CHAPTER 5

Trust and Experience

I guess it would seem to me it depends on what group of people you are talking about. In my personal life or work life I would have the tendency to lean towards trust. When it comes to political issues I would probably have the tendency to not trust.

Most people can be trusted, not all people but some, most people can though. Experienced a few people in his life where he trusted them and got shafted. Sometimes getting too close with feelings toward people you trust them and sacrifice things for them and they can surprisingly shaft you, but they were serious enough that you never forget the experience. The past is the past and you should live for the day and of course you never forget the experience but its not healthy to dwell on it.

Most people can be trusted although they have a renter who hasn't paid in two and a half months. They gave [the renter] an eviction notice today. Everybody else needs to pay their bills.

Respondents to the 2000 ANES Pilot Study "think aloud" question on trust

When we decry the decline in trust from almost 60 percent in 1960 to barely more than a third of Americans in the late 1990s, we naturally begin to wonder what we can do to rebuild confidence in other people. Optimism, self-control, and good parenting don't offer much

guidance in how to increase trust. How do we make people feel better about themselves and how do we make them better parents?

But there are two routes to interpersonal trust that offer greater hope for social engineering: formal and informal socializing, on the one hand, and government on the other. Putnam (1993, 2000) and others argue that when we get involved with friends and neighbors, we become more trusting. And Levi (1998) Rothstein (2000), and Stolle (1999a) and others have argued that a well-functioning state can lead to greater interpersonal trust (see Chapter 2). Yet, the evidence so far suggests that experience–with other people and with government–translates only weakly into generalized trust. There are few people who claim that declining trust in government actually *caused* the decline in interpersonal trust (even though there are many who say that government can rebuild trust). But advocates for civic engagement link the drop in trust to the withdrawal of Americans from social life (see esp. Putnam, 1995a). In this chapter, I step back a bit and look at both questions in greater depth.

Putnam (1993, 180) and Stolle (1998b, esp. 507) argue that trusting people are more likely to join organizations (cf. Uslaner, 1998a, 1998b). But Brehm and Rahn (1997, 1017) and Shah (1998, 488) argue that organizational membership has a much stronger effect on trust than faith in others has in leading people to civic engagement.[1] All the evidence is not in–and there are reasons to be skeptical that involvement with others can produce trust.

Packed into Putnam's argument are two key assumptions. First is the reciprocal relationship between social ties and trust. I shall suggest that Putnam's (1993, 180; 2000, 137) "virtuous circle" of trust, civic engagement, and informal social networks is at best a "virtuous arrow," where, *if there is any connection at all*, the causal direction goes from trust to civic engagement

rather than the other way around. You just can't put people in groups and expect them to become more trusting. As Newton (1997, 577) argues, "It is difficult to see how social networks can be created unless there is trust to start with" (cf. Stolle, 1998b; Wuthnow, 1997, 29). Second is the presumption that the causal arrow usually goes *somewhere*. Some social connections might even reinforce particularized rather than generalized trust. But most of the time social networks, both informal and formal, are moral dead ends. They neither consume nor produce trust. They just happen.

There is more plausible support for the argument that trust leads to civic engagement. The tale of Carol Erhard in Chapter 4 tells the story of the causal arrow going from optimism to trust to civic engagement. Your optimistic world view makes you a generalized truster and your trust in strangers makes you willing to engage in civic activities with them. When you see people giving of themselves, you are looking at people who already trust people who are different from themselves. They may gain an extra boost (the "warm glow") by doing good deeds, but this extra currency is only available to people who already have faith in others.

Putnam (1993, 115) links the development of trust in northern Italy to the many choral societies, soccer teams, and bird-watching societies that sprung up there compared to the sparse social life in the south. In the United States, he focused on bowling leagues and membership in voluntary organizations (Putnam, 1995a) in his early work. His more comprehensive study (Putnam, 2000) includes political participation, membership in unions, churches, and synagogues, attendance at religious services, volunteering, giving to charity, blood donation, and many different forms of informal social connections--including, but hardly limited to, visiting bars and restaurants, visiting neighbors, eating dinner with your family, and playing cards. Putnam's

message is simple: A civil community is composed of many different types of voluntary organizations, civic activities, and informal socializing. A civic community depends more on *how many organizations* people join (Putnam, 1993, 90) than the types of associations (Putnam, 1993, 90; Wollebaek and Selle, 2000, 32). Trust seems to be an all-purpose elixir. And many different, and often not very demanding, activities can produce generalized trust.

Some activities are more important in building generalized trust: Formal organizations are better than informal socializing, since they put you in contact with more people and require more effort (Putnam, 2000). Organizations that hold meetings are better than those that "merely" require people to write a check and get a membership card and a magazine (Putnam, 1995). And "bridging" organizations, composed of people from different backgrounds, are better than groups with homogenous memberships (Putnam, 1993, 93). Hierarchical organizations such as the Mafia or the Italian Catholic Church, which are run from the top-down, might even discourage popular participation (Putnam, 1993, 111, 175). Horizontal organizations, which are run democratically, promote civic engagement. Associations that cut across social cleavages are best, but any horizontal group and even informal socializing will help create a civic community (Putnam, 1993, 175; Putnam, 2000, 21, chs. 3, 6).

There may also be a spillover from confidence in government to trust in other people. Lane (1959, 165-166) sees trust in government as part of the same general outlook as trust in people:

> ...a person who has faith in people [is] the sociable man with many social contacts, and the man who likes his community is the effective citizen in our democracy. His relationships with his social environment are good. He is in rapport with

> others. He works for political ends not in a spirit of antagonism but in a spirit of cooperation.

Putnam (1993) argues that trust in people helps produce the social cooperation that is necessary for government to function well–and to be trusted in turn.

Others suggest a more complex dynamic: States can build trust among people by expanding rights, providing a social safety net for the less well-off, and enforcing contracts between people (Levi, 1996, 1998). In each case, the government acts as a buffer and neutral arbiter between contending individuals and groups –ensuring everyone that all will be treated fairly (Levi, 1996, 1998; Offe, 1996, 33). Brehm and Rahn (1997, 1008) extrapolate from the correlation between trust in people and democratic institutions: Interpersonal trust is higher in democracies (see also Inglehart, 1997, ch. 6). Following Levi (1996), Brehm and Rahn argue that democratic government can lead to generalized trust–and interpersonal trust will in turn make people more likely to have confidence in their government. Stolle (1999b, 9) elaborates on this linkage, which she expects to be particularly strong for local governments:

> ...citizens who feel that they are taken seriously by politicians, listened to, and respected, may also develop a belief in other people or people in general. If they perceive politicians to act fairly, honestly, and responsively, they feel more secure and encouraged to trust others. Surely, there must be a connection between those realities and perceptions of local political life, political life, and generalized trust.

I am skeptical of these linkages. Most types of social connections don't bring us into contact with people who are different from ourselves and few of us spend enough time in civic groups to change our values. Some activities– volunteering time and giving to charity–do

connect us with people who are different from ourselves. They also call upon our ethical ideals that tie us to the idea that we have a responsibility for people in our moral community. But most types of civic activity don't (and can't) produce trust in people who are different from ourselves. The linkage between trust in people we know and strangers is rather weak.

Trust in government is more ephemeral than trust in people (see Chapter 3). But there is some evidence linking the two types of trust, so it is important to consider the linkage. Most of the evidence to date suggests that confidence in government depends upon trust in people rather than the other way around. So people who have faith in others will extend this trust to the political system (Brehm and Rahn, 1997; Brehm, Rahn, and Carlson, in press). However there is also some evidence of a reciprocal relationship (Berger and Brehm, 1997). Instead, I suggest that the two types of trust have different foundations. Trust in government rests more on approval of the leaders of the day than it does on deeply-seated values.

<u>*Schmoozers* and *Machers*</u>

Social contacts breed social trust, Putnam argues. And he distinguishes between *schmoozers* and *machers*, two Yiddish terms representing different aspects of social life (Putnam, 2000, 93-94). *Schmoozing* is hanging out with friends and chatting–whiling away your time in the pleasant pursuit of nothing in particular. A *macher* "makes things happen" by joining groups, working on community projects, giving to charity, following politics, and the like (Putnam, 2000, 93-94).[2]

America at the turn of the century has fewer *schmoozers* and *machers*, by Putnam's (2000, chs. 2, 3, 4, and 6) count. We socialize less with friends, eat dinner less with our family–either at home or in restaurants, play cards less, visit less with our neighbors or relatives,

go to church and synagogue less frequently, attend fewer club meetings, belong to fewer organizations, no longer join the Parent-Teachers Association, vote less often, attend fewer political rallies, write fewer letters to the editor or elected representatives, and signed fewer petitions. Putnam (2000, 291) suggests that our withdrawal from social life is strongly connected with the decline in social trust (Putnam, 2000, 291). Even if it is difficult to sort out what is cause and what is effect, there is clearly a syndrome of withdrawal from others in our community. We are now a nation of "homebodies" and we don't think other people are quite so worthy.

What Putnam has shown us is that states that have high levels of formal and informal socializing and political participation are also more trusting. But it is less clear that the trends for all of these activities track each other so closely–and, even more critically, that there is some connection at the individual level between being either a *schmoozer* and a *macher* and trusting others.

I leave the question of whether our withdrawal from social life follows the same trend as the decline in trust to Chapter 7 (hint: it doesn't). First, I examine the individual-level connections. I shall present tables for only a few of the analyses that I discuss. The story of the book is trust, not group membership or volunteering or any other consequence of faith in other people. So presentation of tables for the consequences of trust would whet the reader's appetite for a discussion of what drives each of the dependent variables. That would take me quite far afield from trust. So, aside from a few selected tables, I shall instead describe the consequences of trust and show how faith in other people affects them. I shall list the other predictors in the models in the Appendix.

There are several reasons to doubt that an individual-level connection exists. First and

foremost, most of our social connections involve people very much like ourselves. When we attend religious services, we congregate with people who believe in the same ideals that we do. When we join civic organizations, we also meet people with similar interests. When we get involved with politics, we work with people with similar ideologies and party affiliations to ourselves. Most critically, virtually all of our *schmoozing* involves people we know well. So it is unclear how we transmit trust in people like us to people who are different from us.

Second, do we spend enough time in socializing or group activity to make us more trusting?

Third, not all socializing will foster trust. Often, perhaps usually, we take political action to defeat someone else, not to try to reach some common ground. Political action may well thrive on a healthy degree of mistrust (Barber, 1983, 166, 169; Hardin, 2000, 223). We know that fundamentalists are more likely to be particularized than generalized trusters, so it is far from clear that religious devotions will always lead us to be trusting of fellow citizens. Membership in ethnic organizations might also reinforce in-group ties and make us less tolerant of people different from ourselves.

Does Social Interaction Lead to Trust?

There is lots of speculation about the impact of both informal and formal social connections on trust, but there are very few studies that have tried to sort out what causes what.[3] Putnam's early analysis (1995a, 1995b), Brehm and Rahn (1997), and Stolle (1998a, 1998b) all find that people who join civic groups *are* more trusting than stay-at-homes (but see Damico, Conway, and Damico, 2000, 344-346). Putnam (1993, 180; 2000, 137) argues that trust and social connections form a "virtuous circle": Trusting people join groups and social life makes us

more trusting. But he does not test this claim. Brehm and Rahn (1997) confirm Putnam's thesis in their analysis of General Social Survey data from 1972 to 1996. Civic engagement is even more likely to produce trust than faith in others is to lead to participation in group life, they report.

Stolle's survey of group members (and some non-members) in the United States, Germany, and Sweden asks people how long they have belonged to each type of group. And she finds that neither the simple fact of group membership nor the length of involvement makes people more trusting. So the trust gap between engaged and disengaged people is attributable to "self selection." Trusting people join groups, she argues, but group life doesn't make people more trusting.

These are all important studies. But none provides a satisfactory answer to whether civic engagement make you more trusting. If the causal arrow can go both ways, then we should not estimate simple models that tests for effects in only one direction, as Putnam and Stolle do.[4] To test the "virtuous circle" hypothesis, we need a statistical technique that lets us test for linkages in *both* directions. And this means some technique of simultaneous equation modeling. The estimates from more simple statistical techniques (such as ordinary least squares regression) may lead to erroneous conclusions.

Brehm and Rahn do estimate a multiple-equation model, allowing for possible connections among civic engagement, trust in people, and trust in government. But their analysis has two different problems. First, their measure of generalized trust is a scale that also includes perceptions of fairness and helpfulness (see Chapter 3). Second, and more critically, what you get out of a statistical model depends heavily on what you put into it. And their model is very thin on

measures of optimism and control. It is far from clear that measures of civic engagement would still matter in a more elaborate model.

I shall present a more comprehensive test of the argument about trust and social connections by examining a wide range of types of informal and formal ties, linking them to trust, and determining what causes what through simultaneous equation estimation (see the Appendix for lists of variables included in the models).[5]

We know more than a little about the connections between group membership and trust. Yet we know far less about the link between being a *schmoozer* and a truster–or about the ties between activities that might bind you more to people who are different from yourself, such as volunteering time and giving to charity. There may be good reason to assume that this type of 'bridging" activity might make you more trusting of strangers. There is less reason to believe that "bonding" with people very much like yourself–folks in groups you join and *especially in your social circle*–would make you more likely to trust strangers.

Some forms of *schmoozing* may foster distrust rather than faith in strangers. Putnam (2000, 101) argues that Americans are going to neighborhood bars less frequently than in the past and worries that the goodwill and socializing at "the real-life equivalent of *Cheers*, the neighborhood bar 'where everybody knows your name'...is becoming a thing of the past."[6] Others, including Sergeant John Kaminski of the Cleveland, Ohio Police Department, have a different view (Butterfield, 1996, A1):

> Back when Sgt....Kaminski started out in homicide in the 1960s, the most common murder cases were barroom brawls. There was a bar on every street corner in Cleveland those days, and the men who worked in this city's steel and automobile

> plants took the trolley to their jobs, stopping off for a shot and a beer on the way home. In some bars, it was like clock work....After a few drinks a patron would insult the man on the next stool, usually a friend, and pretty soon a knife or a gun would be pulled out and one of the customers would be dead. No more. The factories, the bars, and the way of life are largely gone. "I can't even remember the last bar fight," said Sergeant Kaminski, who is 65 years old and has been a homicide detective for 30 years.

Not every bar has the upscale sociability of *Cheers* or the good fellowship of the English pub.

Both Putnam and Sergeant Kaminski may overstate the societal implications of the neighborhood tavern, but the bulk of the evidence supports the sergeant. There is at best a very modest *positive* relationship between going to bars and trusting others in the 1974-1996 GSS. But this doesn't mean that bars are marked by good companionship. People who visit bars daily are twice as likely to be the victims of robbery or burglary and almost six times as likely to have been arrested.[7] Overall, you are better advised to watch your wallet in a bar than to leave it on the counter.[8]

The story is not much more optimistic when we look at other forms of socializing that Putnam (2000) discusses. We *schmooze* when we eat out, but people who go to restaurants are no more trusting than folks who eat at home.[9] Hanging out at bingo parlors has no effect on trust.[10] Playing cards doesn't lead to trust either, whether you just "play cards" or play the very social games of poker and pinochle. People who play cards have more faith in their neighbors–the people they play with–but not in strangers.[11]

There is one *possible* exception: playing bridge. Bridge players are *far more trusting* than

non-players (by 73 to 44 percent) and playing this sociable game makes them *dramatically* more trusting. Do they get there by socializing with people who are beyond their immediate social circle? Not quite. "Social" bridge clubs have a lot of conversation about all manner of things–including politics. But they are composed of people who already know each other and who largely think alike. "Serious" clubs have more diverse memberships–but their members are so single-minded about their passion that all they do at meetings is play bridge and go home (Erikson and Nosanchuk, 1990; Scott and Godbey, 1992). This possible exception thus lacks a compelling story.

Across a wide variety of social connections–from visiting friends and parents to talking to neighbors–there are at best modest correlations with trust. There is some evidence that trusters are more likely to talk to more neighbors–but they are *less* likely to see their best friends often and *less* likely to spend a lot of time with parents and relatives.[12] They are no more likely to go to parades, sports events, or art shows often; spend a lot of time with friends from work or simply to hang out with friends in a public place; visit chat rooms on the World Wide Web a lot, or even to play lots of team sports. People who trust folks they know–their neighbors–*are* more likely to go to parades and join sports teams frequently. But overall, the major reason why people socialize a lot is that they have many friends, not that they trust strangers. Misanthropes have friends too.[13]

Trust and Organizational Life

There is little evidence that *schmoozing* either depends upon trus or, more critically, can produce it. What about social interactions through organized groups? Putnam (1993, 115) points to choral societies as one of the types of groups that helps people develop trust in others. The 1993 GSS asked whether people perform music, dance, or drama–about as close as we can come

to Putnam's choral societies. Who sings? Young singles who like classical music. Choral societies are dating clubs. They don't generate trust–and they don't depend upon it either.[14]

Let's look at the evidence more broadly. First, I look at whether trust shapes civic engagement and then move on to whether group membership leads to trust.[15] I examine many different venues for volunteering and charitable contributions (which show a deeper commitment to community life) as well as types of voluntary organizations across a wide range of surveys. I estimated single equation models for a wide variety of types of civic engagement that I summarize in Table 5-1.[16] I classified each venue as reflecting high trust, middle trust, no effect, negative trust, and mixed effects based upon the overall pattern for each across the surveys.[17]

The story is just about what we would expect from the literature on trust and civic associations: Some of the time group members, volunteers, and people who give to charity are more trusting than folks who opt out of civic life. But much of the time they are no more trusting and once in a while, they are even less trusting. The most trusting people take part in cultural and educational groups and the least trusting in unions and religious organizations (always taking into account the demographic backgrounds of group members). People who work with others on civic or political activities are not any more trusting than others. And perhaps the biggest surprise is the middling level of trust among members of fraternal organizations. Groups such as Rotary Clubs, the Shriners, the Moose, the Odd Fellows, and the Elks, had reputations for doing lots of good works (Putnam, 1993, 115; 2000, 20, 117). Their passing reflects "an American society at war with no-longer fashionable notions of community and fellowship," write Hakim and Mitchell (1995, F4; cf. Putnam, 2000). Members of fraternal groups *do* volunteer more than other people.[18] But they are barely more trusting than their fellow citizens, once we control for other

factors (especially age). As with socializing, you don't need trust to get people involved in civic groups.

Table 5-1 about here

Do people become more trusting once they are in groups? I focus first on the same GSS surveys that Putnam and Brehm and Rahn examine. I report a simultaneous equation model in Table 5-2.[19] The model tests for reciprocal causation among trust, membership in secular voluntary associations, and optimism for the future. I focus on secular organizations because people are likely to have different motivations for joining religious associations. Religious organizations may be havens for particularized rather than generalized trusters. I also exclude unions from the calculations, since for many people membership in unions is not voluntary.

The simultaneous estimation allows me to look at reciprocal causation. Does membership in voluntary associations produce trust, consume trust, both, or neither? And does trust depend upon optimism for the future–or does trust lead to optimism?

Table 5-2 about here

The model for trust is similar to those in Chapter 4 and so are the results. What is different is that I include membership in secular organizations in the model for trust, and trust is also included in the model for group affiliation.[20] Trust has the strongest impact of any variable in the model for group membership. People with faith in others are Lane's "sociable" men and women. They take active roles in their communities. But civic engagement *does not* lead to greater trust. Simply put, group membership has *no effect on trust*.[21] Trust largely reflects an

optimistic world view (as in Chapter 4), rather than the experiences learned in civic groups. The results in Table 5-2 suggest support for the "self-selection" thesis: *If there is a connection between civic life and trust, it is through the "virtuous arrow" (from trust to engagement) rather than the "virtuous circle."* You won't become more trusting by joining civic groups.

There is an additional message in this table. The relationship between trust and optimism is not one way. It is reciprocal. Greater optimism leads to more trust and a trusting disposition makes you more optimistic. The causal linkage is not completely clear–it may well be that trusting people become more optimistic by doing good deeds, as the discussion of volunteering and giving to charity suggests. Whatever the causal logic, there is a much more powerful effect of optimism on trust than the other way around. Optimism has more than three times the effect on trust as trust has on optimism.

Producing and Consuming Trust

Trusters belong to lots of groups (Wollebaek and Selle, 2000, 31). Yet I have argued–and presented data in Table 5-1--that some groups may be have more trusting than others. Even assuming that the causal arrow goes only one way–from trust to civic engagement–not all forms of participation depend upon trust. Groups with heterogenous memberships are likely to have more trusting members (cf. Stolle, 1998b, 516). Religious organizations may tap deep feelings of helping others–but fundamentalist denominations may lead to particularized rather than generalized trust. Groups stressing distinct identities–ethnic organizations and veterans' groups–may also lead to mistrusters of people who are different. And some organizations may simply lead nowhere: Hobby groups, like choral societies, may bring together people with similar interests

who have no intention to do more than build model ships. And, as I argued in Chapter 2, more demanding forms of civic engagement such as volunteering or giving to charity should be more likely to both consume and produce trust.

Now I put the pieces of the puzzle together and test a more comprehensive model of what types of civic participation might produce trust–and how different modes of engagement rely on faith in others. I turn to the 1996 ANES, which has the best overall set of measures of group and informal involvement. The survey asked people whether they were involved in 20 different types of voluntary organizations, encompassing religious, political, cultural, and professional association as well as groups addressed to the interests of the young, the old, women, hobbyists, and people seeking self-help. People could say that they belonged to as many as four groups within each category (as opposed to just checking "yes" or "no" for the GSS and most other surveys), though only for business, hobby, ethnic, and education groups did as many as four percent select two or more. The ANES also asked about volunteering and donating to charity as well as talking to neighbors and attending religious services. Overall there are 24 measures of civic engagement and I use them all in a "kitchen sink" model to get a first cut at what might affect trust. I estimate a probit model using the 24 indicators of civic engagement and a series of other predictors based upon the estimations in Chapter 4 and present the results in Table 5-3.

Table 5-3 about here

The chief message of the estimation in Table 5-3 is that *very few types of civic engagement lead people to become more trusting*. Only five of 24 measures of involvement make people significantly more likely to trust others: business, cultural, and children's groups, contributions to

charity, and attending religious services. And three of these five just pass significance at the generous .10 significance level. Joining an ethnic group makes you *less* trusting. All other forms of civic engagement–including the political, the religious, volunteering, talking to neighbors, and groups for education, self-help, women, the elderly, hobbyists, fraternal orders, and veterans–don't make folks more trusting.

This analysis tells but part of the story, since it doesn't allow for trust to shape any of the forms of civic engagement. It does serve an important pruning function, since a full model testing for reciprocal causation among trust and all forms of civic engagement would have 25 equations–one for each variable in Table 5-3 plus another for trust. At best this would be unwieldy and uninterpretable. At worst, the whole thing would be likely to implode.[22]

The model in Table 5-3 suggests dropping all but the significant predictors of trust in the probit and this is what I do. I then estimate a three-stage least squares model of involvement in business, ethnic, cultural, and church groups as well as charitable contributions and volunteering. Even though church groups and volunteering were not significant in the model in Table 5-3, I included them in the simultaneous equation estimation because they are theoretically important. Volunteering reflects a commitment to others, and religious activities may reinforce particularized trust.[23] The resulting model has eight equations–for business, children's, ethnic, cultural, and church groups, volunteering, giving to charity, and trust. I report the results for the effects of trust on civic engagement and for civic participation on trust in Table 5-4 below.[24]

Table 5-4 about here

The results are striking. Trust has powerful effects on business and cultural group

involvement as well as on charitable contributions and volunteering. Trust is the strongest predictor of volunteering, with an impact almost double that of its closest rival, knowing and talking to your neighbors.[25] Beyond church involvement, trust has the greatest effect of any variable on charitable contributions (just beating out family income). And trust ranks first for business group involvement and second (behind being Jewish) for cultural membership. But its effects are *not* universally powerful: Trust has a small positive effect on ethnic group involvement, but no impact at all on either church or children's group membership.[26]

Trust matters most on those activities that signify the greatest commitment to your community–donating money and especially giving time. The two organizations where trust has big impacts help build bridges across groups. People make connections in business and professional societies–and these friendships are likely to be particularly important to women and minorities in a world traditionally dominated by white males. Cultural organizations can spread ideas that promote understanding of other peoples' music, art, and drama. Associations based on churches, children, and ethnic groups are less likely to build bridges across cultures. They bring you into contact with people like yourself and whom you may already know.

Does civic engagement promote trust? Membership in organizations does *not* increase trust, no matter what the group is. I started with 20 types of associations named in the 1996 ANES and eliminated all but six for the more complex analysis. None of these survived the test of reciprocal causation. Involvement in church groups even *decreases* confidence in others. Involvement in children's groups also seems to depress trust, though I have no ready explanation for this and am wary of putting too much confidence in the negative coefficient.[27]

For most all types of both formal and informal social contacts, trust is *neither a cause nor*

an effect. People can form social bonds without drawing on moral resources. People join civic groups, they say, because friends are members, because they want to meet others who can help them in their career, or to help out in their children's activities (Wuthnow, 1998, 29). There is nothing wrong with that. It's great that young people who like classical music get together to meet potential mates with similar interests. It's nice that birders bond together to get a peak at the rara avis. And it's fine that people enjoy themselves competing in bowling leagues. But let's not reify these activities as the backbone of a civil society. Trusting societies may be marked by lots of associations, but so may societies lurching toward totalitarianism (Berman, 1997, 565-566).

Doing Good and Trusting Others

But sometimes civic engagement does promote trust. Both giving to charity and donating time create "warm glows," feelings of doing good. Indeed, for both volunteering and especially for giving to charity, the boost in trust from helping others was greater than the impact of trust on acts of beneficence. Volunteers say, "I'm sure you'll hear this over and over, but I get a lot more than I give" (Bowles, 1996, B4). And there is evidence that they do. The impact of volunteering on trust is 20 percent greater than the effect of trust on volunteering. And giving to charity has almost two and a half times the impact on trust that faith in others has on making contributions. But as powerful as giving time and money are, they are *not* the most important determinants of trust–whereas trust does rank at the top of the factors leading to acts of beneficence. So you need trust to get people involved in good deeds, though folks can be trusting without giving of themselves.

But good deeds repay the good Samaritans many times over. In the 1996 Giving and

Volunteering survey trusters take up almost twice as many volunteering opportunities (1.606 versus .856) and charitable options (2.015 versus 1.221) as non-trusters. Volunteers who take part in eight or more organizations are twice as likely to trust others (by 64 to 34 percent), while people who give to seven or more different types of charities are more than twice as likely to put their faith in strangers (by 68 to 30 percent).[28] Had I a cardinal measure of trust I would expect to find volunteers and donors to have much higher scores than people who don't give of themselves. The stranger factor from the Pew Philadelphia survey gives us precisely this type of measure and it shows that people who don't volunteer for any secular organization have a standardized trust score of -.123 while people who give of themselves in five or more types of organizations have a mean score of .187 ($p < .008$).

The lesson seems to be that civic participation can produce trust, but only when there is faith in strangers to begin with. It cannot make a silk purse of a sow's ear–or you can't turn Scrooge into Bob Cratchitt simply by forcing him to volunteer at a homeless shelter or to empty bedpans at a hospital. As an unhappy student said of her mandatory "service learning" program, in which she had to give her time to a worthy cause to graduate from a Maryland high school: "You're just forcing it on us, and people don't get as much out of that" (Cloud, 1997, 76).

Granted that it takes trust to make more trust (suggesting that faith in others is truly a form of capital, social or otherwise), there is one finding that seems puzzling. Giving time is more demanding than simply writing a check to a charity. So why should the payback be so much greater for donating money than for devoting time?

My first thought was that there must be something strange about the estimation using the 1996 ANES, so I constructed another, though simpler, simultaneous-equation model using the

1996 Giving and Volunteering survey. I present this model, which has just three equations, in Table 5-5. Once again, trust is by far the strongest predictor of both volunteering and giving to charity. It even trumps your socializing patterns, whether you help specific people (relatives or homeless people on the street), and how active you were when you were young (being involved in student government–and even volunteering with your parents and your family). But there is *no* "warm glow" from volunteering at all and a big one from giving to charity.[29]

Table 5-5 about here

There is no easy way to solve this quandary–but I speculate that we may be more likely to volunteer with our own kind. Even putting religious volunteering to the side, we may give time with people like ourselves–in our schools, with our children's youth groups, and the like. As Sara Mosle (2000, 25) wrote: "...a lot of what passes for volunteering used to be called simply 'parenting': people heling out in their own children's schools or coaching their own children's soccer teams. Kids with parents who already have resources end up benefitting the most."

Our charitable horizons may be more expansive. We may read about a faraway needy cause in the newspaper or see a story about it on television. We give aid to victims of natural disasters such as hurricanes or earthquakes. We are more likely to donate to homeless shelters than to spend time there. Many people spend time looking for "worthy causes" when they decide to give to charity, but may give of their time at the first and most convenient opportunity, which is likely to be among people they know. Giving to charity, except in the most unusual cases, involves helping people who are different from yourself, at least in class terms. Volunteering, even as it is more demanding, may not extend our horizons to strangers. If this argument is

correct, no wonder we get more of a warm glow when we give money to strangers than when we give time to our children and neighbors.[30]

There is both circumstantial and more direct evidence for my argument. In the 1996 Pew Philadelphia survey, both generalized and particularized trusters are more likely to volunteer in schools, for environmental groups, with youth organizations, and for the elderly. Volunteers for the arts and in hospital are more likely to be generalized trusters. And people who do good works through religious organizations are considerably more likely to be *particularized trusters*. Mainline (or "liberal") Protestant and Catholic churches do reach out to provide social services to the broader community. But white fundamentalist churches "do not embrace social service provision as an essential part of their mission [and] concentrate their energy on evangelism on meeting the immediate needs of congregational members" (Greenberg, 1999, 19-20). Much religious volunteering draws on one's "strong" ties to people you know (Granovetter, 1973) rather than on weaker bonds to the larger community.[31]

The Social Capital Benchmark Survey, conducted in the summer and fall of 2000, provides even stronger evidence (see n. 11). This survey separated donations to charity by whether their source–religious or secular–and volunteering by beneficiary. *Generalized trust has no effect on religious giving, but a significant impact on secular donations. Religious donations stem from particularized trust (trust in your co-religionists), while secular donations do not.* Most people who trust nobody still contribute to religious causes. Generalized trusters and people who *only* trust people of their same faith are equally likely to give to religious causes. However, a bare majority of mistrusters give to secular causes, compared to 63 percent of people who only trust others of their faith and 76 percent of generalized trusters.

Similarly, much of the good works we do for volunteering benefit our own kind. People give time to the arts because it interests them (they are highly educated), not because they trust others. Going to religious services and participating in your house of worship, not trust, leads people to give time to spiritual causes. Having kids, rather than being trusting, engages people in volunteering for young people. *On the other hand, some volunteering does reach out, most notably giving time to the poor or elderly, for health care or fighting disease, or for a civic group. The type of volunteering that reaches out to others depends upon generalized trust; in contrast, people who primarily trust their co-religionists shy away from helping strangers. And people who only trust people of their same ethnic background are less likely to engage in almost all kinds of volunteering than generalized trusters, even at their houses of worship.*[32]

Do these findings represent a general syndrome of civic engagement by generalized trusters and withdrawal by particularized trusters? No! Some particularized trusters will participate only in groups of their own kind. Fundamentalist Christians, e.g., don't participate much in secular civic groups (see the citations in Chapter 2). Yet, there is less evidence that particularized trust leads to opting out more generally. People who only trust their own ethnic group generally participate at similar levels to generalized trusters in 17 of the 18 types of groups in the Social Capital Benchmark Survey. People who only trust their co-religionists are just as active as generalized trusters in 15 of the 18 forms of association.[33] Particularized trusters primarily opt out of the more demanding forms of civic engagement that might link them to people who are different from themselves. They can–and do–form their own self-help, hobby, and youth groups (among others). And so do misanthropes. Mistrusters do participate less than either particularized or generalized trusters, but the differences are generally minuscule.[34] As

misanthropes have friends, they also seem to have groups. They may be dour sorts, but misery does seem to love company too.

Reach Out and Touch Someone

It seems tempting to draw a sharp line between the social ties that depend upon trust and those that don't. If an act draws upon a sense of compassion, then it will be based upon trust. If the social tie is mainly for your own enjoyment, it has no ties to trust. This is too simplistic an argument. There are all sorts of reasons for doing good deeds beyond the sense of generalized faith in others, ranging from a commitment to people who are close to you (family and friends) to a basic sense of human decency that most people share. Random acts of kindness won't produce trust, since faith in others is not based upon reciprocity. Helping behavior may not even be good guides to who is trustworthy and who is not. Some good deeds produce a "warm glow," while others are mere fireflies in the realm of trust, lighting up one's faith in humanity for a brief second before fluttering away.

There are some data fragments that directly address the question of whether trust depends upon reciprocity. The 1996 Giving and Volunteering survey of the INDEPENDENT SECTOR asked respondents whether they had been helped by someone else when they were young, whether their family had helped someone, or whether someone they admired had helped someone. If trust depends upon reciprocity and experience, then being helped or seeing someone close to you assist others should matter mightily for your own views. But they don't: 38.5 percent of people who had been helped by someone when they were young believe that most people can be trusted compared to 38.3 percent who were not the beneficiaries of beneficence; 38.7 percent of people whose family helped someone when they were young trust others, compared to 37.8 of

people whose family provided no assistance. And marginally fewer people who saw someone they admire provide aid place their faith in others (38.5 percent compared to 38.8 percent).[35]

In most cases, there is no clear linkage between receiving help or even seeing someone you admire give assistance and whether you volunteer now. In a few cases, there are moderate correlations, but they tend to reflect volunteering activities that may help out people you know (youth related volunteering and giving time through work).[36]

Nor does the link between helping and trust depend upon who the beneficiary is. You can help a neighbor or give a homeless person some spare change–and in neither case are you likely to be more trusting than others in the society. Helping strangers is not a fail-safe guide to a trusting disposition.

In the summer of 1998 my family took a break from the Delaware shore. We visited Australia and rented a motor home (and didn't take a cooler with us). Somewhere between nowhere and nowhere else we had a flat tire. We barely knew where we were and had no idea where the spare tire was located. I saw a small house down the road and my son and I walked there to see if we could ring the emergency road service for help. A woman answered the door, took pity on this father and son with strange accents, and let me call both the road service and the owner of the motor home company. We thanked her for her kindness and walked back to the van to wait the hour or so it would take the road service to appear.

Five minutes later a truck whizzed by in the opposite direction, stopped suddenly, made a U-turn, and pulled up to our motor home. The woman and her husband got out and he immediately squeezed under the vehicle, located the spare, got his jack from his truck, and began changing the tire. He continued working hard even when the road service arrived (thankfully in

just 15 minutes) and didn't leave until we were road-ready once more. Then, he and his wife (who stood directing traffic around us) got back in their truck, waved, and took off in a huff like the Lone Ranger and Tonto.[37]

Why did the Australian couple help us? It was clear that they didn't expect any reciprocity from me. I offered to pay for the phone calls. They declined. It was highly unlikely that they would expect some favor from me in the future, since we were returning to the States in three days and they did not appear prosperous enough to make the trip to the Washington area. Even if they somehow wound up in my neighborhood, they were in a particularly poor situation to demand reciprocity since (like the Lone Ranger) they didn't even ask our names (or give us theirs).

Here was a couple who could have turned us away. They could have demonstrated their fine character by simply letting us make the two long distance calls. But they chose to come back and find us and help us out, even when the road service was working on the tire. This seems like a wonderful trust story. But it may not be. All sorts of people, trusters and mistrusters, are willing to help people that they can identify.

In both the Giving and Volunteering survey and the Niemi-Jennings parent sample, generalized trusters reserve their good deeds for *organized* volunteering rather than person-to-person assistance. And these good works have a big impact on their children. Parents who take part in organized volunteering have more trusting children. And this impact is lasting. If your parents volunteered, you will be more trusting as a young adult as well.[38]

Individual acts of beneficence, including helping family, neighbors, the homeless, or other needy people you see on the street are uncorrelated with trust.[39] Informal helping does reflect

your personal experience: People who were helped when they were young or who saw someone they admire help someone when they were young are more likely to give to a *specific individual* who needs help. But they are not any more prone than others to do organized volunteering or donate to charitable organizations. This is where trust comes in. It takes generalized trust to give either time or money to help people you don't know and will likely never see (cf. Amato, 1990, 31). Good works toward your own kind or at least to people you can identify is based upon personal experiences and reciprocity. Good works toward people you can't identify depends upon your moral sense–and not upon your life history.[40]

Helping people you can see is not quite the same thing as helping your own kind, but the psychological logic seems similar. Once we make eye contact, we seem to treat beneficiaries as different from the "generalized" stranger. We think back to our experiences when others helped us and we react in kind. The Australian couple who helped us may have taken pity upon us when I walked up to their house, with my son, then eight years old, looking at them expectantly. Perhaps someone had helped one of their children. Reciprocity may lead us to do good deeds. But it won't lead us to trust and it will lead us to do different sorts of good deeds than trust.

We may readily jump to the conclusion that people who help others, like the husband and wife who helped fixed the flat tire on our van in Australia, must be generalized trusters since they perform good deeds. But this isn't the case. I didn't ask whether they believe that most people can be trusted and they didn't volunteer whether they have a positive view of human nature. But, upon reflection, there was little reason to expect that they were generalized trusters. People in small towns and rural areas may depend upon such acts of reciprocity–and the couple who helped my family may have benefitted from others' assistance in the past. Australians who live in rural

areas are generally less trusting than urban residents–but they are *more* likely to provide help to other people (Onyx and Bullen, 1998).

Neither trust nor civic engagement rest upon reciprocity. And if people don't decide to trust others based upon people they know, they certainly should not make up their minds upon the purported behavior of people they don't know. Thus, contextual effects are not likely to represent estimates of trustworthiness. Instead, the assumption that they stand for contagion effects seems quite reasonable.

Generalized trust isn't simply an evaluation of how trustworthy others are. But it is far more than a synopsis of how we see ourselves. Almost everyone sees themselves as trustworthy. Fifty-three percent of Americans said that they were "very trusting" persons and an additional 39 percent called themselves "somewhat trusting" in the 1998 GSS. In the Pew Philadelphia survey, more than 90 percent of people said that "most people trust you." Yet, our upbeat views of ourselves don't translate readily into favorable views of others. A majority of "very trusting" people (56 percent) says that "you can't be too careful in dealing with people." And a majority (51.7 percent) who say that "most people trust you" also urge caution in dealing with others.[41]

From People We Know to Strangers

Most of our social connections neither depend upon trust nor produce it. They are "moral dead ends." For a few activities, you need trust (the "virtuous arrow") and for even fewer there is evidence of a "virtuous circle." Even when social ties can produce trust, they depend even more heavily upon it. Most of the time, you can't get there (trust in strangers) from here (trust in people you know).

There is reason to be skeptical of the linkage between trust in people you know and a

generalized faith in others. As Rosenblum (1998, 48) argues:

> ...there is the tendency to adopt a simplistic "transmission belt' model of civil society, which says that the beneficial formative effects of association spill over from one sphere to another....The "transmission belt" model is simplistic as a general dynamic. It is one thing to say that within face-to-face rotating credit associations "social networks allow trust to become transitive and spread: trust you, because I trust her and she assures me that she trusts you," and quite another thing to show that habits of trust cultivated in one social sphere are exhibited in incongruent groups in separate spheres.

In Japan, there is evidence of such a "transmission belt" of trust–from your immediate family to the school to the workplace–and then, it stops. Particularized trust doesn't spread to strangers in Japan; indeed, "when Japanese people are taken out of...settings" where trust has developed because of personal ties, "they tend often to behave in highly aggressive and exploitative ways" (Eisenstadt, 2000, 61). Stolle (2000, 233) argues that civic groups amount to "private social capital," providing benefits only to members that "are not universal and cannot be generalized to other settings."

The 1999 New York Times Millennium survey asked the generalized trust, fairness, and helpfulness questions–as well as whether people they know were fair or helpful. And the 1996 Pew Philadelphia survey asked the generalized trust, fairness, and helpfulness questions as well as whether friends and family were trustworthy (see Chapters 2 and 3). These surveys offer an opportunity to examine the reciprocal effects of expectations about people we know and trust in strangers. I estimated simultaneous equation models for the three measures of generalized trust,

fairness, and helpfulness and the two knowledge-based indicators for the Times Millennium survey and for the same three measures and the trust in friends and family factor for the Pew survey. I present diagrams of the key relationships in Figures 5-1 and 5-2 (see the Appendix for the full models).

Figures 5-1 and 5-2 about here

For the Times Millennium survey, I constrained the linkages among the three generalized measures: Trust could shape fairness and helpfulness, but not the other way around. This is arbitrary, but allowing for complete reciprocal causation led to nonsensical results where nothing caused anything else. The story in Figure 5-1 is that interpersonal trust is related to the other generalized measures (hardly a surprise since many people use them as part of the same scale). But it has only weak relationships to the knowledge-based measures.

Trusting strangers doesn't make you more likely to believe that people you know would be helpful or fair. We are much more likely to say that people *we know* are both helpful (85 percent) and fair (90 percent), compared to people we don't know (59 percent helpful, 35 percent fair, and 40 percent trusting). As Hardin (2000, 80) argues, we restrict most of our interactions to people we know are trustworthy.[42] We have so much confidence in people we know that our personal relations are a rather poor guide to how we feel about strangers. There is, to be sure, a link between knowledge-based fairness and generalized trust–but it is rather weak and is barely significant even at the generous .10 level.

The results of the 1996 Pew Philadelphia survey are even more pointed. Here I estimate

just two equations, one for interpersonal trust and the other for particularized (knowledge-based) trust in our friends and family. Generalized trust shapes generalized helpfulness and fairness. Generalized fairness, *but not generalized trust*, makes people more likely to have faith in friends and family. But there is *no reciprocal relationship* from knowledge-based trust *to any of the generalized measures of trust, fairness, or helpfulness. You simply can't get there from here.* We don't transfer trust in people we know to strangers. So the weak links between trust and socializing with people like ourselves stem from the lack of a broader connection.

The Pew Philadelphia study shows why trust in one domain doesn't translate easily into the other. Among the most important factors shaping generalized trust are a sense of personal control (I can have an impact on my community) and parental warning not to trust others (see the Appendix). Personal connections such as support networks have no role in predicting generalized trust. But they are critical for particularized trust. How you feel about your friends and family depends upon how long you have lived in your community, whether you think that you can turn to people for support, whether you have people you can rely upon, if you are a union member, whether you have volunteered for a secular organization, and especially your race. Particularized trust reflects your immediate life experiences far more than generalized trust.

These results are *not* specific to one culture. Gibson (2001, 61) reports a correlation of virtually zero between trust in strangers and trust in people in your social network *in Russia.* As in the United States, the overwhelming majority of people place trust in their acquaintenances and only a minority have faith in strangers.

<u>Trust in People and Trust in Government</u>

If neither trust in friends nor recpirocity makes us more trusting of strangers, might

government do the job? Do attitudes toward government shape our relations with fellow citizens? Is the well-documented decline of faith in government in the United States responsible for the waning of interpersonal trust?

Lane (1959, 164) argues, "Trust in elected officials is seen to be only a more specific instance of trust in mankind." Advocates of a link between the two types of trust maintain that strong government performance makes people feel better about government–and ultimately more willing to cooperate with each other (Berger and Brehm, 1997; Brehm and Rahn, 1997, 1008; Misztal, 1996, 198; Stolle, 1999b). Citizens can rest easier when dealing with strangers if they know that government will enforce contracts. We don't have to be quite so wary in dealing with each other if we know that there is a neutral arbitrator to resolve disputes (Levi, 1998). Rahn, Brehm, and Carlson (1997, 24) argue that when people trust their government, they are more likely to believe that they can influence it. This growing sense of efficacy makes people more likely to trust each other.

But Americans' sense of efficacy has not grown. As we have lost faith in each other, we also have far less confidence in government. In 1964 almost 80 percent of Americans trusted the federal government to "do the right thing" always or most of the time. By 1994 the percentage of trusters had fallen to barely more than 20 percent before bouncing up again in 1996 (to 29 percent). We became much more likely to believe that government is run by big interests (from 31 percent in 1964 to 72 percent in 1996), to say that government wastes taxes (from 48 to 61 percent), to say that many in government are crooked (from 30 to 43 percent), to deny that government officials care about the common person (from 75 percent in 1960 to 25 percent), and to say that "people like me have no say" in politics (from 30 percent in 1960 to 45 percent).

Distrust of government may well be a rational response to a venal political system. Fifty or more years ago, a lobbyist asked Louisiana Governor Earl Long how he should explain a broken campaign promise on a tax break for business. Long replied, "I'll tell you what to tell them. Tell them I lied" (quoted in Liebling, 1970, 41). Several decades later, then Representative (now Senator) John Breaux (D, LA) was asked if his vote could be bought. No, he replied, "but it is available for rent" (quoted in Barone and Ujifusa, 1997, 621). In between one President was forced to resign for lying about a burglary and another was forced to forsake reelection because he had not told the truth about a war many thousands of miles away. Later, another chief executive lost an election for going back on his solemn pledge not to raise taxes, while a second President was impeached for lying to a grand jury about indiscretions with an intern.

Distrust is the citizen's tool to try to keep political leaders honest; some skeptics see exhortations to trust our leaders as strategies by the powerful to keep the masses in their place (Barber, 1983, 167-170). Leaders lie to us about things big and small.[43] They may manipulate the economy to get themselves reelected (Tufte, 1978). No wonder we have less trust in our elected leaders.

Is our withdrawal of faith in other people part of the same syndrome as our decline in faith in government? At the aggregate level, trust in people and confidence in government go together. The two trends track each other quite closely, with a simple correlation of almost .800 (see Figure 5-3).[44] Looking at survey responses, Brehm and Rahn (1997) find support for the linkage at the individual level as well. Their examination of GSS data shows a reciprocal relationship between the two types of trust. Confidence in government was *the most important factor shaping faith in other people*–a finding replicated by Berger and Brehm (1997, 22) using

the 1972-74-76 ANES panel.

Figure 5-3 about here

Yet, there is reason to be skeptical about the link between the two types of trust. If trust in government rests on perceptions that our leaders are out of touch or even crooked, it is not clear that we should expect generalized trust to follow the same path. Trust in people is not primarily based upon the assumption that other people, much less our politicians, are trustworthy. If confidence in government depends more on our evaluations of specific institutions and their performance (Citrin, 1974; Hetherington, 1998), there is even less reason to expect similar roots for trust in people.

Sometimes trust in government was a significant predictor of generalized trust in Chapter 4 and sometimes it wasn't. It reached significance in surveys that lacked good measures of general optimism (the ANES and the Giving and Volunteering surveys), but was insignificant where there were good measures of hopefulness and control (the GSS). So the connection between the two types of trust may reflect a common foundation of positive feelings.

Even then, there is less of a syndrome of positivity than Lane (and others) may have imagined. Trust in people and trust in government are *not* strongly correlated at the individual level either in the United States (Orren, 1997, 85), in Russia (Gibson, 2001, 64) or formerly Communist countries more generally (Mishler and Rose, 2001). Nor is there a significant linkage cross-nationally (Newton, 1999). I spell out the bivariate relationships measures in Table 5-6 below. I also compare the more standard ANES question (see n. 40) with the GSS measure on confidence in the executive branch. The correlations between interpersonal trust and confidence

in government are generally rather modest. The average tau-c for the ANES measure is .117, the average gamma .261. For the GSS question, the averages are .094 and .175.[45]

Table 5-6 about here

So why do other studies find such powerful reciprocal effects between the two types of trust? The time period that Berger and Brehm (1997) examine, the early-to-mid 1970s, is highly atypical. This period of Watergate and Vietnam had unusually high correlations between the two types of trust. The correlations (tau-c) range from .207 in the 1976 ANES to .227 for the 1972 survey, by far the most powerful in the eleven measurements–and more than twice as great as the mean for other years. There is much the same pattern, though slightly less pronounced, for gammas. And we see the same pattern for the GSS data: The correlations for 1973-1976 are higher than almost any others. When I remove the surveys from 1972 to 1976, the mean tau-c with interpersonal trust falls by 31 percent for the ANES measure and by almost 10 percent for the already-lower GSS question.

Interpersonal trust is far more stable in the 1972-74-76 ANES panel than confidence in government: 73.4 percent of people had the same general level of trust in people over four years, compared to 56.9 percent for trust in government (see Table 3-3 in Chapter 3). More than twice as many young people had consistent responses to trust in people from 1965 to 1982 than stayed the same on confidence in government (63.9 percent compared to 29.9 percent in the Niemi-Jennings youth sample). The gap was only slightly less pronounced over these 17 years for their parents: 71.7 percent compared to 44.8 percent (see Table 3-4 in Chapter 3).

Trust in people is a long-term value, while confidence in government reflects our

evaluation of how well government performs, especially on the economy (Citrin, 1974; Hetherington, 1998; Lipset and Schneider, 1983). When people think that the government is doing a good job, they say that they trust government. How well the government is doing can change in a relatively short period of time. The mid-1970s were a good example of how political turbulence can weaken trust in government. In 1972 57 percent of Americans said that they could trust the government in Washington to do the right thing all or most of the time; by 1974, as Watergate, Vietnam, energy crises, and racial problems dominated national politics, just 38 percent gave government the benefit of the doubt most of the time. The ANES panel showed virtually no change in the aggregate share of people who said that "most people can be trusted."

It is easy to see why there are differences. Our evaluation of government depends upon specific performances–how much we like the President, the Congress, and even the Supreme Court. But it is not simply about our preferences for abstract institutions. Confidence in Washington reflects our evaluations of the men and women who lead the nation. It also reflects how well people think things are going in the country *now*. Trust in government, then, largely reflects our experience with our political world–and how we evaluate specific performance. It is partly about seeing government as trustworthy but even more about how well we think our leaders are doing their jobs. As a friend remarked at a social capital conference: "I have a lot of trust in other people, but I see no reason to trust my government because I don't agree with what it is doing."[46]

Our evaluation of government is, in Levi's words, always contingent. And that means that trust in government is *strategic* trust.[47] Confidence in government reflects our experiences with specific leaders and institutions, rather than abstract ideals. We evaluate the performance of

government in many of the same ways that we judge the performance of contractors. Our expectations for leaders are simple: They should keep the economy humming along and keep the country out of war. They should pursue policies in accord with public opinion–or at least attitudes in their own constituencies (Hibbing and Thiess-Morse, 1995, ch. 5; Fenno, 1978; Kimball and Patterson, 1997; Patterson and Caldeira, 1990; Stimson et al., 1995). And they should foster an image of trustworthiness. People base their evaluations on both performance and on specific knowledge of government decisions–and whether they like them or not. There is even some evidence that popular approval of the Supreme Court reflects agreement with its decisions (Caldeira , 1986). We may not know the people in government personally, but we believe that we have quite enough information to make judgments about them and the institutions in which they serve.

The public shows what we might consider common sense when it evaluates specific departments in the government, according to a survey by the Pew Research Center for The People and The Press. The Postal Service, the Park Service, the Centers for Disease Control, the Defense Department, and the Food and Drug Administration get the most favorable evaluations, while the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Internal Revenue Service fall at the bottom (Baer, 1998). The top ratings seem to go to agencies that provide services–usually with considerable efficiency–or protect people against disease and contamination. The public is most skeptical about investigative bodies or other agencies that consistently get negative press. There seems to be some factual basis for Americans' evaluations of their government departments.

One of the best ways to demonstrate the differences between the two types of trust is to

estimate models for each and then see how well the trust in people model accounts for confidence in government (and vice versa). I use the 1996 ANES to estimate models for each variant of trust based upon the theory I have developed for interpersonal trust and upon the extant literature for how we evaluate government.[48] I present these models in Tables 5-7 and 5-8 below.

Tables 5-7 and 5-8 about here

The trust in people model (Table 5-7) includes a workable measure of particularized trust (in-group trust for whites, African-Americans, and Hispanics minus out-group trust),[49] as well as measures of long-term optimism and control, religiosity, egalitarianism, efficacy, and standard demographics. The trust in government model (Table 5-8) includes specific evaluations of office holders (Bill and Hillary Clinton), institutions (the Supreme Court, the Congress, candidates for Congress), knowledge about government (knowing the majority party in Congress), political efficacy, and standard demographics. This model also includes both long-term and short-term evaluations of the economy, since our feelings about government may well reflect how well we think that it is performing now–while the optimism that underlies generalized trust is more long-term.[50]

The two types of trust clearly have different foundations. The most important variable in the trust in people model is by far particularized trust. The more you trust your in-group compared to out-groups, the less likely you are to trust other people. Particularized trust has *the wrong sign* for trust in government. Race is far more important for trust in people, and so are egalitarian beliefs and religious values. Only efficacy ("people like me have no say in politics") and a sense of control ("too much attention are paid to others' well-being") are strongly signifi-

cant in both equations.

The most important factors in the trust in government model are evaluations of specific institutions (the Supreme Court and the Congress; cf. Feldman, 1983; Hetherington, 1998; Luks and Citrin, 1997). and leaders (Bill and Hillary Clinton). Feelings about candidates for office (Democratic House candidates) and political knowledge (which party controls the House) also matter. *None of these factors are significant for trust in people*–and two (approval of Congress and know which party has the majority) have the wrong sign. Evaluations of the economy are significant for both types of trust–and, as expected, short-term personal evaluations have a stronger impact for trust in government. Measures of efficacy and many of the demographics are significant in both equations.

The trust in people model is based largely on abstract ideas–how we view in-groups and out-groups, interpretation of the Bible, and social egalitarianism. True to my claim that trust is a moral ideal, faith in strangers reflects these deeply-held values. Trust in government, in contrast, is a summary evaluation of how pleased we are with our leaders and institutions. The trust in government model performs very well for confidence in our institutions, but not nearly as well for trust in people.[51]

For the trust in people model, I calculated joint effects for particularized trust,[52] interpretation of the Bible, social egalitarianism, race (the dummy variable for being black), and Hispanic identification. Someone who ranks high on out-group trust, endorses a liberal interpretation of the Bible, and is strongly concerned about social egalitarianism is 34.6 percent more likely to trust others than a person who ranks low on out-group trust, who places a low value on social egalitarianism, and endorses a literal interpretation of the Bible. The composite effect for trust in

government is 8.8 percent.

When I repeat the same exercise for the trust in government model, the results are almost as striking. Here I used the six institutional/personal variables that shape trust in government. A respondent with positive evaluations of both Clintons, who strongly approved of both the Supreme Court and the Congress, who knew which party had majority control of the House, and who strongly approved of House Democratic candidates was 74.1 percent more likely to trust government than someone who strongly disliked the President and the First Lady, had little confidence in the Court or the Congress, who didn't like Democratic House candidates and who could not say which party controlled the House. The composite effect for trust in people is 26.6 percent.[53] If there is anything remarkable about these findings, it is that these specific evaluations have a measurable impact at all for trust in people.

The broader message is that trust in government and trust in people don't have much in common. When I estimate a model allowing for each type of trust to cause the other, neither type of trust has an impact on the other.[54] This null finding is rather remarkable since both questions (at least in the ANES wording) include the word "trust" and both types of confidence depend upon a sense of efficacy.

Reprise

Once more, we have seen evidence that trust in people largely *doesn't* depend upon our experiences. Neither people we know nor government makes us trusting of strangers. And this makes sense: We trust people we know because they have proven themselves trustworthy. We trust government when it works well and produces results and policies that we like. In both cases, our experiences are the most important factors shaping our confidence. Yet trust in

strangers can't be based upon our experiences. So it shouldn't be surprising that these worlds of trust are quite different, if complementary.

Generalized trust is also more stable than trust in government. Yet this does not mean that it is never changes. Trust in people has fallen dramatically from its high of almost 60 percent in 1960–to the mid 30s in the 1990s (before inching back up again to the 40s). When looking for the causes of the decline in trust, we now have some clear directions–and they point away from our personal lives and point more to collective experiences. I turn next to this question.

TABLE 5-1

The Linkages Between Forms of Civic Engagement and Trust

*Volunteering and Charitable Contributions**

High Trust	Middle Trust	No Effect	Mixed Effects
Arts and Culture	Health/hospitals	Informal	Religion
Education	Human services	Private	
	Youth	Recreation	
		Work-Related	
		Politics/Environment	
		Civic Organizations	

*Group Membership***

High Trust	Middle Trust	No Effect	Negative Effect	Mixed Effects
Business/ Professional	Service Groups	Women	Labor Unions	Religion
Cultural/Arts	Sports	Hobbies		Veterans
Social	Self-help	Neighborhood		
	Education	Farm		
	Politics	Youth		
	Fraternal***	Civic Groups		
	Fraternities/ Sororities***	Ethnic		

* From 1996 General Social Survey, 1996 Giving and Volunteering survey, and 1996 Pew survey of metropolitan Philadelphia.

** From 1972 and 1996 ANES, 1996 Giving and Volunteering survey, and General Social Survey for 1975, 1978, 1980, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, and 1994.

*** Generally small positive effects, mostly on the border line of statistical significance.

TABLE 5-2
Three-Stage Least Squares Estimation from General Social Survey

		Coefficient	Standard Error	t Ratio
Membership in secular organizations (excluding unions)	Model Chi Square = 591.677 (RMSE = 1.706)			
Trust		1.583****	.175	9.055
Frequency attend religious services		.062****	.011	5.451
High school education		.044****	.012	3.619
College education		.084****	.010	8.531
Number of hours worked last week		.005***	.002	2.492
Live in same city as child		.130**	.058	2.227
Family income		.004	.014	.270
Constant		-.799****	.189	-4.218
Trust	Model Chi Square = 588.887 (RMSE = .623)			
Satisfied with personal friendships		.016***	.005	3.220
Lot of average person getting worse		-1.026****	.167	-6.158
Confidence in science		.031**	.015	1.996
Membership in secular organization (without unions)		-.001	.029	-.023
Black		-.071***	.027	-2.673
Age		.005****	.001	6.133
Afraid to walk at night in neighborhood		-.038***	.014	-2.696
High school education		.010**	.004	2.237
College education		.009**	.004	2.253
Contextual trust		.257****	.066	3.870
Constant		.811****	.131	6.211
Lot of Average Person Getting Worse	Model Chi Square = 279.313 (RMSE = .505)			
Trust		-.554****	.063	-8.830
Age		.002***	.001	3.157
Life exciting or dull		.030***	.011	2.704
High school education		.002	.004	.503
College education		.000	.003	.000
Satisfied with job or housework		-.013**	.007	-2.000
Financial situation compared to others		-.016**	.007	-2.223
Family income		-.002	.002	-.878
Fundamentalism		.013**	.007	1.901
Constant		.812****	.057	14.266

**** p < .0001 *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .10, N = 3389

TABLE 5-3
Summary of Group Involvement Impacts on Trust from 1996 ANES[#]

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error
Business group involvement	.158***	.062
Cultural group involvement	.252**	.109
Childrens' group involvement	.094*	.056
Contributed to charity	.184*	.114
Ever attend religious services	.152*	.107
Ethnic group involvement	-.293**	.106
Arts group involvement	.022	.122
Elderly group involvement	.020	.106
Labor union involvement	-.024	.087
Veterans' group involvement	.127	.102
Church group involvement	-.019	.092
Non-church religious involvement	.008	.076
Hobby group involvement	.039	.070
Fraternal group involvement	.147	.127
Service to needy group involvement	.014	.088
Education group involvement	.061	.086
Self-help group involvement	.127	.184
Political issue group involvement	.023	.098
Party/candidate group involvement	-.216	.202
Civic group involvement	-.103	.197
Women's group involvement	.136	.430
Other group involvement	.064	.119
Volunteered time	-.010	.088
How many neighbors R talks to	.026	.031

Estimated R^2 = .353 -2*Log Likelihood Ratio = 1394.330 N = 1233
Percent Predicted Correctly: Probit: 71.7 Null: 60.2
*** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .10

[#] Effects calculated between zero and two for business, hobby, and educational groups, between zero and one otherwise. See the Appendix for other variables included in the model.

TABLE 5-4
Summary of Reciprocal Effects of Trust and Civic Engagement: 1996 ANES:
Three-Stage Least Squares Estimates

	Coefficient	Standard Error	t Ratio
Effects on Trust from:			
Business group involvement	.076	.091	.838
Children's group involvement	-.155	.088	-1.763
Ethnic group involvement	-.088	.247	-.354
Cultural group involvement	-.049	.168	-.296
Church group involvement	-.435****	.130	-3.358
Charitable contributions	.669****	.200	3.342
Volunteering	.505***	.163	3.090
Effects of Trust on:			
Business group involvement	.554****	.117	4.733
Cultural group involvement	.287****	.073	3.919
Church group involvement	.109	.088	1.232
Children's group involvement	.056	.130	.430
Ethnic group involvement	.064*	.048	1.339
Charitable contributions	.278****	.072	3.851
Volunteering	.410****	.100	4.113

Equation	**RMSE**	**Chi-Square**	**N**
Trust	.590	175.183	998
Business group involvement	.681	145.672	998
Cultural group involvement	.409	98.094	998
Church group involvement	.476	246.222	998
Children's group involvement	.639	103.058	998
Ethnic group involvement	.251	28.067	998
Charitable contributions	.388	236.095	998
Volunteering	.502	109.390	998

**** $p < .0001$ *** $p < .01$ ** $p < .05$ * $p < .10$

TABLE 5-5
Three-Stage Least Squares Estimation from 1996 Giving and Volunteering Survey

	Coefficient	Standard Error	t Ratio
Trust	Model Chi Square = 207.717 (R.M.S.E. = .494)		
College education	.100****	.026	3.799
Black	-.209****	.033	-6.232
Hispanic	-.071***	.028	-2.504
Age	-.001*	.001	-1.569
Worry about future	.005	.010	.488
Baptist	-.108****	.025	-4.237
Parents born in U.S.	.035***	.014	2.448
Confidence in: federal government	.033***	.011	3.131
Volunteer	-.136	.153	-.887
Contribute to charity	.431**	.194	2.221
Volunteer with parents/family	.016	.025	.646
Constant	.254****	.073	3.481
Volunteering	Model Chi Square = 466.903 (R.M.S.E. = .503)		
Trust	.648****	.129	5.016
College education	.047*	.032	1.488
Active in student govt when young	.049**	.028	1.742
Baptist	.064**	.036	1.789
Attend services	.061****	.012	4.941
Volunteer with parents/family	.139****	.022	6.474
Spend time with friends from work	.027**	.012	2.266
Spend time with friends from church	.041***	.013	3.224
Spend time with friends from sports	.025***	.010	2.362
Gender	.041**	.022	1.891
Have helped relatives	.196****	.025	7.730
Helped homeless	.047**	.028	1.651
Constant	.275***	.087	3.166

TABLE 5-5
(CONTINUED)

Charitable contributions	Model Chi Square = 354.513	(R.M.S.E. = .455)	
Trust	.520****	.088	5.936
High school education	.140****	.041	3.427
College education	.146***	.047	3.125
Family income	.010****	.002	4.592
Attend services	.056****	.009	6.059
Volunteer with parents/family	.067****	.018	3.699
Age	.002****	.001	4.061
Spend time with friends from church	.032****	.009	3.501
Have helped relatives	.113****	.020	5.693
Constant	.283****	.063	4.521

**** p < .0001 *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .10, N = 1714

TABLE 5-6

Correlations Between Trust in People and Trust in Government: 1964-1996

ANES Question Wording*			**GSS Question Wording****		
Source	tau-c	gamma	Source	tau-c	gamma
1964 ANES	.143	.268			
1966 ANES***	.160	.251			
1968 ANES	.122	.227			
1972 ANES	.227	.408			
			1973 GSS	.119	.215
1974 ANES	.220	.430			
			1975 GSS	.124	.234
1976 ANES	.207	.426	1976 GSS	.165	.313
			1978 GSS	.097	.189
			1980 GSS	.095	.175
			1983 GSS	.107	.201
			1984 GSS	.118	.213
			1986 GSS	.055	.103
1987 GSS***	.136	.252	1987 GSS	.105	.193
			1988 GSS	.071	.133
			1989 GSS	.092	.171
			1990 GSS	.127	.232
			1991 GSS	.026	.049
1992 ANES	.076	.158			
			1993 GSS	.125	.239
			1994 GSS	.075	.144
1995 Washington Post***	.046	.100			
1996 ANES					
Pre-election	.117	.244	1996 GSS	.048	.092
Post-election	.085	.177			
1998 ANES	.098	.194	1998 GSS	.038	.075
Mean	**.117**	**.261**		**.094**	**.175**
Mean Excluding 1972-1976	**.084**	**.208**		**.084**	**.158**

* "Do you trust the government in Washington to do the right thing"?
** Confidence in the executive branch of government.
*** Four-point scale employed.

TABLE 5-7

Probits for Trust in Government and Trust in People: 1996 ANES (Trust in People Model)[#]

	Trust in Government			Trust in People		
	Coefficient	Std. Error	**Effect**	Coefficient	Std. Error	**Effect**
Particularized trust (in-group minus out-group)	.038	.036	**.113**	-.142****	.038	**-.412**
Too much attention paid to other's well-being	-.082**	.037	**-.108**	-.073**	.037	**-.099**
Bible literal word of God	-.001	.059	**-.001**	-.101**	.058	**.069**
Not a problem that others have equal chance	-.036	.033	**-.047**	-.105***	.034	**-.144**
Living standards better in future	.232****	.045	**.158**	.168***	.045	**.081**
Days read daily newspaper last week	.010	.014	**-.049**	.042***	.014	**.100**
People like me have no have say in politics	.153****	.032	**.200**	.162****	.031	**.226**
Black	-.181*	.130	**-.057**	-.595****	.142	**-.191**
Hispanic	-.054	.142	**-.018**	-.490***	.149	**-.159**
Family income	-.021***	.006	**-.166**	.024***	.006	**.141**
Education	-.011	.015	**-.060**	.018*	.015	**.104**
Constant	-.583**	.286		-2.449****	.296	

Government: Estimated R^2 = .295 -2*Log Likelihood Ratio = 1441.168 N = 1241 People: Estimated R^2 = .287 -2*Log Likelihood Ratio = 1474.406 N = 1242

Percent Predicted Correctly: Probit: 70.2 Null: 70.1 Percent Predicted Correctly: Probit: 69.8 Null: 60.1

**** p < .0001 *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .10

TABLE 5-8

Probits for Trust in Government and Trust in People: 1996 ANES (Trust in Government Model)[#]

	Trust in Government			Trust in People		
	Coefficient	Std. Error	**Effect**	Coefficient	Std.Error	**Effect**
Bill Clinton feeling thermometer	.007**	.002	**.205**	.001	.003	**.051**
Hillary Clinton feeling thermometer	.006**	.003	**.182**	.003	.003	**.097**
Supreme Court feeling thermometer	.010***	.003	**.255**	.001	.003	**.041**
Approval of Congress	.173****	.036	**.195**	-.075	.032	**-.042**
Democratic House candidates feeling thermometer	.005*	.003	**.125**	-.001	.003	**.107**
Know Republicans have majority in House	.064*	.039	**.074**	-.023	.037	**-.033**
Living standards better in future	.162***	.060	**.093**	.116**	.056	**.084**
Better off than last year	.202****	.054	**.217**	.114***	.047	**.163**
People like me have no have say in politics	-.161***	.044	**-.176**	-.150****	.039	**-.218**
Politics too complicated	-.025	.045	**-.028**	-.152****	.040	**-.221**
Hispanic	-.192	.196	**-.051**	-.522***	.186	**-.179**
Black	-.749****	.192	**-.174**	-.550***	.172	**-.189**
Age	.012***	.003	**.190**	.007**	.003	**.138**
Family income	-.012*	.009	**-.078**	.025***	.008	**.205**
Constant	-1.940****	.442		-2.107****	.406	

Government: Estimated R^2 = .499 -2*Log Likelihood Ratio = 810.212 N = 815 People: Estimated R^2 = .201 -2*Log Likelihood Ratio = 1012.248 N = 812
Percent Predicted Correctly: Probit: 73.7 Null: 70.7 Percent Predicted Correctly: Probit: 65.2 Null: 54.7

**** p < .0001 *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .10

[#] Effects for age calculated between.18 and 75.

Figure 5-1

The Relationship Between Generalized and Strategic Trust
In the 1999 New York <u>Times</u> Millennium Survey



Connected lines reflect statistical significance at $p < .05$ or better. Dashed lines reflect statistical significance at .10. Mixed long and short dashes indicate a significant relationship at $p < .10$ between "people you know are helpful" and generalized fairness and a significant relationship at $p < .05$ between generalized fairness and "people you know are helpful."

Figure 5-2

The Interaction of Generalized and Strategic Trust
from the 1996 Pew Metropolitan Philadelphia Survey



Connected lines reflect statistical significance at $p < .05$ or better. Dashed lines reflect statistical significance at .10.

FIGURE 5-3

Trust in Government and Trust in People in the United States, 1964-1998



APPENDIX

For the equations below, variables significant at $p < .10$ are underlined, variables significant at $p < .05$ are **in bold**, variables significant at $p < .001$ or better are *in italics*, and insignificant variables are in regular typeface.

Going to bars: being *young, single or divorced, male, not very religious, and socializing with friends.*

Playing bingo (from the 1972 ANES): *gender* and *membership in social organizations* are the strongest determinants of bingo playing. Also in the model are **membership in fraternal organizations, believing that luck rather than skill determines whether you win in games of chance,** feeling bored, and satisfaction with your time to relax. The equation for trust included *whether it is safe to walk the streets in the neighborhood, whether you believe that you can make your plans work out, whether public officials care about me,* **trust in government, believing that you can run your life as you wish, whether good Americans must believe in God,** particularized trust (out-group thermometers - in-group thermometers), a dummy variable for being black, whether the bad is balanced by the good, age, and belief in life after death. In the simple probit, trust is negatively related to playing bingo and is significant at $p < .0001$.

Playing pinochle (1972 ANES): A two-stage least squares estimation shows that playing pinochle neither produces nor consumes trust. Predictors of trust include whether *public officials*

care what happens to you, whether it is safe to walk on the street in your neighborhood, **how much influence you have over your life, can one run one's own life, whether your plans work out, trust in government, whether good Americans must believe in God, race,** belief in life after death, and age. Predictors of playing pinochle include **whether one plays for money or fun, being married, satisfaction with your spare time**, race, gender, family income, union membership, membership in social group, and a dummy variable for Catholicism (N = 519, RMSE = .399 for pinochle and .445 for trust).

Playing bridge (from the 1972 ANES): In the two-stage least squares estimation for trust, the predictors include *playing bridge, trust in government, the belief that you can run your own life,* **age, safe to walk the street in your neighborhood, whether a good American must believe in God, public officials don't care about me, belief in life after death**, **particularized trust**, race, whether bad is balanced by good, and whether you can make plans work. For bridge the predictors are *college education,* **trust, number of children the respondent has, family income, gender, how long one has lived in the community, age, and a dummy variable for Protestantism**.

Trust model in Table 5-3: The other variables are *race, trust in out-groups, whether one ought to get involved in helping people,* **education, expectation that the standard of living will be better in 20 years, interpretation of the Bible as the literal word of God, a dummy variable for having a job**, family income, belief that this year's economy is better than last

year's, trust in in-groups, interest in politics, marital status, number of children, and age. The 1996 ANES also has measures of level of activity in organizations, but few people admitted more than a passing role in any of the types of groups.

Social Capital Benchmark Survey models for religious and secular charitable donations:

Religious donations equation: *Service attendance, participation in church/synagogue other than attending services, gender (male), family income, trust in co-religionists,* **age**, **education**, **own your home,** number of people you can confide in, generalized trust, Catholic. **Secular donations equation**: *Education, income, participating in church/synagogue other than attending services, number of people you can confide in,* **generalized trust, age, own your home, Catholic,** gender, trust in co-religionists.

New York Times Millennium Survey analysis of generalized trust and knowledge-based fairness and helpfulness: Generalized trust equation: *Age, public officials don't care about me,* **will life for next generation be better, dummy for Southern residence, number of children, satisfaction with family life,** people you know are fair, education level, expectations for the future of the United States, family income, Hispanic, people you know are helpful. **Generalized helpfulness equation:** *expectations for future of the United States,* **generalized trust, number of children, public officials don't care, being employed,** concerned more about yourself than others, people you know are helpful, people you know are fair. **People you know are helpful equation:** *how often attend*

church, **more concerned about self than others, number of children,** generalized fairness, generalized trust, generalized helpfulness, satisfied with family life. **Generalized fairness equation**: **people you know are fair, generalized trust, married, number of children,** people you know are helpful, government officials don't care, education. **People you know are fair equation**: **generalized fairness, more concerned with self than others, frequency of church attendance,** family income, people you know are helpful, generalized trust, expectations for future of the United States, married, able to meet personal goals.

Pew Philadelphia survey of generalized and knowledge based trust: **Generalized trust equation**: *Feel safe walking in neighborhood,* **education, like neighborhood, can have an impact on community, parents warned not to trust others, age, Hispanic, trust federal government,** particularized trust factor, black, can turn to people for support, volunteered for secular organizations. **Friends and family (particularized) trust factor**: *Black, feel safe at home,* **education, can turn to people for support, secular volunteering, number of children, union member, how long live in neighborhood, have people you can rely on, own home,** generalized trust, Hispanic, parents warned not to trust others, talk to neighbors.

NOTES

1. Shah, like Putnam, uses the DDB Needham Life Style data. So he also uses honesty as a surrogate for trust. See Chapter 3 for a discussion of the difficulties in using this measure.

2. Well, sort of. A *macher* makes things happen, but more like a "rainmaker" than someone who is simply involved in his or her community. Rosten (1968, 216) defines a *macher* as "someone who arranges, fixes, has connections; a big wheel, an 'operator'" who does things "miraculously." Obviously, it is a different question whether community leaders are trusting than whether members of civic groups are.

3. Torcal and Montero (1999) show that trusters are more likely to join voluntary organizations in Spain. Wollebaek and Selle (2000) find the same relationship in Norway. And Whiteley (1999) finds that the more organizations people join, the more trusting they are, using the first two waves of the World Values Survey, with 92,000 respondents in 45 countries. He also reports significant effects of group membership on trust in separate analyses for the United States, France, Great Britain, and Italy (though not for Germany).

4. Putnam (2000) does not test for connections between trust and social interactions at all, other than creating an aggregate scale including both.

5. In some cases, when the bivariate relationships are weak, I don't estimate more complex models.

6. *Cheers* was a fictional bar in Boston on a television show of the same name in the United States during the 1970s. It was patterned after a real pub, a place of conviviality–and, in a case of life imitating art, the producers of the television show established a national chain of bars named *Cheers*–where tourists would pay money for all sorts of souvenirs in a place where nobody knew their name.

7. The simple correlations between going to bars and trusting others are: tau -c = .057, gamma = .098, N = 9285. 4.9 percent of people who go to bars almost daily have been robbed in the past year compared to 2.2 percent who never go to bars (tau-c = .021, gamma = .112), while 12.3 percent of daily visitors to saloons have had their homes burglarized compared to 6.1 percent of those who never go to bars (tau-c = .030, gamma = .098). Thirty-four percent of almost daily visitors have been arrested at some point in their lives compared to 6 percent of people who never go to bars (tau-c = .173; gamma = .424). This finding is not an idiosyncracy of one survey. In the 1968 Panel Study of Income Dynamics of the Survey Research Center, the correlation (tau-c) between how often one goes to bars and a slightly different measure of trust (trichotomized to trusting few, some, and most people) is .020 (gamma = .036).

8. Returning lost wallets is often taken as a sign of a trusting community. See Knack and Keefer (1997).

9. From the 1988 GSS, the correlations are: tau-b = .022, gamma = .056. See Rothstein (2000) for a similar result for Swedish samples.

10. The simple bivariate relationship between bingo playing and trust in the 1972 ANES is minuscule (phi = -.010, Yule's Q = -.027). In thee multivariate analysis, people who trust others are slightly less likely to play bingo (by about 12 percent, $p < .10$) but playing bingo has no effect on trust. Indeed, there is some evidence–from a probit model of playing without reciprocal causation (a reasonable assumption from the simultaneous equation estimation) that bingo afficionado may be substantially *less* trusting (see the Appendix).

11. People who play cards, according to the 1996 Pew Philadelphia survey, are neither more trusting nor sociable: 50 percent of card players socialize with their neighbors compared to 47 percent of people who don't play cards (tau-b = .022, gamma = .044). And forty-one percent of card players believe that most people can be trusted, compared to 45 percent who don't play cards (tau-b = -.034, gamma = -.071). The relationships don't grow any stronger in multivariate analyses. Poker players are slightly more likely to trust other people (by 52 to 48 percent in the 1972 ANES), but this weak relationship vanishes in a multivariate equation. Pinochle players *are* more trusting (by 56 percent to 45 percent in the 1972 ANES), but this relationship also vanishes in multivariate specifications. According to the Social Capital Benchmark Survey, conducted in 2000, trust in neighbors is a significant (at $p < .05$) predictor of card playing, but generalized trust is not. These

results come from a tobit analysis of the frequency of card playing with age, gender, income, education, race (black), the length of a respondent's commute, the number of hours worked per week, the number of hours the respondent watches television and spends on the World Wide Web, whether the respondent is a homemaker, the number of children, frequency of attending religious services, how long the respondent has lived in the community, and the number of friends the respondent has as predictors. I used this same model for other measures of socializing discussed below. The Social Capital Benchmark Survey was commissioned by Robert Putnam of Harvard University. It had a national sample of 3,003 and samples in 41 communities of another 26,230. It is available for public download at http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu.

12. In the 1974-96 GSS, trusters are slightly less likely to visit with their parents or close relatives (gammas = .-.048 and -.075). They are also less prone (according to the 1986 GSS) to visit their closest friend daily (gamma = -.127) or to have frequent contact with their best buddy (gamma = -.096). They are more likely to socialize with their neighbors (Yule's Q = .122 for the Pew Philadelphia survey and gamma = .162 for the 1992 ANES and .153 for the 1992 ANES).

13. These results come from the Social Capital Benchmark Survey. Each measure is the number of times people did a particular activity in the past year. See n. 11 for details on the survey and the tobit model used for each form of socializing. The measures I employ

are going to parades, sports, or arts events; visiting family members; having friends over to your home; hanging out with friends in a public place; how many co-workers socialized with outside of work; number of sports teams, and number of on-line Internet discussions. Generalized trust is a significant ($p < .05$) positive predictor of how often you hang out with friends outside of work, but this coefficient belies the zero-order correlation with trust of -.005. Trust is not a significant predictor of the number of friends one has. Significant predictors are *happiness, participation in church/synagogue other than services, black (-),* **gender (male), income, being single, being retired,** age, education, number of children, frequency of attending services, how long you have lived in your community, and home ownership.

14. Younger people who are single with higher incomes are more likely to take part in performances. So are blacks. But the effect for taste in music dwarfs all others. No other taste in music–including opera, Broadway musicals, jazz, Latin, new age, oldies, reggae, contemporary rock, big band, bluegrass, blues, folk, gospel, easy listening, rap, or heavy metal–had any effect on performance. There was a slight *negative* impact for country music, but that vanished in multivariate analysis.

15. This question is really more appropriate for Chapter 7 (where I discuss the consequences of trust), but given what lies ahead, it fits in much better with the flow of the argument here.

16. The surveys I used are the GSS (various years), the 1996 Giving and Volunteering survey, the 1996 Pew Philadelphia survey, and the 1972 and 1996 ANES. For each venue for charitable giving and volunteering and each type of membership in voluntary associations, I ran a probit analysis predicting participation from trust, standard demographic variables (high school and college education, income, age, gender, race, marital status, being a homemaker) and attitudinal predictors of civic engagement that might be available in different surveys (religious fundamentalism, whether one's parent volunteered, feelings of efficacy). I treated each year of the GSS as a separate sample; when I ran one equation across almost 14,000 cases, all of the variables were strongly significant–perhaps spuriously so.

17. High trust activities generally have coefficients significant at $p < .01$ or beyond (all one-tailed tests). Middle trust groups usually have coefficients significant at least at $p < .05$ and relatively few insignificant coefficients. No effect is just that: most of the estimated coefficients were not significant even at $p < .10$. Negative effects had most coefficients significant at least at $p < .10$. And mixed effects indicated some significant positive coefficients and some significant negative ones. the survey questions do not make it easy to figure out what is included in each category. The GSS asks whether people are members of service groups but does not give people examples of what would fall under each category. The 1972 ANES asked about membership in civic groups and the 1996

ANES listed community groups (which I listed with civic organizations) and neighborhood organizations–without specifying what any of these associations might do and who would be eligible to join. The 1996 Giving and Volunteering survey and the 1996 GSS both asked about giving time and money to private community and public–society benefit organizations. But overall, most of the venues don't need much explanation.

18. These results come from the 1996 ANES and the 1996 Giving and Volunteering survey. Members of fraternal organizations are especially more likely to volunteer in health, human services, recreation, and cultural programs Details are available on request.

19. The model is estimated using three-stage least squares.

20. The equation for group membership includes many standard predictors (see Putnam, 1995a; Brehm and Rahn, 1997). More highly educated people (especially those with college degrees), people with strong local roots (who have lived in the same city as a child), and the very busy who work long hours are all more likely to join voluntary organizations. And people who attend religious services are also likely to join secular organizations.

21. The coefficient for membership in secular voluntary associations is -.001, and the standard error is 29 times the size of the slope. Other standard predictors such as age and gender were dropped because they were insignificant.

22. The problem is likely underidentification.

23. How often you attend services and whether you believe that the Bible is the literal word of God do shape generalized trust in the estimation in Table 5-3.

24. For cultural involvement, the other variables in the model are: *a dummy variable for being Jewish,* **family income, being a liberal, age, gender,** and living in an urban area. For church involvement, the other variables are *frequency of prayer, how often one reads the Bible, a dummy variable for being Catholic, age, family income, being a liberal (negative coefficient),* **how long one has lived in the community**, and a dummy variable for being Jewish. The variables in the equation for business involvement are *being self-employed, family income,* **a dummy variable for being Jewish, the number of hours worked each week, saying that others' beliefs are similar to your own, and knowing and speaking to neighbors**. The equation for children's groups includes *age,* **number of children aged six to nine, being married, being a late Baby Boomer (born 1946-1955), church involvement,** family income, whether it is important to be involved in helping others, and saying that others' beliefs are similar to your own. For ethnic group membership, other variables include *race,* **knowing and talking to neighbors, gender,** <u>family income</u>, trust in in-groups, and education. For charity, the predictors are *church group involvement, family income,* **frequency of newspaper readership, knowing and**

talking to neighbors, saying that others' beliefs are similar to your own, and business group involvement (negative coefficient that meets conventional two-tailed tests for significance at $p < .05$). For volunteering, the predictors are *knowing and talking to neighbors, saying that we should care about the well-being of others,* **a dummy variable for being Jewish**, family income, business group involvement, and age. For trust, the equation also includes *trust in demographic out-groups, people like me have no say in politics (negative coefficient),* **there would be fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional family values, trust in demographic in-groups (negative coefficient)**, and a dummy variable for late baby boomers.

25. I determined the impact by multiplying the regression coefficient by the range of the independent variable. The impact of trust on volunteering is simply the value of the regression coefficient (.410), while the impact for talking to neighbors is .061 (the coefficient) times the range (four), or .244.

26. Church involvement is largely driven by how often you pray and how often you read the Bible–both of which are slightly related to mistrust. And people who work with kids' groups have more children of their own between the ages of six and nine: 55 percent of adults with young children are involved in kids' groups, compared to 15 percent who don't have young kids. So parents interact with their own children and those of their

friends and neighbors–surely a worthwhile enterprise, but not one that builds the bridges that undergird generalized trust.

27. On a two-tailed test, the coefficient would be significant only at $p < .10$, and on a one-tailed test expecting a positive slope, it would be insignificant.

28. All four relationships are significant at $p < .0001$ or better. These findings are replicated, though with slightly weaker findings, for the 1996 GSS.

29. Trusting others makes you 65 percent more likely to volunteer your time, according to the regression analysis. And you are 52 percent more prone to make charitable contributions–with trust once more having bigger effects than helping behavior in both childhood and adulthood, income, and even attending religious services. Weekly attendance makes you 24 percent more likely to give to charity. The coefficient for volunteering on trust is slightly negative, though insignificant. Charitable contributions, on the other hand, remain more powerful, raising trust by 43 percent. In this model, trust has a bigger effect on charity than vice versa, but charity once again has a bigger impact on faith in strangers than does volunteering.

30. Three graduate students (Kimberly Cull, Sebastian Gagnon-Messier, and Randi Macks) in my seminar on Social Capital suggested alternative explanations. People may have some bad experiences volunteering, but since there is no personal contact in giving to charity,

donors will remain full of hope.

31. Note, of course, that the friends and family factor includes people in your church.

32. There are too many results to spell them all out. I estimated identical probit models for volunteering for arts, health, the needy and elderly, civic groups, religion, and youth. The predictors, in addition to the two measures of trust, include age, gender, family income, education, attending services, participation in other activities in your house of worship, owning your own home, being a student or a homemaker, the number of hours a day you watch television, weekly hours working, the number of children living at home, the time you spend commuting each day, and a dummy variable for race (black). Trust in co-religionists leads to *more* participation only for volunteering for religion and the arts, and for *less* participation for the needy, health, and civic groups. Generalized trust is significant only for the needy, health, and civic groups. I constructed a measure of overall trust from the generalized trust question and the question about trusting co-religionists. People who answered positively to the generalized trust question and who said that they trusted their co-religionists a lot were classified as generalized trusters. Generalized mistrusters who trusted co-religionists a lot or some were classified as particularized trusters. People who trusted neither were classified mistrusters. 87% of generalized trusters, compared to 83 percent of particularized trusters and 72 percent of mistrusters contributed money to religious causes; 76% of generalized trusters, compared to 63 percent of particularized

trusters, and 53 percent of mistrusters contributed to secular charities. I also constructed a more complex measure of particularized trust, using the mean scores for trust in racial and ethnic in-groups (whites, Asians, African-Americans, and Hispanics). The measure is similar to that for co-religionists, but because of differing marginals, I used trust "a lot" or "some" of in-groups in building the measure of generalized trust. The results show that generalized trusters are five to nine percent more likely to volunteer *in each of the areas*, including for religious venues, with the exception of giving time to the arts. Each of these differences were significant at $p < .0001$ or better.

33. The 18 groups are: religion, sports, youth, parent/teachers, veterans, neighborhood associations, elderly, charity, service, unions, professional, ethnic, political, literary, hobby, self-help, and Internet. Generalized trusters are very weakly more likely to participate in service groups compared to people who only have faith in their own ethnic groups. And they are weakly more likely to participate in political groups than folks who only trust people who share their faith. However, the relationships are stronger for professional associations and service groups. People who only trust their own ethnic group are weakly less likely to join service groups.

34. When I cross-tabulate the composite measures of trust against group membership, *none* of the tau-c correlations is above .10 for ethnic-based particularized trust. Only charitable groups, professional societies, and service groups have tau-c's above .10 for faith-based

particularized trust. Details are available on request.

35. For being the beneficiary of beneficence, tau-b = .002, gamma = .004. For family helped someone when you were young, tau-b = .008, gamma = .020; for someone you admire helped someone, tau-b = -.003, gamma = -.006.

36. These data come from the 1996 Giving and Volunteering survey. Details are available upon request.

37. "The Lone Ranger" was a children's Western television program in the United States in the 1950s. The ranger wore a mask to conceal his identity. He and "his faithful Indian companion," Tonto, would ride the range looking for people in trouble. He would help them out, and then he and Tonto would ride away without identifying themselves.

38. Seventy one percent of high school students whose parents volunteered are trusters compared to 63 percent whose parents did not (gamma = .179). Seventeen years later (in 1982), 70.3 percent of young adults whose parents had volunteered in 1965 said that most people can be trusted compared to 60.3 percent whose parents did not volunteer (gamma = .220).

39. In the 1996 Giving and Volunteering survey, these activities are correlated (gammas) with trust at .014, -.033, -.051, and -.033, respectively.

40. These results are based upon a three-stage least squares estimation of models for trust, volunteering, giving to charity, helping the homeless, and helping other needy people from the 1996 Giving and Volunteering survey. Details are available upon request.

41. People who say that they are less trusting are also less likely to have faith in others, but the relationship is not strong (tau-c = .086, gamma = .167). And people who say that others trust them are also more likely to say that most people can be trusted, but again the relationship is not overwhelming (phi = .174, Yule's Q = .627).

42. This comparison shows that Hardin is wrong when he interprets the standard trust question as reflecting our personal knowledge.

43. Which is which depends upon where you stand on the political spectrum.

44. The trust in government question is the standard ANES query about how often you can trust the government in Washington to do the right thing. The strong correlation reflects the time trend (downward) common to both trust items. When I detrend both, they are not so strongly related (r = .413).

45. The GSS also asks about trust in the legislative branch. Since attitudes toward Congress play a large role in shaping generalized trust in government, I also examined the correlations between confidence in the legislature and trust in people. The average tau-c is .041

(.037 with 1972-76 excluded) and the average gamma is .084 (.080 with 1972-76 excluded). The aggregate correlation (N = 19) over time between confidence in the legislative and executive branches is .759. The individual-level tau-c's range from .304 in 1974 (when Congress and the President were virtually at war) to .485 in 1978. The gammas range from .493 to .759.

46. This quote is from Per Selle of the University of Bergen at the European Consortium for Political Research Workshop on Social Capital in Copenhagen, April, 2000. The quote may not be exact.

47. Hardin (1995, 25; 2000, 221) argues that we don't know enough people in government personally to determine whether we should trust them. But apparently a large number of Americans feel comfortable evaluating political leaders and institutions and using these judgments to express trust or mistrust about government. Ninety-four percent of Americans in the 1996 ANES were willing to place President Bill Clinton on a left-right scale and just 16 percent said that he was a conservative. Ninety-one percent could rate Republican Presidential nominee Bob Dole on the left-right scale and just 13 percent said he was a liberal. Overall, most people seem to know enough about the political leanings of their leaders to make judgments about them.

48. I dichotomized the trust in government measure.

49. The 1996 ANES asks about trusting each group, not simply thermometer scores. See Chapter 7.

50. It might seem reasonable to include trust in people in the trust in government model and vice versa, but this would make it impossible to estimate the models in Tables 5-7 and 5-8.

51. The estimated $R^2 = .499$ for the trust in government model, compared to .201 for the trust in people model.

52. The minimum value I used for particularized trust was -.548 and the maximum 2.468, representing the fifth and 95th percentiles.

53. The signs are reflected for approval of Congress, the House Democratic feeling thermometer, and knowledge of which party controlled Congress. For the Clintons, the minimum was zero and the maximum 100; for House Democratic candidates it is 15 and 85 (see n. 8 above).

54. I estimated a two-stage least squares model for both trust in people (using the variables in the model in Table 7-2) and trust in government (using the variables in the model in Table 7-3), making each type of confidence endogenous to the other. Trust in people was not significant in the confidence in government model–and vice versa.