainwaring and Christopher Welna, eds., *Democratic Accountability in Latin America* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003); Argelina C. Figueiredo, "The Role of Congress as an Agency of Horizontal Accountability: Lessons from the Brazilian Experience," in Scott Mainwaring and Christopher Welna, eds., *Democratic Accountability in Latin America* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003). This view characterizes Latin American democracies as run by plebiscitary executives to whom broad political power has been delegated by an abdicant legislature, see Guillermo O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 5 No. 1 (1994), pp. 55–69; Susan Stokes, *Mandates and Democracy: Neoliberalism by Surprise in Latin America* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
 33. Samuel Kernell, *Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership*, 3rd edition, (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1997).
 34. Scott Mainwaring, "Multipartyism, Robust Federalism, and Presidentialism in Brazil," in Scott Mainwaring and M. Shugart, eds., *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997); David Altman, "The Politics of Coalition Formation and Survival in Multiparty Presidential Democracies: The Case of Uruguay (1989–1999)," *Party Politics*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (2000) pp. 259–283; Ernesto Calvo, "The Responsive Legislature: Public Opinion and Law Making in a Highly Disciplined Legislature," *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 36, No. 2 (2006).
 35. Jorge A. Schiavon, "Bicameralism in Latin America: Does it Make a Difference?" presented at annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 29–September 1, 2002.
 36. Mariana Llanos and Detlef Nolte, "Bicameralism in the Americas: Around the Extremes of Symmetry and Incongruence," *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, Vol. 9 No. 3 (2003),

- pp. 54–86; Mariana Llanos and Francisco Sánchez, “Council of Elders? The Senate and Its Members in the Southern Cone,” *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. 41, No. 1 (2006), pp. 133–152.
37. In the Argentine Congress, the revising chamber votes the bill only once. If it passes the same version as the chamber of origin the bill is sent to the President to be promulgated. If the revising chamber amends the bill, it returns to the chamber of origin for a last vote. The chamber of origin can then insist on its original version or endorse the version passed by the revising chamber. If the revising chamber passed its version by a super-majority vote (more than two-thirds) than the chamber of origin needs the same majority to insist in its original version, otherwise a majority vote is enough.
 38. The few articles on the subject include: Brian Crisp, María C. Escobar-Lemmon, Bradford S. Jones, Mark P. Jones, and Michelle Taylor-Robinson, “Vote-seeking incentives and legislative representation in six presidential democracies,” *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 66, No. 3 (2004), pp. 823–46; Michelle M. Taylor-Robinson and Christopher Diaz, “Who gets Legislation Passed in a Marginal Legislature? A Study of the Honduran Congress,” *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 5 (1999). Pp. 590–626.
 39. John R. Hibbing, *Congressional Careers: Contours of Life in the U.S. House of Representatives* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1991); Michael K. Moore and Susan Thomas, “Explaining Legislative Success in the U.S. Senate: The Role of the Majority and Minority Parties,” *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 45 (1990) pp. 53–60; Stephen Frantzich, “Who makes our laws? The Legislative Effectiveness of members of Congress,” *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (1979), pp. 409–28.
 40. William D. Anderson, Janet M. Box Steffensmeier, and Valeria Sinclair Chapman, “The Keys to Legislative Success in the U.S. House of Representatives,” *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 28, No. 3 (2003), pp. 357–86.
 41. James E. Campbell, “Cosponsoring legislation in the U.S. Congress,” *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (1982), pp. 415–22.
 42. Rick K. Wilson and Cheryl D. Young, “Cosponsorship in the U.S. Congress,” *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1997), pp. 25–43; William D. Anderson, Janet M. Box Steffensmeier, and Valeria Sinclair Chapman, “The Keys to Legislative Success in the U.S. House of Representatives,” *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 28, No. 3 (2003), pp. 357–86.
 43. Scott E. Adler, and John Wilkerson, “The Scope and Urgency of Legislation: Reconsidering Bill Success in the House of Representatives,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 1–4, 2005.
 44. James H. Fowler, “Connecting Congress: A Study of Cosponsorship Networks,” *Political Analysis*, (forthcoming).
 45. Richard Hall, *Participation in Congress* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996).
 46. John R. Hibbing, *Congressional Careers: Contours of Life in the U.S. House of Representatives* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1991); Michael K. Moore and Susan Thomas, “Explaining Legislative Success in the U.S. Senate: The Role of the Majority and Minority Parties,” *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 45 (1990), pp. 53–60. Moore and Thomas also found a negative relationship between the number of bills sponsored and a member’s effectiveness.
 47. Stephen Frantzich, “Who makes our laws? The Legislative Effectiveness of members of Congress,” *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (1979), pp. 409–28.
 48. William D. Anderson, Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, and Valeria Sinclair Chapman, “The Keys to Legislative Success in the U.S. House of Representatives,” *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 28, No. 3 (2003), pp. 357–86.
 49. *Ibid.*, looking at data for the U.S. House of Representatives found that bills initiated by women or black legislators were not less likely to be enacted.
 50. Both Argentina and Costa Rica have passed legislation establishing a quota for women’s representation.

51. In addition we control for both the number of bills introduced and the number of bills introduced by the individual legislator.
52. We tried various specifications of this variable. See the results section.
53. If the bill was initiated in the house and never made it to the Senate, the variable indicating the number of Senate committees was set to that year's mean. Similarly, if the bill was initiated in the Senate and never made it to the house, the value of the number of house committees was set to that year's mean. This adjustment is necessary to prevent the absence of information in the house or the senate to dampen the estimates of the model.
54. Mark P. Jones, Sebastián M. Saiegh, Pablo T. Spiller, and Mariano Tomassi, "Amateur Legislators-Professional Politicians: The Consequences of Party-Centered Electoral Rules in a Federal System," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 46, No. 3 (. 2002), pp. 356–369.
55. Interviews with former Dep. Jesus Rodriguez (UCR, July 12, 2006), Sen. Alicia Mastandrea (UCR, July 12, 2006), Dep. Delia Bissuti (ARI-Frepaso, July 5, 2006), and Dep. Paula Bertol (PRO, July 13, 2006).
56. Because Model 2 only includes deputies, there are no observations for the variable "initiated in the Senate."
57. José Antonio Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, "Democratic Institutions and Regime Survival: Parliamentary and Presidential Democracies Reconsidered," *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 5 (2002), pp. 151–79.
58. R. Rose, "British MPs: More Bark Than Bite?" in E.N. Suleiman ed., *Parliaments and Parliamentarians in Democratic Politics* (New York, NY: Holmes & Meier, 1986). A cross national study of 14 parliamentary countries during the early 1970s found that in 13 countries individual member initiatives never made more than 20% of bills passed; Herman V. and F. Mendel, *Parliaments in the World: A Reference Compendium* (Berlin, Germany and New York, NY: Interparliamentary Union-De Gruyter, 1976).
59. Eduardo Alemán, "Presidential Success in the Legislative Arena," prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association (New Orleans, LO: January 7–11, 2004). Bills were considered of major importance if they were mentioned on the front page of the national newspaper *La Nación* during the first year of a president's term.
60. Guillermo O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 5 No. 1 (1994), pp. 55–69; Gary W. Cox and Scott Morgenstern, "Epilogue: Latin America's Reactive Assemblies and Proactive Presidents," in Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif, eds., *Legislative Politics in Latin America* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
61. Mark P. Jones, Sebastián M. Saiegh, Pablo T. Spiller, and Mariano Tomassi, "Amateur Legislators-Professional Politicians: The Consequences of Party-Centered Electoral Rules in a Federal System," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 46 No. 3 (. 2002), pp. 356–369.