

Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, Chapter 7-1

CHAPTER 7

Trust and Consequences

Part of my attraction to [volunteer firefighting] is its vivid clarity: what we do is of immediate unalloyed benefit. The pager jolts into life and we rush to someone's urgent need, achieve a degree of resolution, then go back to what we were doing, having given completely of ourselves.

Koren (1997)

...a lot of what passes for volunteering used to be called simply "parenting": people helping out in their own children's schools or coaching their own children's soccer teams. Kids with parents who already have resources end up benefiting the most.

Mosle (2000, 25)

Trust matters. People who trust others have an expansive view of their community and this helps connect them to people who are different from themselves. It also leads people to seek common ground when they disagree on solutions to public issues. In this chapter, I trace the benefits of trust both for individuals and the society. I also examine how some of the gains from trust, both public and private, have become more scarce as trust has fallen. In the next chapter, I extend this examination to look at the sources of trust and its impact cross-nationally.

Trust is not an all-purpose solution to society's problems. It won't get people involved in civic groups or in political life. But it does have other, perhaps even more important consequences. Because trust links us to people who are different from ourselves, it makes cooperation

Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, Chapter 7-2

and compromise easier. Trusters are substantially more likely to say that most people are cooperative—by 83.5 percent to 54.4 percent for mistrusters in the 1972 ANES.¹ Many experimental studies in game theory have found that people who trust others are more likely to use cooperative strategies (Orbell and Dawes, 1991; Rotter, 1971, 1980; Wrightsman, 1991; Yamigishi, 1986, 1988; Yamigishi and Yamigishi, 1994).²

A civil society is a cooperative society (cf. Putnam, 1993, 88, 105, 111). As trust in people has declined since the 1960s, so has cooperation in our body politic (Uslaner, 1993, ch. 4). Trust may not be the only route to cooperation (Levi, 1999, 14). But trust can make it easier to solve recurring collective action problems, since good will eliminates much hard bargaining at the outset of each negotiation—and should make it more likely that some compromise will be reached (Putnam, 2000, 135).

In a cooperative culture, citizens should be engaged in their communities. They should devote their time and financial resources to improving the lives of others. People who trust others should also be the most likely to endorse the prevailing moral code in their communities. Cooperation and compromise can only flourish when people respect each other, despite their differences. So a trusting community is a tolerant community, where discrimination is an anathema.

Generalized trusters have a distinctive view of civil society: They see it as *one* society united by a set of common values. They oppose efforts to split the society into groups that might foster particularized trust, so they don't like attempts to do away with classical education or letting ethnic politicians make appeals primarily to their own communities. Here they face tensions in their own moral values: Trusters want to empower people who face discrimination in

Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, Chapter 7-3

the society. Yet they also worry that groups just gaining power will be more concerned with asserting their own influence than building coalitions across the major fault lines (race, ethnicity, gender) in society.

An engaged, tolerant, and committed group of people who believe that others share their values seems the perfect recipe for a cooperative society. Recall the bases of misanthropy and selfishness in the literatures in social choice theory, social psychology, and politics (both scientific and ideographic). The egoist of rational choice theory who seems doomed to suboptimal outcomes will either not cooperate at all or only in response to others' initial positive moves. The misanthrope in social psychology and politics (such as Banfield's Montegrano) is a social hermit who has little faith in human nature. She *may* place her confidence in people like herself and then burrow herself into her own community. But this will make her *less* predisposed to cooperate with strangers. She may feel that events in her community are beyond her control, so it makes little sense to get involved with strangers. People from different backgrounds don't share her values, so working with them can at best lead nowhere and at worst be treacherous. A society with a lot of mistrusters or particularized trusters won't be tolerant, inclusive, or ready to compromise with people who are different from themselves.

I have already demonstrated two of the most important consequences of trust: volunteering time and donating to charity (see Chapter 5). Giving time and money reflect a deeper commitment to your community than simply joining a voluntary association made up of people like yourself. These activities depend upon trust in two ways. First, we do these good deeds *because* we feel a connection to other people. Generalized trust is based upon the notion that those who are less fortunate than ourselves are part of our moral community. Second, since

Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, Chapter 7-4

generalized trust has a moral basis, trusters feel a moral responsibility to help people who have less through no fault of their own. People who trust others believe that it is wrong that some people have so much less than others (see Chapter 4). As inequality has increased in society, the need for good deeds has gone up—but the supply of trust has gone down (see Chapter 6). This places a heavier moral burden on people with faith in strangers. Fewer people are doing good deeds because there are fewer trusters, even as the demand for altruism goes up.

Underlying the link between trust and good deeds is a broader set of consequences. Generalized trusters are connected to not just to other people, but to their communities. American society, they believe, is held together by a set of common values. Trusters are tolerant of people who are different from themselves. Not only do they give of their own time and money to help the less fortunate, but they also support governmental policies to redress social and economic inequalities. Trusters believe that you should not try to take advantage of your neighbors or the state—and that it is imperative that we all fulfill obligations to each other, such as serving on juries (cf. Putnam, 2000, ch. 21). Trust also affects some more routine aspects of daily life--not locking your doors, not using a gun to protect yourself, and not calling in sick when you are well.

Just as trust does not usually lead people to join voluntary associations, it also has little effect on political participation. Putnam (2000, 290-292) reports that states with high rates of political participation also are more trusting. But there is little evidence that people who trust others participate more in politics, or that trends in political activity are linked to the decline in trust.

Trust and political participation are in constant tension. On the one hand, taking part in

Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, Chapter 7-5

the political system is itself an act of trust in government. Voting, signing a petition, and writing a letter to a public official all are affirmations of the belief that someone out there is listening and is likely to be responsive. It is an act of trust. On the other hand, political life is necessarily confrontational. People will be more likely to get involved in political life when they get mad and believe that some others, be they other people or political leaders, can't be trusted. When people are upset, they are more likely to take direct action in their communities (Dahl, 1961, 192-199; Scott, 1985, 44-45) and give money to their favored causes (Hansen, 1985). It may be ironic that we need generalized trust to make politics run smoothly, but we need distrust to get people involved in the first place (Warren, 1996).

Americans have become less trusting and more insular. We give less of our income to charity and volunteer less (at least for the Red Cross). We give less all around, but particularly to causes that help people who are different from ourselves. As trust has dropped, so did respect for the law (as reflected in the reported crime rate). And so did our ability to get things accomplished in the legislative arena. In both the private and public spheres, a less trusting environment means that it is more difficult to reach out to those who may be different from us or who may disagree with us. But, at least in the United States, there is not much direct support for the argument that trust leads to economic growth.

Why Trust Matters

Perhaps the most important role of trust in a civil society is its commitment to a set of ideals that all people share. Trusters believe that there is a common set of beliefs. Forty-one percent of people with faith in others agreed with the strong statement in the 1993 GSS that "Americans are united and in agreement on the most important values" compared to 29 percent of

Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, Chapter 7-6

mistrusters. No other variable shapes the perception that Americans share a common set of values.³ Trusters' belief in a common culture is hardly an ultimatum to conform or else. People with faith in others value diversity within the context of common understandings. Trusters are far less likely than mistrusters to be suspicious of people who try to be different from the mainstream culture.⁴

Saying that there is a common culture goes hand-in-hand with a belief that society needs to take steps to include that groups that have historically faced discrimination. Among whites, trusters are substantially more likely to admire African-Americans. Indeed, trust is the strongest determinant of admiring blacks.⁵ And white trusters are *less* likely to believe that African-Americans can overcome prejudice without special assistance. Aside from ideology, trust has the greatest impact on support for affirmative action.

Trusters don't support affirmative action because they are liberals. In fact, they are not.⁶ People who have faith in others *do* see people having shared fates. Trusters are less likely to believe that programs that will benefit minorities will take away benefits, specifically promotions on the job, from their own families. And white trusters believe that their own race gets more attention—and blacks get less concern--than they deserve.

Trusting people are also far less likely to be anti-Semitic. Trust, far more than any other variable, predicted people's attitudes toward Jews in a 1964 survey. Generalized trusters were far less likely to hold a range of stereotypes about Jews compressed into a single scale—and they were also less likely to believe that Jews stir up trouble by their beliefs or that God has punished Jews for refusing to accept Jesus as their Messiah. They were also more likely than mistrusters to say that they would vote against a candidate who made anti-Jewish statements.

Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, Chapter 7-7

People with faith in others are also supportive of immigrants. People with faith in others are not bothered when immigrants fare better than people born in the United States. As with African-Americans, trusters don't see illegal immigrants taking jobs from natives. And they have far more favorable views of *legal* immigrants than mistrusters: Immigrants don't increase crime rates, generally help the economy, don't take jobs away from people who were born in America, and make the country more open to new ideas. And trusters don't believe that immigrants can readily work their way up the economic ladder, any more than African-Americans can, without government assistance.

Trusters want to let more immigrants come to America since they are more likely to believe that newcomers share the basic values of people already here. And trusters also favor free trade as a means of boosting economic growth. People with faith in others are less afraid that trading with other countries will permit other countries to take unfair advantage of the United States. Once again, this reflects a greater comfort level with people unlike oneself.

It thus should not be surprising that trusters, whom we know are less authoritarian, should also be less xenophobic. They are less prone to say that being an American is very important to them, that other countries should emulate the United States, and especially that the United States should go its own way in the world.

Trusters also have more positive evaluations of other groups in the society that have faced discrimination. They rate gays and lesbians more highly than mistrusters. Generalized trusters are much more supportive of gays and lesbians serving in the military and adopting children. In each case—general affect, military service, and adopting children—particularized trusters (as measured by the difference in feeling thermometers of out- and in-groups in the 1992 ANES) are far less

Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, Chapter 7-8

supportive of homosexuals. Particularized trust is by far the strongest determinant of overall affect and it is also more powerful for military service. Trusters are far more supportive of gays' and lesbians' right to teach and speak in public schools and for the right of libraries to have books by gay and lesbian authors. Since trusters don't fear strangers—or even people they don't like or agree with—they are willing to extend the same rights to atheists and racists.

And people who have faith in others are also more likely to endorse greater rights for women and to reject arguments that women are either biologically better suited for raising children or willed by God to take primary responsibility for child care. Particularized trusters are, in contrast to generalized trusters, less supportive of women's rights.

Although I have looked at affect for out-groups and support for their rights as consequences of trust in others, it is equally plausible to argue (as I did in Chapter 4) that the direction of causality goes the other way. Positive views of out-groups is the hallmark of generalized trusters. Support for women's rights should not, on this logic, precede generalized trust, because women are not "out-groups" in the same sense that minorities are.

Trust and the Unitary Temperament

People who trust strangers are not simply fuzzy multiculturalists. Trusters are tolerant of people who are different from themselves—and who may have ideas and lifestyles that are very different from their own. These attitudes make cooperation with others much easier. Trusters are willing to give others the benefit of the doubt and to assume that there are underlying shared values, a unitary temperament.

Trusters want to empower minorities and other groups that have faced discrimination. Yet they worry that groups that disadvantaged groups might be wary of forming broad coalitions.

Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, Chapter 7-9

Empowerment might easily lead to fractionalization. This would go against the very lesson that trusting people put highest on their agenda: working to include rather than exclude folks who are different from yourself. So trusters are especially likely to say that ethnic politicians should *not* primarily serve their own communities. And, reflecting their view that there *is* a common culture, trusters are wary of the claim that high school and college students spend too much time reading classic literature. (See the Appendix for the multivariate statistical analyses.)

Trusters thus walk a fine line between empowering minorities and telling them how their politicians should conduct themselves and what the curriculum in their schools should be. This tension is the “price” of a common vision underlying the culture. And it is the very idea of a common vision that makes trust so compelling to so many social scientists. Lane’s argument about the trusting person as the effective citizen is a rather broad claim. And I have shown that trust produces the sorts of attitudes that are essential for a cooperative society.

Trust is a powerful force shaping civic engagement. But its effects go well beyond volunteering or giving to charity. While these types of engagement are all to the good, they may not be the most important ways in which people can work together cooperatively to solve collective action problems. Agreement on legal norms is a prerequisite for a civil society where people seek to work together to solve common problems. I argued in Chapter 2 that trust is the foundation of a rule of law—and shall provide evidence below that crime rates have risen as trust has fallen in the United States. I shall present cross-national evidence in the next chapter that a strong legal system depends upon trust. Here I show that support for the rule of law depends upon trust.

People who trust others are the strongest supporters of the fundamental norms that make

Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, Chapter 7-10

for a civil and cooperative society. Trusters are more likely to say that it is wrong to purchase stolen goods, to claim government benefits that you are not entitled to, to keep money you have found, and to hit someone else's car without making a report. Trust and one's own moral code lead people to endorse strong standards of moral behavior—and *not* expectations of others morality. Trust matters most on moral questions when the stakes are highest (in terms of real monetary costs) and when there is the least consensus on what is moral. When everyone agrees that something is wrong—say, on joyriding—or when violating a norm has small consequences—say, on avoiding a fare on public transportation—trust doesn't matter so much. Trust also matters most when a specific person bears the brunt of breaching a norm. Trust is not quite so important for actions affecting the government—say, cheating on taxes or avoiding fares—as it is when we can point to a specific, though unknown, victim such as keeping money you have found or hitting someone's car without making a report.

This strong support for a moral code helps maintain a system of rules and laws. Yet, trusters do *not* give blanket endorsements to upholding laws under all circumstances. Law must be based upon justice. People who trust others say that it is sometimes acceptable to disobey unjust laws (by 65 percent compared to 52 percent of mistrusters in the GSS). They are also more likely to say that protest demonstrations should be permitted. So trusters are critical supporters of the legal system. We must enforce *just* laws and people must be permitted to protest statutes that they believe are wrong.

Yet trusting people are more supportive of *the legal order*. They are substantially more willing to serve on a jury—where they not only help to run the system of laws but also are likely to interact with people unlike themselves. Generalized trusters are more likely to say that they are

Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, Chapter 7-11

willing to serve on a jury. And particularized trust matters even more: People who rank their own in-groups highly are much less likely to say that would serve, while those who give more favorable ratings to out-groups are much *more* willing to do their jury duty.⁷ The measures of generalized and particularized trust are *the strongest predictors* of willingness to serve on a jury. Trusters form the backbone of the legal system—because they have the strongest commitment to the values that sustain it.

Saying that there is a common culture goes hand-in-hand with a belief that society needs to take steps to include that groups that have historically faced discrimination. Among non-whites, trusters are substantially more likely to admire African-Americans. Indeed, trust is the strongest determinant of admiring blacks.⁸ And non-white trusters are *less* likely to believe that African-Americans can overcome prejudice without special assistance. Aside from ideology, trust has the greatest impact on support for affirmative action.

Trusters don't support affirmative action because they are liberals. In fact, they are not.⁹ People who have faith in others *do* see people having shared fates. Trusters are less likely to believe that programs that will benefit minorities will take away benefits, specifically promotions on the job, from their own families. And white trusters believe that their own race gets more attention—and blacks get less concern--than they deserve.

People with faith in others are also supportive of immigrants. As with African-Americans, trusters don't see illegal immigrants taking jobs from natives. And they have far more favorable views of *legal* immigrants than mistrusters: Immigrants don't increase crime rates, generally help the economy, don't take jobs away from people who were born in America, and make the country more open to new ideas. And trusters don't believe that immigrants can readily work their way

Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, Chapter 7-12

up the economic ladder, any more than African-Americans can, without government assistance.

Trusters want to let more immigrants come to America since they are more likely to believe that newcomers share the basic values of people already here. And trusters also favor free trade as a means of boosting economic growth. People with faith in others are less afraid that trading with other countries will permit other countries to take unfair advantage of the United States. Once again, this reflects a greater comfort level with people unlike oneself.

It thus should not be surprising that trusters, whom we know are less authoritarian, should also be less xenophobic. They are less prone to say that being an American is very important to them, that other countries should emulate the United States, and especially that the United States should go its own way in the world.

Trusters also have more positive evaluations of other groups in the society that have faced discrimination. They rate gays and lesbians more highly than mistrusters do. Generalized trusters are much more supportive of gays and lesbians serving in the military and adopting children. In each case—general affect, military service, and adopting children—particularized trusters (as measured by the difference in feeling thermometers of out- and in-groups in the 1992 ANES) are far less supportive of gay rights.¹⁰ Trusters are far more supportive of gays' and lesbians' right to teach and speak in public schools and for the right of libraries to have books by gay and lesbian authors. Since trusters don't fear strangers—or even people they don't like or agree with—they are willing to extend the same rights to atheists and racists.

People who have faith in others are also more likely to endorse greater rights for women and to reject arguments that women are either biologically better suited for raising children or willed by God to take primary responsibility for child care. Particularized trusters are, in contrast

Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, Chapter 7-13

to generalized trusters, less supportive of women's rights.

Although I have looked at affect for out-groups and support for their rights as consequences of trust in others, it is equally plausible to argue (as I argued in Chapter 4) that the direction of causality goes the other way. Positive views of out-groups is the hallmark of generalized trusters. Support for women's rights should not, on this logic, precede generalized trust, because women are not "out-groups" in the same sense that minorities are.

Trust and Daily Life

Beyond values that promote cooperation in dealings with other people, trusters also demonstrate their faith in other people in daily life as well. They may not be more likely to help people they see on the street or their own relatives. But they feel obligated to demonstrate their commitment to society in other ways—and in so doing provide a link between strategic and moral trust. People with faith in others are less likely to call in sick when they are really well. Most of the predictors of fidelity to your employer reflect more "strategic" considerations—how long you have worked for your employer, whether you can make most of your job decisions yourself, and how much you like your job—but trust matters too, even if not so dramatically.

No one would say that trusters should feel morally obligated to keep their doors unlocked. Perhaps doing so would be foolhardy in many places. But trusters are *far* more likely to say that it is not important to keep your house bolted. Indeed, next to living in an urban area, trust has the biggest effect of any variable on whether people think they should lock their doors. Even being attacked or robbed three times in the last five years doesn't matter as much as being a truster. People with faith in others are also less likely to feel that they must protect themselves from criminals with a gun.¹¹ In some ways, then, trusters are cockeyed optimists, going well beyond

Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, Chapter 7-14

what calculations based upon personal experience. But maybe only someone with a bit too much optimism and trust can look for cooperative solutions in today's more contentious and less trusting world.

The Consequences of Declining Trust

If trust brings us lots of good things, then there should be consequences of declining faith in others. And, indeed, there are. Yet we should recall that trust is not a cure-all elixir. Just as trust does not shape much of our social life, it cannot be the villain for everything either. Putnam (2000) is concerned that we are not connecting with each other as much as we did in the past. And he is equally worried that we are less trusting than we used to be. Yet, he doesn't show any direct links between these tumbling trends. Nor is there any good reason to believe that there *should be* any connection between them. Hanging out with friends is great, but it doesn't make people any more trusting of strangers. And misanthropes are just as likely to socialize with friends as trusting people (see Chapter 5). Outlaw bikers have social circles too. They may be very different from choral societies, but they are not necessarily more diverse. While we may not be bowling in leagues as much as we used to, we are *hardly* likely to bowl *alone*.

So if we are *schmoozing* less and joining fewer organizations these days, we cannot lay the blame on declining trust. And if we are less trusting, we cannot trace the cause to fewer social activities with people like ourselves. Across 26 forms of *schmoozing* in Putnam's data and three more formal measures of group involvement, *there is no evidence that declining trust is either the cause or the effect of trends in our social or civic lives*.

We are doing less of almost everything that involves social interactions these days. We eat fewer dinners or breakfasts with our families, have fewer dinner parties, entertain less at home,

Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, Chapter 7-15

and go on fewer picnics. We attend fewer sporting events, go camping and fishing less, spend less time swimming, play less tennis, attend fewer sporting events, and even watch less sports on television (which would surprise the wives of my ESPN-addicted friends).¹² We don't play cards that much and we even don't bowl as much as we once did. Church attendance is down, as is participation at club meetings and work on community projects. As we withdraw from social connections, we are more likely to shop by mail than in stores.

Yet we cannot trace the decline of either informal or formal civic engagement to falling trust. And lower levels of trust are not the reason we spend less time with family, friends, or people like ourselves. In no case does any form of formal or informal participation lead to a decline in trust. In only a handful of cases is there any evidence that trust affects *schmoozing*. But each time, less trust leads to *more* informal social contacts with people like yourself. As trust has gone down, we are *more* likely to play cards, eat family dinners together, go fishing, and, yes, *go bowling*. Maybe we would be better off if people *did* bowl alone—or, at least, not bowl so much. These results may be counterintuitive—or they may just be statistical flukes.¹³

Our social connections have changed as our families have become smaller and women have entered the workforce (cf. Putnam, 2000; Wuthnow, 1998). Working mothers don't have as much free time to work on community projects or go to club meetings or to prepare dinner for either their families or friends. As our families have become smaller, we are less likely to spend time together. We don't *schmooze* as much because our families are busier than ever and because there are fewer people in our closest circle, the family. Smaller families and working women, not generalized trust, lead to "boiling alone." Trust has little to do with these connections—and there is little reason to expect it to be critical in such mundane events as how often we go camping.¹⁴

Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, Chapter 7-16

We see a similar pattern (or lack thereof) for political participation. The Roper organization has asked people about a wide range of political activities from 1974 to 1994.¹⁵ Trust in government (specifically in the Congress), not trust in people, leads people to get involved in politics across 12 categories of political actions—and the residual category of no activity, at least in the aggregate. Trust in people does have modest effects for being an officer in a club and serving on a committee within an organization.

Other activities—signing a petition, attending a public meeting, going to a rally or a speech, working for a political party, writing a letter or an article for a newspaper, making a public speech, running for or holding public office, writing a letter to a member of Congress, or joining a good government group—have no relationship to interpersonal trust. Even the trend in refraining from *all of these forms of political activity* does not track trends in trust. People who participate in protest marches are *less* likely to trust strangers; they are more likely to trust people of their own faith. Some forms of political activity thrive on mistrust rather than trust¹⁶ It is hardly surprising that the link between political participation and faith in others is so weak and sometimes even negative. The cooperative spirit underlying trust stands in stark contrast to the harsh realities of political life. Politics revolves around rallying the faithful for a cause, which may be an anathema to seeking common ground with opponents.

Yet, generalized trust is very important for the two activities that tie people to strangers at the individual level: giving to charity and volunteering time. As interpersonal trust has declined from 1960 to 1996, so has the share of gross domestic product that Americans have donated to charity (cf. Putnam, 2000, 123).

The most comprehensive data base on charitable giving, the American Association of Fund

Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, Chapter 7-17

Raising Council's Giving USA, shows a strong relationship with generalized trust ($r^2 = .610$, see Figure 7-1). While trust is a powerful predictor of overall charitable giving, it is not *the most important predictor*. This is not surprising, since the Giving U.S.A. figures reflect *all types* of charitable contributions, not just to people who are different from yourself.

There is a stronger link to trust for United Way contributions over time. The United Way is composed overwhelmingly of charities that reach out to the less fortunate.¹⁷ Contributions to the United Way dropped from .087 of GDP to .045 percent. The trends in charitable giving and trust are strongly linked ($r^2 = .804$, see Figure 7-2). Trust has the strongest effect of any variable in a multivariate analysis on United Way contributions.¹⁸ It is also the strongest predictor of donations at the individual level—and the rationale is not hard to understand. Giving to others makes more of a commitment to people unlike yourself.

[Figures 7-1 and 7-2 about here](#)

Time series data on volunteering are hard to come by. However, Red Cross officials have kindly put together trends from their annual reports for me. Some caution is in order. The Red Cross has but a small share of the total volunteering population in the United States. The figures never exceed 2 million, while a reasonable estimate of the total volunteering population in the United States might be approach 100 million.¹⁹ The Red Cross, like the United Way, comprises a small share of good deeds Americans do. Yet, both organizations tap moral resources. The United Way is a large umbrella organization where contributions are more likely to go to people you don't know. And Red Cross volunteering is mostly aimed at helping strangers, through such activities as blood donations, humanitarian services (especially in natural disasters), and interna-

tional assistance.

The share of Red Cross volunteers in the population has decreased as trust has gone down ($r^2 = .796$, see Figure 7-3).²⁰ This holds in multivariate analyses allowing for simultaneous causation between trust and volunteering. Trust is the major determinant of trends in Red Cross volunteering. There is mixed evidence about whether volunteering increases trust as well.²¹

Figure 7-3 about here

Two sets of data on charitable contributions allow me to expand on my claim (in Chapter 5) that trust is more important for donations to people unlike yourself than for offerings to your own kind. Both of these data sets separate the two types of contributions by beneficiaries.

John and Sylvia Ronsvalle have divided church-based charitable contributions over time into “benevolences,” contributions to strangers, and “congregational” contributions, which support the local church. And their data suggest that giving to people who are different from yourself depends more on trust than contributing to your own kind. Both benevolences and congregational contributions have declined in tandem with trust. Yet, trust has a more powerful impact on benevolences, while congregational gifts depend more heavily upon church attendance rates. So reaching outside your church and giving to people different from yourself depends more on trust, while contributions to your own congregation reflect your allegiance to the church itself.²²

The relationship between trust and benevolences is very strong (see Figure 7-4).²³ As trust has declined, we are less likely to make contributions to people who are different from ourselves. Yet, as we see in Figure 7-5, we are also *less likely to contribute to people who are*

Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, Chapter 7-19

different when the need is greatest—when the level of economic inequality is greatest. The correlation between benevolences and the Gini index of economic inequality is both *negative* and extremely strong.²⁴

Why do we give less when the need is greatest? As inequality grows, trust declines. The levels of contributions don't depend upon simple economic factors (such as economic growth, inflation, or unemployment) as much as they do on our sense of trust. Benevolences are not the only “good works” that fall when the need is greatest. As inequality grows, Red Cross volunteering, congregational giving, and giving to both the United Way and to charities more generally all fall.²⁵ The rise in inequality may well tap an increase in materialism among those who are well off—and a corresponding decline in the public-spiritedness that undergirds trust.

[Figures 7-4 and 7-5 about here](#)

The Giving USA data even more dramatically show trust shapes some forms of giving and not others. Trust is the strongest predictor of giving to secular causes over time, but it is *not* a significant predictor at all of religious charitable contributions (in direct contrast to the Ronsvalle's data). There are moderate positive correlations between trust and contributions to education and health, but both vanish in multivariate analyses. And trust is *negatively* related to the AAFRC's categories of arts and culture and public/society.²⁶ “Public/ society” may appear to be reach out to the less fortunate—and to some extent it is (including civil rights, voluntarism, and community development). But it is dominated by contributions to research institutes in the sciences and social sciences, as well as public utilities and credit unions. In both arts and the sciences, better off people are making contributions to good causes. But they are not redistribut-

Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, Chapter 7-20

ing resources from the well-off to the less fortunate. Instead, we are now contributing more to causes that we might benefit from personally—museums, universities, theater groups.

Mosle (2000, 25) writes: “When people talk about giving, they are often talking about contributing to institutions, like the Metropolitan Museum of Art or the New York City Opera, that confer prestige on the donor and improve the quality of life primarily for the middle class. Despite the roaring economy, organizations that work with the poor have actually seen their proportion of the charitable pie narrow in recent years.” We are contributing less to human services charities. We gave twice as much of our national wealth to public/society causes in 1960 as we did in 1996. Our arts contributions increased by 82 percent. But we are now giving half as much to human services. We can boast of generosity while making ourselves feel better.

Not surprisingly, trust is the most important factor shaping giving to human services charities. The human services category is a veritable laundry list of good causes: homeless shelters, food banks, vocational counseling, assistance to the handicapped, Meals on Wheels, disaster relief, summer camp for disadvantaged kids, the Boys and Girls Clubs, and the like. Yes, some groups may not have much outreach—Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, Little Leagues, the Grange, and the Farm Bureau. Yet, most beneficiaries do help people who are different.²⁷ As Americans’ empathy for people who are different has fallen, we have redirected our charitable contributions. We give more to our own kind and less to others. But there is no evidence that we have become less trusting because we see others shunning the less fortunate. The direction of causality goes from trust to charitable contributions, the aggregate data suggest (see the Appendix). Charitable contributions do lead to a “warm glow” for those who do good deeds. But they depend upon trust in others in the first place—so they cannot be responsible for the decline in trust among the

Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, Chapter 7-21

American public.

There is also some evidence about another form of civic engagement that ties people to others: serving as volunteer firefighters. These firefighters, whose quarters have been described as “the hub of community life” (Gross, 2000, A25) are strongly motivated by a sense of doing good for others (Benoit and Perkins, 1995, 22; Thompson and Bono, 1993, 336-337). Volunteer firefighters have been replaced by careerists. In 1983 volunteers constituted 80 percent of all firefighters, but by 1998 they are just 74 percent.²⁸

Fewer people volunteer because people have less free time, training has become more onerous, two career families place greater family demands on would-be firefighters, and because of “an unmeasurable but undeniable decline community spirit” (Grunwald, 1999, A6; Gross, 2000, A25). The trend in volunteer firefighters as a percentage of the United States population does track trust, but only modestly. However, the volunteer firefighter data don’t begin until 1983. If I estimate earlier values for the share of volunteer firefighters in the population, there is a very strong link with trust.²⁹ So the “decline in community spirit” that is said to be the culprit in the smaller share of volunteer fighters is none other than falling trust.

Other Consequences of Declining Trust

People who have faith in others are more strongly attached to the legal system. As people become less attached to each other, they may feel less of an obligation to maintain civic order and established social norms. As trust has declined, the reported crime rate per capital has increased. Per capita crime—of all sorts—increased from .012 in 1960 to .061 in 1991, before falling back down to .053 in 1996. And while lots of things—especially better reporting procedures—affect trends in crime, trust clearly seems to be one of them. Of course, an alternative thesis is also

Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, Chapter 7-22

plausible. Perhaps people look around them and see rising crime. They might reasonably conclude that trusting others is too risky in such a world—as a strategic view of trust would suggest. There is no easy way to sort out the causal connection, though some evidence suggests a reciprocal relationship, with the link from trust to crime rates being much stronger.³⁰

Putnam (1993, 180), Knack and Keefer (1997), and LaPorta et al. (1997, 336) have argued that trust also brings prosperity. When people burrow into their own communities, they will not gain the advantages of trading with people who are different from themselves (Woolcock, 1998, 171). Prosperity depends upon generalized trust. The logic seems reasonable, but the evidence is not quite so supportive for the United States: Trust is *not* appreciably higher during boom times than when times are bad.³¹ The boom years of the Reagan and Clinton administrations were marked by rather low trust—even in comparison with the wrenching stagflation of the last two years of the Carter administration. The aggregate correlation of trust with change in per capita gross domestic product from 1960-96 is .339. The correlations with unemployment and inflation are -.396 and .010, respectively.

There are not sufficient observations on trust to trace trends outside the United States. But there is cross-sectional evidence across many nations and it is more supportive, both directly and indirectly: More trusting societies have higher levels of growth and they also have more open economies (see Chapter 8). There may thus be an indirect connection between trust and prosperity in the United States: If trust leads to greater support for free trade and trade promotes economic growth, trust may help produce greater prosperity in the United States as well.

We might expect that America has become less tolerant as trust has fallen. Yet this is *not* what has occurred. The tolerance scores discussed in Chapter 6 have actually increased over

Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, Chapter 7-23

time. The average American was moderately intolerant in the late 1970s and is now moderately tolerant.³² Yet, over time, there has been little increase in whites' feeling thermometers toward African-Americans. There has been a very small shift toward more positive scores, but it is not statistically significant. And whites are even slightly less favorable toward blacks now than they were in 1976.³³

Fewer Americans now say that African-Americans are different from whites because of "inborn differences" than in 1977 and fewer also say that blacks are different because they don't have as much will. Yet, a majority of whites still say that African-Americans *don't have as much will as whites*. And fewer Americans now say that blacks face racial discrimination than admitted this in 1977. Fewer also say that differences are attributable to less education. We may be somewhat more tolerant, but the pace of progress seems rather slow 40 years after the first civil rights legislation passed. Had trust not declined, it seems likely that racial attitudes would have become more tolerant.³⁴

Trust and Governing

Much of the reason I can't establish a more powerful relationship between declining trust and intolerance is that there have been two long-term trends pushing in opposite directions. The first is simply greater acceptance of civil rights. The second is the growth of economic insecurity and particularized trust, while generalized trust has fallen. This leads to ambiguous findings about the decline in trust.

Yet, there is clearly one instance in which intolerance prevails. It is in our public life. We may not always express intolerance toward identifiable minorities. But we are increasingly likely to deny that our political opponents are part of our moral community. And this has made political

Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, Chapter 7-24

life more contentious. The result has been the growth of stalemate in our legislative institutions. the ability to compromise within the legislature depends upon the level of polarization outside. The more confrontational style of legislative politics these days reflects the waning trust in the larger society (Uslaner, 1993). Congress is finding cooperation increasingly difficult as members increasingly cast aspersions on each others' motives, especially across party lines.

A less trusting society is a more polarized society. People are apt to deny that their political foes are part of their moral communities. Democrats have prohibited pro-life candidates from speaking at their national convention (in 1992). Republicans have fought over ideological diversity on abortion and other issues. The debate over the impeachment of President Clinton in 1998 was not just acrimonious. Each side, both in the Congress and in the public, talked past one another (Uslaner, 2000). Members of Congress have lost the trust that underlies the capacity to reach compromises.

The problem of trust has gotten so bad that an outside agency, the Pew Foundation, has tried to restore comity by sponsoring two retreats in Hershey, Pennsylvania to get members of the House of Representatives talking to each other. The 1997 getaway was marked by good spirits all around –and the cheerfulness quickly faded. About a month later, the House Rules Committee Subcommittee on Rules and Organization of the House realized the depth of the problem and held hearings on what might be done to restore civility. The initial hearings were called to a halt when the members had to scurry to the House floor to vote on a motion to censure a House Democratic leader for insulting the Speaker.³⁵ The 1999 meeting came after each party had inflicted further wounds on the other during the debate on the impeachment of President Clinton. Two weeks before the retreat one of the Democratic party's leaders (Steny Hoyer, D-MD) said that the

Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, Chapter 7-25

gathering would be a good opportunity to lecture the Republicans on how to behave more civilly.

The decline in interpersonal trust is also linked to the waning of norms of cooperation in the Congress. As trust has waned, so has the norm of committee reciprocity in the House of Representatives and the increasing use of restrictive rules for legislation (which prohibit members, especially from the minority party, from offering amendments) have strong links to the decline in interpersonal trust (Uslaner, 1993, chs. 4-5). Congress divides its work among its committees, so that the body can take advantage of the expertise members have (or develop) by concentrating their efforts on particular topics. This specialized knowledge gives committee members key advantages in the shaping of legislation (Krehbiel, 1991).

When members trust each other, they will acknowledge these advantages and will not fear that other legislators will somehow exploit their privileged positions. They accept a norm of committee reciprocity that expects legislators to respect the expertise of *all* committees (Matthews, 1960). When legislation comes to the floor, any amendments offered should come from members of the sponsoring committee. If you don't know much about the legislation at hand, you should keep quiet. When everyone who might have an idea gets into the act of legislating, the prospects for reaching an accommodation drop precipitously. As trust in the larger society has plummeted, the percentage of House bills with amendments from outside the sponsoring committee has increased.³⁶

Perhaps the most well-known procedure to block legislation in the Congress is the filibuster in the Senate—which has become far more frequent in recent years (Binder and Smith, 1996).³⁷ Increasing use of the filibuster is a sign that members are not willing to accept legislative decisions as binding. Stalemate is preferable to losing or even compromise. The number of

Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, Chapter 7-26

attempts to cut off filibusters (cloture petitions) in a year has increased from an average of three from 1960 to 1973 to more than 20 in the 1990s. The level of trust in society is the strongest determinant of the number of cloture motions filed. It is even more important than the level of partisan conflict in the Senate.³⁸ Put all together, the rise in obstructionist tactics makes cooperation less likely and there is also a direct linkage between the fall in trust and the decline in Congressional productivity (Uslaner, 1993, ch. 6).

Declining trust not only leads to obstructionist tactics. It is also responsible for greater stalemate in the legislative process. As trust has declined, so has legislative productivity, whether measured by Mayhew's (1991) list of major laws passed in each Congress or Binder's (1999) newer measure of gridlock (stalemate). Trust is the most important determination of legislative productivity, by either measure.³⁹

It becomes more difficult to get compromises when there is a large ideological gulf between the parties. And the ideological gap between the parties has widened in both the House and the Senate as Americans have become less trusting (Uslaner, 2000).⁴⁰ Here is a prime example of how trust can lead to collective action. In American society, major legislation usually commands overwhelming majorities (Mayhew, 1991), perhaps because our anti-majoritarian culture doesn't readily tolerate major policy shifts enacted by narrow coalitions. To get to such majorities, political leaders must make compromises. And trust makes compromise possible because it fosters respect for alternative points of view. Without trust, leaders must assemble coalitions piece by piece. Strong ideological divisions make it difficult to form broad coalitions and small party majorities make it difficult to enact even the most basic legislation such as budgets. We have become a less cooperative society where stalemate is the order of the day.

Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, Chapter 7-27

Trust's Consequences

The most important consequence of trust, as Putnam (1993, 171) noted, is that it fosters cooperation. When people trust each other, they do not have to renegotiate the terms for negotiation each time they seek to take a collective decision. Yes, we can reach agreements without trust (Levi, 1999), but collective action appears to be easier in trusting environments. People with faith in others are more likely to cooperate with others because they do not see their interests as incompatible with those of others, even those they know they disagree with.

Trusters believe that there is a common culture. And they also believe that they have an obligation to ensure that all members of that common culture are treated equally—and with respect. They are thus likely to support policies that promote civil rights and civil liberties—and to shy away from standards of behavior (as well as actions) that would disrupt this social consensus. Beyond these commitments to a more inclusive society, people who have faith in strangers feel an obligation to make society better. They volunteer their time and give money to charity—and will seek out opportunities to help people who are different from themselves—and who may need assistance more. Trusters “resolve” collective action problems by waving away the fundamental assumption that what is good for you must be bad for me.

Trusters aren't simply “joiners.” They are civic activists for “good causes.” So it should not be surprising to find trusters no more likely to join most types of organizations than other people. And while people may gain all sorts of enjoyment from organized group life, they are not likely to become more trusting by linking up with people like themselves. The sorts of things that trust produces—helping solve collective action problems, becoming committed to a cause, and the like—are not likely to be learned, especially as an adult, at social gatherings of people who get

Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, Chapter 7-28

together for good times.

Yet, the good things that trust brings are increasingly in short supply—charitable giving as a share of national wealth, at least some volunteering, and the good humors that make it easier to resolve collective action problems. Much of this decline can be traced to the waning of trust.

Are these results generalizable beyond the United States? In the next chapter I move to a cross-national examination of trust, its causes, and its consequences.

Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, Chapter 7-29

APPENDIX

For the equations below, variables significant at $p < .10$ are underlined, variables significant at $p < .05$ are **in bold**, variables significant at $p < .001$ or better are *in italics*, and insignificant variables are in regular typeface.

Willingness to serve on jury (from 1992 ANES): The ranges reflect the probit results reported in Uslaner (1998a) and the reanalyses I conducted based upon a simultaneous equation estimation with trust as endogenous. Other variables in the model are: *discussing politics*, **trust in government**, **high school and college education**, **being divorced**, **the number of hours worked each week**, **being self-employed**, talking to others about election campaigns, being married, and the number of hours one's spouse works each week.

Importance of classics (from 1993 GSS, estimated by ordered probit): Other variables included *education*, *ideology*, **a dummy variable for the South**, **relative financial status**, party identification, gender, subjective social class, fundamentalism, size of community, frequency of attendance at religious services, age, and dummy variables for being black, Catholic, or Jewish.

Ethnic representation (1994 GSS): In a two-stage least squares estimation with trust endogenous, the other predictors of ethnic representation are **expectations that the national economy would improve**, fundamentalism, age, and whether the government pays sufficient attention to blacks.

Moral standards (1981 World Values Study in the United States): The measures of moral standards are all ten-point scales ranging from least to most acceptable. I estimated a seemingly unrelated system of equations for these standards of moral behavior together

Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, Chapter 7-30

with other measures (joyriding, lying, cheating on taxes, and avoiding fares on public transportation). The other predictors include measures of *how much people believe that they obey the secular components of the Ten Commandments, whether there are clear standards of good and evil, how important marital faithfulness is, race, age, being married, belief in hell, belonging to a union household*, and education. (These are average significance levels over the eight equations.) The measure of reciprocity is the execution that other people obey the secular commandments. These results are described in greater detail in Uslaner (1999a) and in a comparative context in Uslaner (1999b).

Obey unjust law (1996 GSS): The bivariate correlations are $\tau\text{-}c = .128$, $\gamma = .264$, $p < .001$. Trust is also significant in a multivariate analysis that also includes *high school and college education, gender, how important it is that children obey parents, confidence in the legislative branch of government, how often one attends religious services, whether one grew up as a religious fundamentalist, and how important it is that children be well liked*. Religiosity (especially fundamentalism) and the desire that your children be obedient and popular make people more likely to demand that we always obey laws, while confidence in government, as well as trust in people (and higher education) lead people to judge each law on its merits.

Protest demonstrations should be permitted (1996): Other variables include *whether people should always obey unjust laws, age, gender, education, confidence in the executive branch of the government, race, how important it is that children obey their parents, wanting children to think for themselves, and frequency of attendance at religious services*.

Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, Chapter 7-31

Not calling in sick (1968 Panel Study of Income Dynamics): The estimation came from a two-stage least squares analysis with trust endogenous. Other predictors include *how long the respondent has been employed in the same position, how important one's own decisions are on the job, age, family income, how much the respondent likes challenges in one's job, union membership (negative coefficient), the number of days unemployed, satisfaction with yourself, being single (negative coefficient), being married, education (negative coefficient), having no spare time, and gender*. The PSID employed a trichotomous measure of trust: trusting few, some, and most people.

Lock doors (from 1978 Quality of Life survey of the Survey Research Center): Positive values indicate that it is unimportant to keep the doors locked. Other variables in the ordered probit are *living in an urban area (negative coefficient), age, how clean the interviewer views the interior of the house, whether the respondent was born in a rural area, how much you like your neighborhood, living in an integrated neighborhood (negative coefficient), how often you were attacked or robbed in the past five years, family income, gender, born in a big city, owning your own house, a dummy variable for being black (negative coefficient), wanting to stay in your neighborhood, whether anything frightens you (negative coefficient), and education*. Just one half of one percent of all respondents said that they were robbed or attacked three or more times in the past five years.

Protecting yourself with a gun (1976 ANES): Other variables in the model are: *dummy variables for living in the South and border states, gender, whether you or a family member have witnessed a crime, whether someone has broken into your home or the*

Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, Chapter 7-32

home of a family member, out-group trust, growing up in a big city, whether you or a family member has been the victim of a physical attack, and in-group trust. There is virtually no correlation with owning a gun in the GSS samples—with trusters being slightly more likely to own guns ($\phi = .032$, Yule's $Q = .065$). However, being willing to protect yourself with a gun is a less trusting action than simply owning a gun.

Participating in a protest march (2000 Social Capital Benchmark Survey): Trust is significant at $p < .05$. Also in the model are *age (-)*, *trust in co-religionists*, *participation in activities other than services at houses of worship*, **education**, political knowledge, gender, and income.

Filibustering: Also in the model are the **percent of Senate votes that pitted a majority of one party against another** (Ornstein et al., comps. 1998, 210), Stimson's (1998) measure of **public mood** (more filibusters when the public ideology is more liberal, indicating that conservatives, who are most likely to use the filibuster, will be most likely to resort to this tactic when they are out of step with the public mood), and a dummy variable for the Congressional session (since obstructionism is more likely in the second session—an astute observation that Richard Beth made in a private conversation). The data for public mood are available at <http://www.unc.edu/~jstimson/ann5296.ppt>.

United Way charitable contributions: Other variables in the multivariate model for charitable contributions are *the rate of change in the consumer price index*, **the rate of change of the gross domestic product**, **the Gini index of inequality**, and a dummy variable dividing the sample into pre- and post-1981 years. The dummy variable reflects changes in tax laws in 1981 (see Uslaner, 1993, 96-97), but it has the wrong sign. Generally,

Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, Chapter 7-33

people give more to charity when the rate of inflation is low and when income inequality is lowest—but when the rate of rate of gross domestic product growth is also lowest (adjusted $R^2 = .930$, $N = 26$). Contributions are highest when people can most afford to give them—rather than when the need is greatest.

Congregational charitable contributions and “benevolences”: I estimated the models by two-stage least squares, with the predictors for trust the same as I use in Chapter 7. The measure of church attendance comes from the biennial surveys of the American National Election Study. To get annual measures, I imputed values based upon time trend using the impute procedure in STATA 6.0. The equations for congregational and benevolences also include the 1981 dummy used in the United Way equation. The unstandardized regression coefficients for trust are about equal for congregational gifts (.622) and benevolences (.580), but the t ratio is much higher for benevolences (2.751, significant at $p < .005$ compared to 1,648, $p < .05$). **Church attendance** had a much higher impact on congregational finances ($b = 1.012$, $t = 2.842$, compared to $b = .384$, $t = 1.927$). And the *1981 dummy* had a big impact on benevolences ($b = -.061$, $t = -3.244$, compared to $b = -.024$, $t = -.711$).

Giving USA total charitable contributions: Two-stage least squares estimation with *inflation*, *trust*, *1981 dummy*, and change in gross national product. All Giving USA estimations treated trust as endogenous, with the Gini index, the public mood, and the election year dummies significant at various levels, as well as each type of charitable contributions, none of which were significant. I also estimated single-equation ARIMA models and the significance levels and coefficients were similar to those from the two-stage least squares.

Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, Chapter 7-34

Giving USA secular charitable contributions: Two-stage least squares model with **trust, the 1981 dummy, inflation**, and change in gross national product.

Giving USA religious charitable contributions: Two-stage least squares model with *inflation*, trust, and change in gross domestic product.


Giving USA health charitable contributions: Two-stage least squares model with **1981 dummy**, trust, change in gross domestic product, and inflation.

Giving USA human services charitable contributions: Two-stage least squares model with *trust, inflation*, change in gross national product, and 1981 dummy.

Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, Chapter 7-35

FIGURE 7-1

Giving USA Charitable Contributions as Percent of GDP and Trust Over Time




Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, Chapter 7-36

FIGURE 7-2

United Way Charitable Contributions as Percent of GDP and Trust Over Time


$uwaygdp = -0.015 + 0.169 \text{ Trust}$
 $r\text{-sq} = 0.804 \text{ RMSE} = 0.005 \text{ n} = 27$



Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, Chapter 7-37

FIGURE 7-3

Red Cross Volunteers as Percent of U.S. Population and Trust Over Time




Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, Chapter 7-38

FIGURE 7-4

Benevolences (from emptytomb) and Generalized Trust, 1968-1996

$$\text{Benevol} = 0.046 + 1.070 \text{ Trust}$$


$$r^2 = 0.605 \quad \text{RMSE} = 0.046 \quad n = 24$$



Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, Chapter 7-39

FIGURE 7-5

Benevolences (from emptytomb) and Economic Inequality in the United States, 1968-96



Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, Chapter 7-40

NOTES

1. I trichotomized the measure of cooperativeness. The tau-c is .302 and the gamma is .589.
2. It is more common in the experimental literature for strategic trust to lead to cooperation: When people see that others play cooperative strategies, they are more willing to trust others and will reciprocate cooperative behavior (Boyle and Bonacich, 1970; Deutsch, 1958, 1960; Giffin, 1967; Loomis, 1959). But these findings cannot solve the collective action problem of why people cooperate in the first place. And the Boyle and Bonacich study *defines* trust in terms of previous payoffs.
3. Other variables include race, gender, education, income, subjective social class, evaluation of how well one is doing financially relative to others, religion, religiosity (fundamentalism or frequency of attendance at religious services), region of the country, size of community, political ideology, party identification, or age. Gender *is* significant at $p < .10$, with men more likely to agree that there are common values, but trust is significant at $p < .003$. Relative financial status has a t ratio indicating significance—but it is people who see themselves with *below average* incomes who are most likely to find widespread agreement.
4. This question comes from a 1964 survey on Anti-Semitism in the United States conducted for the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith and available at <http://www.arda.tm/archive/ANTSEMUS.html> (accessed April 24, 2001). I estimated two-stage least squares models for this and other measures from this survey (see below). Other variables in the model for tolerance of differences are **education, gender (female)**,

Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, Chapter 7-41

a knowledge scale (based upon respondents' ability to identify a range of personalities in politics, entertainment, literature, and sports), fundamentalist, income, relative evaluation of Jews compared to parents, black, and service attendance. The trust model for this and other variables includes *fundamentalism (negative)*, *education*, *black*, *happiness*, *whether our lives are controlled by plots (negative)*, *whether you believe that you have the capacity to solve problems when they arise*, **getting ahead more a matter of luck than ability (negative)**, age, income, and being more successful than others.

5. There are too many results in this section to report the other variables for each finding so I briefly summarize where each variable comes from and the method of estimation. Details for any of the models are available upon request. The question on admiring blacks was asked in the 1994 GSS and the model was estimated using two-stage least squares with trust endogenous. Whether African-Americans can work their way up the economic ladder and the number of immigrants allowed to come to the United States were estimated by ordered probit from the 1996 GSS. The effects of affirmative action and illegal immigration on job loss and how the government treats whites come from the 1994 GSS and were estimated by ordered probit. The questions on the costs and benefits of immigration come from a factor analysis of these four items in the 1996 GSS and the inclusion of the factor scores in a three-stage least squares estimation that also included trust, trade imports, and a composite measure of American nationalism (the components of which are treated separately, since trust did not affect the overall index). These questions include the importance of being an American, whether other countries should emulate the United States, and whether the United States should go its own way in world

Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, Chapter 7-42

affairs. I also estimated ordered probits from the 1996 GSS for questions on why women take greater roles in raising children than men do and from the 1996 ANES on the rights of women scale. The evaluations of gays and lesbians came from the feeling thermometer (ranging from zero to 99) in the 1992 ANES, as did the questions on gays and lesbians in the military and adopting children. I estimated seemingly unrelated equations for the two measures—as well as for the gay and lesbian tolerance measures from the 1972-96 GSS. I also estimated SUR models for racist and atheist tolerance measures from the GSS (estimated together). The question on immigrants' success comes from the B'nai B'rith 1964 Anti-Semitism survey (see n. 4) and was estimated by two-stage least squares. The model used the same predictors as those in the model for tolerance of people who are different, but only trust was significant. The anti-Semitism index is a composite measure including beliefs that Jews have too much power in business, are more loyal to Israel than the United States, employ shady business practices, are "overly shrewd" or tricky, care only about other Jews and only hire other Jews, want to be at the head of things, and have many irritating faults. *Blacks* and **parental attitudes toward Jews compared to the respondent** were also significant, but *trust* had the highest t ratio. For stirring up trouble, *trust* was the strongest predictor, but **fundamentalism**, **black**, and parents' attitudes were also significant. For God punishing Jews, the strongest determinant was the *frequency of attending services* (positive); also significant were **fundamentalists (positive)**, **the knowledge scale (negative)**, and **black (negative)**. Trusters were more likely to vote against an anti-Semitic candidate (at $p < .05$), as are **people more friendly than parents toward Jews**, **people high on the knowledge scale**, and more highly educated respon-

dents.

6. All trusters in the 1972-96 GSS sample are slightly more likely to be conservative: The mean ideology score on a seven point scale is 4.144 for trusters compared to 4.100 for mistrusters ($p < .012$, $N = 18,664$). The gap is bigger when I consider only whites: 4.217 compared to 4.126 ($p < .0001$, $N = 15,842$).
7. People with faith in others are between 7 and 16 percent more likely to say that they are willing to serve. The effects of in-group and out-group trust are even higher, between 17 and 24 percent.
8. There are too many results in this section to report the other variables for each finding so I briefly summarize where each variable comes from and the method of estimation. Details for any of the models are available upon request. The question on admiring blacks was asked in the 1994 GSS and the model was estimated using two-stage least squares with trust endogenous. Whether African-Americans can work their way up the economic ladder and the number of immigrants allowed to come to the United States were estimated by ordered probit from the 1996 GSS. The effects of affirmative action and illegal immigration on job loss and how the government treats whites come from the 1994 GSS and were estimated by ordered probit. The questions on the costs and benefits of immigration come from a factor analysis of these four items in the 1996 GSS and the inclusion of the factor scores in a three-stage least squares estimation that also included trust, trade imports, and a composite measure of American nationalism (the components of which are treated separately, since trust did not affect the overall index). These

Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, Chapter 7-44

questions include the importance of being an American, whether other countries should emulate the United States, and whether the United States should go its own way in world affairs. I also estimated ordered probits from the 1996 GSS for questions on why women take greater roles in raising children than men do and from the 1996 ANES on the rights of women scale. The evaluations of gays and lesbians came from the feeling thermometer (ranging from zero to 99) in the 1992 ANES, as did the questions on gays and lesbians in the military and adopting children. I estimated seemingly unrelated equations for the two measures—as well as for the gay and lesbian tolerance measures from the 1972-96 GSS. I also estimated SUR models for racist and atheist tolerance measures from the GSS (estimated together).

9. All trusters in the 1972-96 GSS sample are slightly more likely to be conservative: The mean ideology score on a seven point scale is 4.144 for trusters compared to 4.100 for mistrusters ($p < .012$, $N = 18,664$). The gap is bigger when I consider only whites: 4.217 compared to 4.126 ($p < .0001$, $N = 15,842$).
10. Particularized trust is by far the strongest determinant of overall affect and it is also more powerful for military service.
11. Only three other variables—living in a border state or the South and whether you or a family member witnessed a crime—has a bigger effect on defending yourself with a gun compared to trust.
12. ESPN is an all-sports cable network (actually, a collection of at least three networks, one of which does nothing but rerun old sporting events) in the United States.

Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, Chapter 7-45

13. Sooner or later if you run enough models, as the famed statistician John Tukey once wrote, the data are bound to say “Merry Christmas!”.

14. See n. 30 in Chapter 3 for the data source. I estimated equations for each of these forms of socializing and more formal activity by two-stage least squares, with each form of civic engagement both a potential cause and effect of trust. The trust equation, as in Chapter 6, includes the Gini index of economic inequality, the public mood, and the election year dummy, as well as each measure of socializing in turn. The equation for each type of activity includes trust (significant *negatively* for bowling, playing cards, fishing, and eating dinner as a family), average household size, education level, and the belief that a woman’s place is in the home (a proxy for a better measure of women as homemakers). Most forms of socializing depended most heavily upon household size and the proper place for women. We had more cookouts, played more cards, went fishing more, bowled more frequently, entertained more at home, had more picnics, ate more meals as families, went to more movies and sporting events, swam more, and ate more meals together when our family size was larger. As our family size shrank, we went to *more* rock concerts. Almost all of these activities were more frequent when more women were at home, as were church attendance, going to club meetings, and especially working on community projects. Exceptions are eating lunch at restaurants, which are now more frequent as more women are in the workforce. Clearly changing gender roles have had a major effect on how we spend our time. Other forms of *schmoozing* not so clearly linked to family structure but also unrelated to trust are: going to bars, playing golf, jogging, attending lectures, skiing, and visiting art galleries (most of which are either increasing or show no time trend). Since

Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, Chapter 7-46

these models are based upon time series data, I also estimated ARIMA models, and they confirmed the two-stage least squares estimates. The forms of socializing and participation selected were based upon the data in the DDB Needham data that had at least 20 years of data available.

15. The Roper data are taken from a memo by Robert Putnam for the conference, “Is Civil Society Weakening? A Look at the Evidence,” sponsored by Pew Charitable Trusts, National Commission on Civic Renewal, and the Brookings Institution, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, November 25, 1996.
16. The aggregate regressions also include an aggregate measure of education, taken from GSS surveys. Confidence in the legislative branch is significant in all equations except for working for a political party, writing an article for a newspaper, and joining a better government group. Attending a rally was negatively associated with trust in the executive branch. I estimated all regressions correcting for serial correlations and also using ARIMA modeling. In the ARIMA models confidence in the executive branch was not significant for signing petitions and writing letters to Congress. When trust in people is significant, it reaches only the $p < .05$ level. The protest march variable is measured at the individual level in the Social Capital Benchmark Survey. See the appendix for the other variables in the model.
17. See the United Way’s web site, <http://www.unitedway.org>, to get an idea of the specific charities that belong to the United Way in any particular area.
18. I follow the Giving USA convention of adjusting charitable contributions for national

Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, Chapter 7-47

wealth (the value of the GDP). Both the United Way and Giving USA data are for individuals—and thus exclude corporate contributions. I am grateful to Robert O'Connor of the United Way and to Ann Kaplan of the AAFRC Trust for Philanthropy for providing me with their data. The correlation between the two series is .835 (N = 30).

19. This figure comes from estimates in various national surveys, including the 1996 Giving and Volunteering Survey and the 1992 ANES, where about 40 percent of Americans say that they have volunteered. The Red Cross figures were provided by Robert Thompson of the Historical Resources Department and Patrick Gilbo of the Public Affairs Department from figures reported in the Red Cross Annual Reports and in organizational files. The Red Cross figures include youth volunteers—but the guess of 100 million volunteers for all causes is still too high because it includes people too young to volunteer. For some years, the figures are precise down to the single volunteer. For other years, the Red Cross only has estimates—for the 1960s the figures are always 2 million while for some later years the numbers are rounded off to the nearest 100,000. But using different break points (eliminating the early years of the 1960s, e.g.) and controlling for time trends don't destroy the basic result.
20. Putnam (2000, 127-129) reports an increase from 1975 to 1999 in volunteering from the DDB Needham Life Style surveys. However, there are questions about the representativeness of this survey (Putnam, 2000, 420-424) that may be particularly severe for demanding activities such as volunteering. Also, the volunteering question Putnam reports does not distinguish among types of volunteering and Red Cross volunteering is

Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, Chapter 7-48

reaching out to people who are different from yourself. Red Cross volunteering as a share of the United States population and United Way contributions as a percentage of gross domestic product are strongly correlated ($r = .907$, $N = 30$). Regressing each against the other yields significant coefficients ($p < .05$) even when controlling for population size, gross domestic product, and time. The partial correlation between the two measures controlling for population, GDP, and time is .334.

21. Both trust and volunteering as a percentage of the United States population are strongly correlated with time ($r = -.872$ and $-.845$, respectively). However, the results are robust to including time as a predictor and also to single-equation models estimated with a first-order autoregressive lag through ARIMA modeling, as well as deleting all cases in the 1960s except for 1968 (to take into account errors in estimation of volunteers in the Annual Reports). The coefficient for trust is .020, with a standard error of .004 ($t = 5.661$). The other variable in the equation is the divorce rate ($t = -3.882$): As the divorce rate increased, fewer people had time to volunteer. There is a strong positive coefficient for volunteering as a percentage of the United States population in the trust equation, but it drops to insignificance when I eliminate the early years of the 1960s.
22. The Ronsvalles divide these church-based charitable contributions as a share of disposable per capita income into “congregational” finances and “benevolences.” The trend data from 1968 to 1997 are available at the Ronsvalles’ web site, <http://www.emptytomb.org/Table2.html> (accessed May 31, 2000).
23. The correlation is .778; $r^2 = .605$.

Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, Chapter 7-49

24. The correlation is $-.953$; $r^2 = .905$.
25. The respective correlations are $-.643$ (Red Cross), $-.648$ (congregational giving), and $-.771$ (United Way contributions), and Giving USA's total contributions ($-.446$).
26. The correlations between trust and the AAFRC categories are: religion ($.121$), education ($.323$), health ($.570$), public service ($-.566$), and arts and culture ($-.791$), and human services ($.781$). These data were also provided by Ann Kaplan of the AAFRC.
27. Public/society contributions increased from $.0005$ of the gross domestic product in 1960 to $.0010$ in 1996; arts contributions rose from $.0077$ to $.0014$, while human services donations fell from $.003$ to $.0016$. See the Appendix for the multivariate analyses for total, secular, religious, health, and human services contributions. All were estimated by two-stage least squares with bootstrapping (1000 iterations).
28. The data source is Karter (1999, 3). I am grateful to Nancy Schwartz of the National Fire Protection Association for providing me with this information.
29. The correlation rises from $.454$ to $.855$. The estimates of values from 1960 to 1982 are through STATA 6.0's impute command, with time as the predictor. This seems reasonable since from 1983 to 1998, the correlation of volunteer firefighters as a percentage of the United States population and time is $-.853$. Trust now becomes by far the strongest predictor of the share of volunteer firefighters.
30. The aggregate correlation over time between trust and crime is $-.810$. In individual surveys, there is less support for the connection between trust and crime. People who

Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, Chapter 7-50

have been victims of crimes are no less trusting than others in either the GSS or the 1976 ANES. I am grateful to Francis Fukayama, who provided me with the crime data he obtained from the Program Support Section, Criminal Justice Information Services Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Department of Justice. Daniel Lederman of the World Bank is working on a cross-national project on crime and social capital. I estimated a two-stage least squares model (with bootstrapping) using the same variables for generalized trust as in Chapter 6 (but adding the reported crime rate). The crime rate was barely significant for trust ($t = -1.566$, $p < .10$), but the effect of trust on crime is much more powerful ($t = -4.414$, $p < .0001$). The equation for the reported crime rate also includes the change in the gross domestic product ($p < .10$) and the unemployment rate ($p < .05$). While it performs well statistically ($R^2 = .739$, $RMSE = .0006$), it is theoretically rather thin, so I am reluctant to make broad conclusions from it.

31. John Mueller called this to my attention and he is correct. Trust measures are not available for 1975, 1977, 1982, and 1985 in the analysis below.
32. The average factor score increased from $-.135$ in 1976 and $-.195$ in 1977 to $.169$ in 1996, where positive scores indicate greater tolerance.
33. The 1964 mean thermometer rating was 60.4; in 1976, it was 67.2; in 1996, it was 63.3.
34. In 1977, 26 percent of white respondents to the GSS said that blacks were different because of inborn differences, 66 percent because of lack of will, 51 percent because of education, and 41 percent because of discrimination. For 1996, the figures were 10 percent inborn, 52 percent will, 44 percent education, and 35 percent discrimination.

Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, Chapter 7-51

Three of the four measures—innborn differences ($\phi = -.125$, $Q = -.345$), will ($\phi = .145$, $Q = -.292$), and education ($\phi = .129$, $Q = .259$)—had at least moderate correlations with generalized trust.

35. The leader was Rep. John Lewis (D, GA). I was scheduled to testify at this hearing in April. It was rescheduled for May.
36. See Uslaner (1993, 97-101) for a discussion of the effects of trust on amendments from outside committee membership in both the House and the Senate. An updated data set on the House from John Owens of the University of Westminster continues to show that trust (together with *public mood*) has a strong effect on the percentage of amendments offered by legislators not on the originating committees.
37. The filibuster is extended debate. The rules of the United States Senate do not provide for a time limit on debate for a piece of legislation. Unless Senators can agree unanimously to consider a bill, a minority can effectively defeat a bill by “talking it to death.” The Senate can cut off debate and move to a vote only if 60 Senators (an absolute figure, not a percentage of members present) vote to invoke cloture, and thus end a filibuster.
38. A cloture motion needs 60 votes to cut off a filibuster. The data on cloture motions was provided by Richard Beth of the Government Division of the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress.
39. For Mayhew’s measure, see Uslaner (1993, 148-151). Gridlock is another term for stalemate. The origin of the word stems from traffic grids in New York City, which are

Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust, Chapter 7-52

always impassible. Binder's (1999) measure of gridlock controls for the salience of legislation by counting New York Times editorials on major issues of public policy and determining how many of the issues cited in the editorials were enacted. The gridlock scores are not publicly available, so I interpolated them from the graph in Binder (1999, 525). While Binder used conditional logit to control for the size of the Congressional agenda (from the Times data), I decided instead to include agenda size as a predictor of gridlock, together with the average ideological distance between the two parties in the House and Senate and measures of divided government. I estimated the models by ordinary least squares, three-stage least squares (with and without a separate equation for filibustering), and ARIMA modeling. In every case but one, trust was the most significant predictor. In that one exception (the simultaneous equation model with filibustering included), trust came in second behind the agenda size.

40. In Uslaner (2000), I operationalize the ideological gap between the parties as the difference in DW-Nominate scores provided by Keith Poole in each chamber. Trust was the most important determinant of the ideological gap.