Voluntary Organization Membership in Canada and the United States* 

Eric M. Uslaner  
Department of Government and Politics  
University of Maryland--College Park  
College Park, MD 20742  
e-mail: euslaner@bss2.umd.edu 

Americans are a participatory people, yet they seem to have withdrawn from their heralded civic engagement. Robert Putnam’s (1995a) seminal essay, “Bowling Alone,” traced declining participation across a wide variety of spheres and sought to explain these trends by noting a decline in social trust in the United States.

Putnam’s concern for civic participation started a cottage industry that ultimately became an international marketplace of ideas. Yet, the phenomenon he observed--declining participation and civic spirit--seems to be a prime example of American exceptionalism. In neither Canada (Nevitte, 1996) nor Europe (Kaase and Newton, 1996; Uslaner, 1997a) is there evidence of a waning civic spirit. Yet, in many ways, the direction of the movement has been superseded by the importance of making theoretical linkages between social trust, other social connections, and civic engagement.

Putnam’s (1995a) argument has become the model for cross-national studies of civic engagement. Following Loury (1977) and Coleman (1990), he outlines a framework for social capital. By social capital he means “networks of civic engagement” that encompass civic participation (especially membership in voluntary organizations), “generalized reciprocity,” and trust in other people (Putnam, 1995a, 67). He treats values, social connections, and civic participation as part of the same general phenomenon of social capital. A society rich in social capital is better able to solve collective action problems. As do others, he posits a reciprocal relationship between civic engagement, on the one hand, and values and social connections on the other (cf. Brehm and Rahn, 1997; and Dekker and van den Broek, in press).

My task in this paper is two-fold. First, I present a different model of social capital from Putnam’s. Putnam (1995a) sees social capital as a “virtuous circle” of participation, values, and social ties, but I argue that we need to distinguish more clearly between cause and effect (cf.
Newton, 1997). To do that, we need to disentangle the parts of social capital and treat them separately. And we need a clearer sense of causal ordering. Second, I examine whether either Putnam’s model or my revision of it (see Uslaner, 1997a, in press, c) is bound by culture. Is social capital as important a determinant of civic engagement in Canada as Putnam (1993, 1995a, 1995b)—followed by many others—argue it is in the United States and Italy?

I present statistical models of trust in others and membership in voluntary organizations for the United States and Canada from the 1990-93 World Values Studies. Is a model developed for the United States applicable to Canada? If so, does it apply to both Anglophones and Quebecois equally? In each case, the answer is partially yes and partially no. There are commonalities in the determinants of trust and civic engagement between Canada and the United States and between Anglophones and Quebecois. But cultural differences also lead to differences in what drives both trust and civic engagement. Trust is not so essential to civic engagement in Canada as it is in the United States. And trust matters in different ways in Anglophone Canada and Francophone Quebec. Some of the differences between Anglophones and Quebecois are reflected in white-black differences in the United States, but others stem from cultural differences among Canadians.

The United States was the most participatory society in the West and is about the only one where civic activism has fallen sharply since the 1970s (Uslaner, 1997b). In both ways, it stands out from the rest of the pack. Yet, Putnam’s model does not derive from a world view based on America culture. Before he turned his eye to the United States, he developed the model for Italy (Putnam, 1993), which Almond and Verba (1963) three decades earlier had classified as the least participatory Western democracy. And one would suppose that a model that applies to two
Western societies that differ considerably from each other would hold throughout the West.

But there is reason to think that the model might not be so generalizable. At the heart of Putnam’s model--and my revision of it--is the claim that social trust plays a large role in shaping civic activism. It is easy to see why social trust is so important. Putnam (1993, 89, 172, 180) considers it a norm that provides the moral glue holding societies together. A trusting society is a happy, prosperous, and participatory society. Yet, there are wide variations in the level of trust across societies. The level of trust reflects a society’s social and political culture (Inglehart, 1997).

If trust is the clue to reciprocity, more trusting societies should be healthier, wealthier, and wiser (more educated). And to a considerable extent this is true (Knack and Keefer, 1996). Many determinants of both trust and civic activism, especially those based on demographics, should be similar across cultures. Yet, other variables, including trust, do not have the same effects--or sometimes any effects at all--in different Western societies (Dekker and van den Broek, in press). Different cultures may have different dynamics underlying both values and civic engagement. What ought we to expect for Canada and the United States and between the two major linguistic groups in Canada?

Some students of Canada and the United States point to the underlying similarity in culture in North America (Nevitte, 1996, 291-295). The determinants of trust and group membership should be similar in the two countries. Others see distinctly different cultures in the two countries (Lipset, 1990; Schwartz, 1967). They would see distinct dynamics in each country. This perspective requires some elaboration.

Consider the case of trust. The standard survey question on interpersonal trust, is “Do
you believe that most people can be trusted, or can’t you be too careful in dealing with people?”

Trusting “most people” involves putting faith in strangers, people who likely are different from yourself (Uslaner, 1997a). Trusting strangers makes sense--and is indispensable--in individualistic societies with a strong sense of common identity. Yamigishi and Yamigishi (1994) distinguish between “generalized trust” and "particularized trust." Under generalized trust, we place confidence in all sorts of people, especially strangers. Under particularized trust, people will burrow themselves into their own communities and trust only people they know (cf. Banfield, 1958). Particularized trusters will avoid civic engagement that puts them in contact with strangers; they will only join organizations made up of people like themselves (cf. Uslaner, 1997a).

In cultures with histories of class or ethnic divisions, people may not be quite so willing to give their trust to people unlike themselves. Yet, these societies are not doomed to poverty or social disintegration. Ethnically divided societies may work out arrangements for power sharing between groups that balance the demands for political and social autonomy with the need for some national laws and standards (Lijphart, 1977). The key to solving collective action problems in such societies is an acceptable way to allocate group rights. Generalized trust does not recognize group rights--nor do societies based on group rights give much heed to interpersonal trust.

Nations with strong class divisions often develop strong states that work to unite their populations against real or imagined threats from without. In both cases, divided societies can hold themselves together and prosper even without widespread trust. But a strong state is a majoritarian state and this means that you don’t have to trust “most people,” only a sufficient
number to create a working majority.

Canada has a long history of ethnic divisions, but not a distinctive pattern (except in places such as British Columbia) of class conflicts. Unlike the United States, Canada has no pretensions to be a “melting pot.” Instead, it sees itself as a “mosaic,” in which different groups are free to maintain their own cultural traditions. This puts a premium on reaching accommodations among the different groups, and Canada has long had a tradition of doing so (Taylor, 1991, 57; Lijphart, 1977, 119).

Yet, Canada is not simply another Switzerland, where several major groups have a live-and-let-live attitude toward each other. There are two dominant cultures, the English and the French. The English describe Canada as a multicultural society, whereas the French see it as a conglomeration of two “founding nations” based on linguistic heritage (Taylor, 1991, 64). The status of Quebec in the Canadian confederation has been a recurring issue in Canadian history. The refusal of much of English Canada to accept the idea of “two founding peoples” has led to a mistrust of Anglophones by Quebecois and a “reciprocal” distrust of Quebecois by Anglophones (and many Allophones, who speak other languages and come from different cultures).

Canadians lack a distinctive identity (Lipset, 1990, 53; Schwartz, 1967, 42). And this has consequences for social trust. A common culture makes it easier to trust strangers. When one adds the lack of identity to ethnolinguistic differences, we should expect that interpersonal trust does not play as central a role in Canadian civic life as it does in the United States. It seems far easier for Americans to say that they trust strangers--and even when we see that Canadians are as forthcoming as their southern neighbors on this score, we would still expect interpersonal trust to play a more central role in shaping civic participation in the United States.
Canada also has a strong state, the United States a weak one (Lipset, 1990, 20-22). Weak states are more reliant on ties among individuals to solve collective action problems. Strong states can use government power (Bell, 1992, 162). Therefore trust and other measures of social capital should play a larger role in shaping civic participation in the United States. A strong state has long been a bulwark against domination by the United States. But it has also been a major element in protecting group rights in the mosaic.

Particularized trust and a strong state are important features of contemporary Quebec rights. The Quebec provincial government used the strong state to make its people “maitres chez-nous” during and after the Quiet Revolution (Galipeau, 1992, 121-125). To promote the French language and French culture in the 1960s and afterward, the provincial government greatly expanded job opportunities for Quebecois. It also spurred economic development in an effort to reduce income gaps between the Anglophones and Francophones--and in 1963 nationalized the province’s energy industry. To come were a succession of language laws, giving French legal priority over English. Each of these actions enforced the group rights of Francophones against Anglophones.

By the late 1970s, many in Quebec--including a majority of Francophones--began to speak seriously of seceding from Canada (Cloutier, Guay, and Latouche, 1992). Trust in other people--other, Anglophone and Allophone Canadians--ran counter to the province’s dominant ideology. Even federalists who wished to stay in the confederation demanded special status for Quebec and often expressed skepticism with about the intentions of Anglophone Canadians.

Particularized trust matters for two reasons. First, people who trust only their own kind are less likely to trust “most people.” Since generalized trust leads people to become active in
their communities (Putnam, 1995; Brehm and Rahn, 1997; Uslaner, 1997a, in press c), anything that works against it might lower civic activism. Second, people who trust only their own kind are less likely to take an active role in civic life, even taking generalized trust into account (Uslaner, 1997a, in press a). When they do participate in civic affairs, they concentrate their efforts in their own institutions, not those of the broader society in the United States. Does this carry over to Canada? Probably, but not completely. Particularized trusters in Anglophone Canada should be, like their counterparts in the United States, ready to withdraw from the larger community. But there is no reason to expect similar behavior from particularized trusters among Quebecois. As an overwhelming majority in their province, Quebecois do not face the dilemma of joining a group that demands generalized trust versus belonging to one that only involves particularized trust. So the issue of particularized versus generalized trust is more critical in heterogenous areas--places where you have some real chance of coming into contact with people unlike yourself.

Prior to the Quiet Revolution, Quebec culture did not encourage widespread participation in civic life (McRoberts, 1993, 122-123). The provincial powers, the Union Nationale and the Catholic Church, discouraged civic activism among a population that was poor and not highly educated. The Quiet Revolution “modernized” Quebec life, bringing strong economic growth and a commitment to education. The emerging middle-class, composed largely of a new professional elite, was committed to a nationalist agenda (McRoberts, 1993, 147-157). Nationalism is an intense, if not extreme, form of particularized trust. The Quiet Revolution led to a more participatory civic culture in the province, as we would expect from a “modern” society. So we see two conflicting tendencies at work: Particularized trust generally demobilizes people, but an
emerging sense of nationalism may encourage wider participation, especially in civic life that does not depend upon interaction with the majority population in the country.

**The Social Capital Model**

I develop a new perspective on social capital that focuses on the direction of causality and distinguishes among different types of trust. I see a causal chain that is asymmetric: Values produce civic engagement rather than the other way around—or both ways. Yet not all beliefs lead people to get involved in their communities.

The early work on social capital stressed its moral foundations. Coleman (1990, 300), following Loury (1977), argues: “...social capital is the set of resources that inhere in family relations and in community social organizations and that are useful in for the cognitive or social development of a child” (cf. Putnam, 1993, 169). I reserve the term “social capital” for values that includes social trust, but is broader. More recent work has put values to the side, focusing instead on social networks, or what I call “social connectedness.” I believe that both values and social networks shape civic participation, but that they are not the same thing (cf. Newton, 1997, 583). Finally, I treat civic engagement—whether it be membership in voluntary organizations (the subject of this paper) or other forms of activism such as volunteering, giving to charity, or voting (cf. Uslaner, 1997a; in press c)—as a consequence of social capital and connectedness. If engagement is part of social capital, then we have trouble separating causes and effects.

Values stand at the beginning of the causal chain leading to civic involvement, not at the end of it. Levi (1996) argues that there is no logical reason to presume that many of the groups we may join (or activities we engage in) should have any impact on our core values or our willingness to cooperate in the larger society. Erikson and Nosanchuck (1990) find little spillover
from playing contract bridge to other forms of civic participation. Mondak and Mutz (1997) show that neither informal ties nor group membership lead people to discuss or participate in politics. And I have elsewhere reported strong support for this asymmetric perspective: Trust in others has powerful effects on membership in voluntary associations, but membership in voluntary associations does not shape trust (Uslaner, in press c; cf. Newton, 1997, 579). I thus concentrate on how values and social ties shape civic participation, rather than the other way around (or both ways).

Values promote cooperation in two ways. First, moral sentiments provide a rationale for abjuring self-interest. For religion, people may invoke a moral force outside themselves that impels them to behave cooperatively. For trust and social egalitarianism, our expectations of others together with a more deep-seated positive outlook on the world, leads us to cooperate with others. Values may lead us to cooperate even when we are tempted to look out for ourselves. Second, values are not just principles in learned writings on morals. They are shared senses of right and wrong. People know something about the intentions of others--thus reducing transactions costs. You are more likely to cooperate with me if you believe that we share beneficent values. Common values give us the rationale for making the inferential leap that we ought to work together.

Which values are central to civic engagement? I consider interpersonal trust a value, not merely a summary of one’s life experiences (see Uslaner, 1997a, in press c; cf. Mansbridge, in press; Wuthnow, 1997). Another key value is religion. Religion can lead people to participate in three ways. Faith produces "something within," a spiritual commitment to secular endeavors (Harris, 1994). Religious traditions exhort followers to give of themselves, especially to the
needy (Cnaan et al., 1993, 37): Jesus fed the poor and hungry, priests and nuns take vows of poverty and work in missions in poor countries, and much of organized Jewish life revolves around raising funds to aid those who have less. Alternatively, religion may mobilize people in a more conventional sense: Churchgoers learn important skills that carry over into political action. Clergy mobilize people into political and social action (Verba et al., 1993, 457). The otherwise passive flock would not participate if it were not involved in an organized religious community (Wuthnow, 1991, 156). Finally, active membership in a church or a synagogue lets people develop and practice skills (letter writing, organizing) that easily translate into political action (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995).

Putnam argues (1993, 107) that religion is an alternative to social capital in Italy. The Catholic Church there is hierarchical; it dissuades people from becoming involved in their communities. Religion sometimes fosters engagement and at other times leads people away from the secular world. Lipset (1990, ch. 5) argues that churches in the United States are less hierarchical and more democratic than their European counterparts and thus encourage participation in the larger world. Canadian churches are recognized—and in limited ways supported by—the state. They are more hierarchical than American churches. The Catholic Church in Quebec was long associated with the established order, fighting movements toward modernization and civic involvement (Quinn, 1979, 18).

Americans are distinctive in their religiosity. Except for Ireland, no Western people are as religious as Americans. Almost all of the cross-national differences in voluntary association membership can be attributed to the larger number of faith-based activity in the United States (Greeley, 1997). Seventy percent of Americans say that God is very important in their lives,
compared to 51 percent of Canadians. Forty-four percent of Americans, but just 26.8 percent of Canadians, attend services at least once a week (Nevitte, 1996, 210). Canadians belong to fewer voluntary organizations than Americans, an average of 1.697 compared to 1.980. The Canadian figure is 85.7 percent of the American level. Yet, once we subtract religious organizations, the two countries have almost identical levels of civic activism (1.447 memberships in Canada compared to 1.493 in the United States). The impact of religion should be much more powerful in the United States: It should stimulate civic activism in the United States and either depress it or have no effect in Canada.

What about differences within Canada? For Anglophones, religion should be less powerful than it is in the United States. Yet, Anglophone religious practice is both hierarchical and pluralistic, at least in comparison to many European countries. So we should see some modest impact of religion on both trust and membership in voluntary organizations. For Quebecois, the historical tradition of the Catholic Church has been to discourage both trust in strangers and participation in civic affairs. Yet, today’s Quebec is different from that of three decades ago. Francophone Canadians are more religious than Anglophones (Nevitte, 1996, 210-211). These religious ties may make Quebecois less trusting of others, but they may also provide opportunities to practice skills that will get them involved in their own civic organizations.

Social connectedness also leads people to cooperate with each other by reducing transaction costs and providing a sense of shared fate (Putnam, 1993, 90, 111). We interact with the same people over time. How we behaved yesterday shapes our reputation, which determines how others respond to our promises to work with others (Greif, 1993). Common bonds help cement shared values. Social ties also reduce transaction costs, making cooperation more likely.
Social Trust in the United States and Canada

I estimate models from the 1990-93 World Values Survey (WVS) for both trust in other people and membership in voluntary organizations in Canada and the United States. The WVS is a multi-nation survey that asks identical questions in each country. It provides the only systematic survey data base that permits cross-cultural comparisons. I use the 1990-93 wave because it includes a measure of particularized trust for Canada. Unlike the 1981 survey, there is no question on television viewing. Putnam (1995b) and Brehm and Rahn (1997) argue that much of the decline in civic participation in the United States can be attributed to increasing television viewing. But this view has not gone unchallenged. Elsewhere I examine a wide variety of survey evidence on the linkage between television viewing, interpersonal trust, and civic engagement and find little support for a television effect, once I bring optimism for the future as an alternative explanation for why people trust each other (Uslaner, in press c).

I begin with social trust. I estimate similar models for Canada and the United States and repeat the estimation for Anglophones and Quebecois. (All francophones in the WVS sample come from Quebec.) Since trust is a dichotomy, I use probit analysis for the estimations. For the probits, the measure of impact is what Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) call the "effect" of an independent variable, the difference in estimated probabilities from the predictor's highest and lowest values, letting the other independent variables take their "natural" values.

The model for includes several demographic variables that are theoretically related to trust: income, age, and education. Education has consistently been among the strongest predictors of interpersonal trust in the United States (Putnam, 1995a; Brehm and Rahn, 1997; Uslaner, 1997a, in press c). Education reflects social status and life experiences; it also indicates exposure
to different sorts of people and a broad range of ideas. Income has had somewhat weaker, but significant effects. And young people are consistently less trusting than their elders (Putnam, 1995; Brehm and Rahn, 1997), although the relationship is hardly linear (Uslaner, in press c). In the United States model only, I include a dummy variable for race (black). Blacks are less willing to say that most people can be trusted (cf. Putnam, 1995; Uslaner, in press, c).

For the Canadian sample, there is a measure of particularized trust that should shape generalized trust. Anglophones were asked if they trust French Canadians while Francophones were asked if they trust English-speaking Canadians. People who trust the other linguistic bloc should be more likely to trust “most people” they meet. For both Canadians and Americans I include a measure of whether people prefer their children to be tolerant of others or whether they would prefer them to be respectful. People who prefer that their children show respect have authoritarian personalities; they are less likely to trust others. If you prefer your child to be tolerant of others, you are more acceptant of strangers (Rosenberg, 1956, 695).

For both countries, I employ two measures of religious involvement. First is frequency of attendance at church or synagogue. This is at least in part a measure of exposure to clergy and fellow congregants. It is the organizational component of church involvement, as Wuthnow (1991) and Verba and his colleagues argue. The second is a measure of how important religion is in daily life, which is a measure of one’s personal moral commitment. Within Canada, religion may be more of an alternative to social capital in Quebec than among Anglophones. The Catholic church in Quebec has had a long history of discouraging civic engagement in the secular realm (Quinn, 1979, 18). We see this legacy in how religion shapes trust among Quebeois. Prior to the Quiet Revolution, the church had a “privileged position” in the province, running
health and social services for the population. The new regime during and after the Quiet Revolution took away these powers and the new professional elite battled religious authorities for domination of the cultural milieu of Quebec. Religious practice fell sharply in Quebec from the 1960s onward as the educated (and nationalist) elite gained the upper hand. Yet, religion still remains a powerful force in Quebec and may work, together with distrust of Anglophones, to reduce generalized trust.

Elsewhere I have argued that the key determinant of social trust in the United States is optimism for the future (Uslaner, in press c). Optimism involves both a set of expectations that life will be better for the next generation and the belief that you can control your destiny and that the country can shape its own future. I include several measures of optimism and self-esteem from the WVS. Americans’ sense of control of their destiny is expressed in the idea of a national sense of ingenuity and progress, worshiping technological advances (Lafollette, 1990, 127). So I include a variable tapping whether people believe that scientific progress is essential for improving our way of life. I also include measures crossing the line between optimism and self-esteem: whether one often feels lonely, whether you think things generally go your way, and whether you often feel excited. I expect optimistic responses to each question to be positively related to interpersonal trust.

The WVS has few good measures of social connectedness. For neither Canada nor the United States did personal ties such as marriage or having children increase social trust (or membership in voluntary organizations). The best question I could find for social connectedness is how important friends are to you. This is a rough, but serviceable, measure of social ties.

I present the probits for Canada and the United States in Table 1. Canadians and
Americans display similar levels of trust overall: 53.1 percent compared to 51.1 percent. And in many cases, the predictors of trust are similar across the two contexts. In both countries, there is a clear generational effect. Younger people are less trusting in both countries, suggesting that there is a parallel drop in social capital in the two countries. Income is significant in both countries, but its effect (and significance level) is slightly higher in Canada. And education is the most important variable in both countries, but the effect in Canada is far greater than in the United States. Someone with a graduate degree in Canada is 38.3 percent more likely to be trusting than a person who did not finish grade school. The comparable impact in the United States is 24.2 percent. In both countries, there is a powerful effect for social connectedness: Friendships have the third greatest effect of any variable in the United States and the fourth greatest in Canada.

Table 1 about here

In both countries, optimism is a powerful determinant of generalized trust. People who feel lonely are less likely to be trusting, while people who say that things are going their way are more likely to put their faith in others. The effects are similar as well. Americans who “feel excited” are more likely to be trusting (by seven percent), while there is only a minimal (and insignificant) impact for Canadians. Easier to understand is the powerful impact for scientific advances in the United States than in Canada. Americans who believe that science provides benefits to life are nine percent more likely to trust others than those who don’t. But there is no significant effect in Canada. Worship of science--and ingenuity--is a central part of American culture. It does not rank so highly in Canadian ideals.

There is evidence that religion can be a double-edged sword in the American data. People
who believe that religion is very important in their lives are 17 percent less likely to trust other people than people who are secular. But people who attend services more than once a week are 13 percent more likely to trust others than people who never go. There is no such ambiguity in Canada. People who say that they are religious are eight percent less likely to trust others—an effect that is half of that in the United States. And there is no significant impact at all for attending services.

Finally, ethnic divisions matter in both countries. Blacks are 23 percent less likely to be trusting in the United States than are whites—for the second biggest effect in the American model (after education and barely ahead of the importance of friends). In Canada, beliefs about others play a central role in shaping trust. People who want their children to be tolerant are 13 percent more likely to be trusting than people who would prefer their children to be respectful of authority. The result is significant at p < .0001. The same variable is barely significant (p < .10) in the United States, and the effect is just one-third as strong (.045). Even more important in Canada is particularized trust. People who strongly trust the other major linguistic group are 25 percent more likely to trust people in general. This is the second biggest impact in the model. Overall, tolerance and trust in people unlike yourself are central to generalized trust in Canada.

There are thus patterns of similarity and differences between the two countries. Trust is more stratified by social position in Canada, but the variable for race may pick up some of the slack in the United States. Optimism matters mightily in both countries, but more so in the United States. This is not surprising, since the belief that tomorrow will be better than today is a central element in American culture (Croly, 1965, 3). Canadians are not quite so sanguine. The satirical group Royal Canadian Air Farce commented on their nation’s expectations for the future, only
partly in jest: “Things are going to get worse before they turn bad.”

The biggest difference between the two countries lies in the role of race in the United States and tolerance and trust of others in Canada. The legacy of racism in the United States explains why blacks would be less trusting of “most people” (Campbell, Converse, and Rodgers, 1976, 456). Canadian racial problems are not so severe. Canada has fewer racial minorities and no history of slavery. But it does have its own ethnic tensions that threaten to break up the country. Tensions between Anglophones and Francophones are as central--perhaps more so--to Canadian identity as race is to American culture. In the absence of mutual trust between Anglophones and Quebecois, each may see the need for a strong state. The state acts to protect minorities (and now to enforce multiculturalism) in the absence of trust. Only 19 percent of Anglophones strongly trust Francophones, while just 13 percent of Francophones have a lot of faith in Anglophones (and over 25 percent don’t trust Anglophones at all). Generalized trust depends heavily on attitudes towards other and on the importance of tolerance in a divided society. They are less important in the United States; indeed, there isn’t even a good particularized trust question in the WVS survey for the United States.

The Canadian-American differences are brought into stark relief when I examine Anglophones and Quebecois separately (see Table 2). Particularized trust and wanting children to be tolerant are central aspects of generalized trust for Anglophone Canadians. They are far less important for Quebecois; tolerance as a desired goal is not even significant. Quebecois society is largely Francophone. Outside Montreal, it is almost exclusively Francophone. Thus, tolerance and trust of Anglophones entails trusting people you are not likely ever to meet and whose motives you may not trust. When they consider whether “most people can be trusted,” the “most
people” they think of are other French-speaking people. Anglophones, on the other hand, are more likely to have contact with Francophones. Their level of trust depends on how they feel toward people who in some key ways are different from themselves. So, after education, particularized trust is the strongest predictor of generalized trust. The effect for Quebecois is just 44 percent of the impact for Anglophones. And Anglophones who want their children to be tolerant of others are 15 percent more likely to trust others than their counterparts who want their children to show respect for authority. In Quebec, the effect is only 3.5 percent (not significant).

Table 2 about here

Optimism matters in both cultures, but in different ways. Anglophones resemble Americans in one key way: The various measures of optimism (excluding faith in scientific progress) contribute about equally (as measured by impacts) to trust in others. For Francophones, there is a modest impact for scientific progress--but only one measure, whether things are going your way--is related to generalized trust. This should not be surprising: Quebecois who believe that the economic future of all Canada looks bright are more supportive of remaining in the confederation-joining with people unlike themselves (Cloutier et al., 1992, 153; Uslaner, 1995).

Religion plays a modest role in shaping trust for Anglophones. Attending services is not significant, while people who say that religion is important are slightly more likely to trust other people (effect = .081, p < .10). For Quebecois, we see support for Putnam’s argument that more religious people in a hierarchical church are less likely to trust others. Quebecois who attend church more than once a week are 12 percent less likely to be trusters than their counterparts who never attend church. And people who say that religion is very important in their lives are 15
percent less likely to trust others than the secular. And context counts. Only 28.7 percent of very religious Quebecois Catholics trust other people, compared to 45.3 percent of very religious Anglophone Catholics.\

Social connectedness seems to matter only for Anglophones. The importance of friends is tied with education among Anglophones for the greatest impact on trust (effect = .314). But it is not significant for Quebecois. Quebecois value friendship equally to Anglophones. Since friendships in Quebec are less likely to cross linguistic lines, the presumed effects of social networks in generating trust (Putnam, 1993, 90) may not operate in a homogenous society that is a minority in a larger nation.

The call for tolerance and trust in people from different groups are the key variables that distinguish Canada from the United States, and Anglophone Canada from Quebecois. Generalized trust in the United States largely reflects optimism and social position. In Anglophone Canada, trust depends on how you views people unlike yourself, especially people from a distinct minority group that may not look kindly on the majority. Quebecois trust, like its American counterpart, depends on optimism and education. But it is most strongly shaped by religiosity. The biggest single barrier to generalized trust in Quebec is religious commitment.

Across cultures, we see many similarities. Resources matter everywhere and optimism plays at least a modest role across all three contexts. But there are big differences across cultures as well. And these comport with what we would expect. Anglophone Canadians are the most trusting (58.5 percent), followed by white Americans (54.5 percent), Quebecois (35 percent), and American blacks (23.2 percent). Quebecois and American blacks are both minorities with longstanding grievances against the majority population. They are not especially hopeful that the
majority will satisfy their just demands. So neither group trusts the majority. For American blacks, optimism doesn’t matter much. For Quebecois, who are not quite so badly off economically nor as pessimistic, optimism has more moderate effects. Quebecois are as likely as Anglophones to say that things are going their way, while American blacks are considerably less likely to make this claim (56.9 percent compared to 72.8 percent for whites). Trust among African-Americans is driven by feeling excited about life, saying friendships are important, and saying religion is not important. More general senses of optimism and internal demographics are not quite so important as among whites--paralleling comparisons between Anglophones and Quebecois. For both Quebecois and blacks, generalized trust depends most heavily on the central institution in their own communities: the church. Very religious blacks are 34.3 percent less likely to be trusting than secular African-Americans. Quebecois who are very religious and attend church more than once a week are 27 percent less likely to trust others than the most secular people in the province. For both blacks and Quebecois, the church functions to shore up ethnic solidarity against what each group sees as a hostile outside world.

**Civic Engagement in Canada and the United States**

Trust matters, Putnam (1993, 180; 1995) argues, because it helps people get together for collective action. Putnam’s primary measure of civic engagement is group membership. The World Values Study gave respondents a list of 16 voluntary associations and asked which respondents had joined. As noted above, Americans belong to more groups on average (1.980) than Canadians (1.697), but this difference rests almost entirely on levels of membership in religious groups. There are differences in the determinants of trust between Canada and the United States. Do they point to different rationales for joining voluntary associations?
In Table 3 I estimate a two-stage least squares regression for membership in voluntary associations in Canada and the United States, with trust in other people endogenous. The first stage equation for trust is identical to the estimation in Table 1. The model for membership in voluntary associations includes, aside from trust, the standard demographic indicators of income, education, and age (cf. Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980 on the United States and Clarke et al., 1979, on Canada), and measures of optimism, personal efficacy, social connections, and religiosity. Optimistic and efficacious people, who say that they can count on success in life, they serve as a role model in politics, and they are not helpless to change an unjust law should be more willing to get involved in civic life. So should people who regularly discuss politics and try to persuade friends about their ideas.

The regressions in Table 3 indicate that the usual demographics are important in both Canada and the United States, although participation is more stratified by income and resources in the United States than elsewhere (cf. Burnham, 1970). General optimism matters more in the United States ($b = .238$ compared to $b = .155$ in Canada for count on success), but personal efficacy matters more in Canada. Serving as a role model and helplessness to change unjust laws have bigger impacts in Canada than in the United States--perhaps because these variables are more closely tied to income and education in the United States. Their influence might be diluted by a stronger intercorrelation with resources. Social networks are important in both countries. Discussing politics is more important in the United States, while attempting to persuade friends matters a bit more in Canada.
In both Canada and the United States, religion is a powerful motivator for participation in civic life. The measures of faith I employ are attendance at services and whether one prays. Even though Canada has considerably less spiritual participation than the United States--almost half of Americans belong to religious organizations compared to just a quarter of Canadians--praying and attendance at services have more powerful effects above the 49th parallel than below it. A Canadian who attends services more than once a week will join 1.28 fewer organizations. The similar effect for Americans is an extra 1.22 organizations. If a Canadian prays, she will join 1.11 extra organizations. The American coefficient for personal prayer is insignificant. Prayer seems to affect primarily membership in religious organizations. While attendance at services has much bigger impacts on membership in religious organizations, it does have spillover effects. Attendance at services in Canada also leads people to get involved in youth groups, women’s associations, and organizations working on third world development.

As expected, trust is significant in both Canada and the United States. But its impact is considerably greater in the United States. The regression coefficient is 1.302 for the United States, 32 percent greater than the coefficient for Canada. This is what we would expect: Trust is more essential to collective action in an individualistic culture such as the United States and less critical in a society that emphasizes group rights and a strong state (Canada).

And even this estimate of trust for Canada may be too high, a composition effect of putting Anglophones and Quebecois in the same sample. When I estimate separate systems of equations for each group, the impact of trust drops sharply for both (see Table 4). Now interpersonal trust is significant at p < .10 for both Anglophones and Quebecois. The stronger impact for Quebecois (b = 1.528 compared to .771 for Anglophones) is belied by the much
greater standard error for this sample. As I found with respect to moral behavior, interpersonal trust is not nearly as important in Canada as in the United States (Uslaner, in press b).

Table 4 about here

In both Anglophone Canada and Quebec, attendance at services is one of the strongest predictors of civic engagement. For Anglophones, prayer also matters. And for both groups attendance at services affects more than just religious involvement. For Anglophones, it leads people to get more involved in women’s and youth groups and third world assistance organizations. Church attendance affects these organizations and more--peace groups, health and voluntary associations, and community action organizations. Even hierarchical organizations such as Canadian churches can spur people on to civic activism. There is an irony here among Quebecois. Strong attachment to religious organizations makes people less trusting. But it mobilizes them to take part in civic life.

Social networks within each culture spur people on to civic engagement. In both Anglophone Canada and Quebec, people who discuss politics and try to persuade friends are more likely to join voluntary organizations. And optimists with a sense of high self-esteem are also more prone to become active. Self-esteem is more important in the more individualistic culture of Anglophone Canada, whereas overall success matters more among Quebecois.

Social Capital Within Canada and the United States

The two values I consider under social capital have a tense relationship with each other. Both interpersonal trust and religion can enhance civic participation, but trust and faith don’t always reinforce each other. Putnam (1993, 107) sees them as antagonistic in Italy. In both
Canada and the United States, highly religious people are less likely to trust each other than are the secular. But church attendance is positively related to trust. Elsewhere I reconcile this anomaly by suggesting that activists in mainline churches are more trusting and involved in secular organizations, while fundamentalists withdraw from participation in the larger world (Uslaner, in press b).

There is less ambiguity in Canada. In Anglophone Canada, there is a weak positive relationship between religiosity and trust, but among Quebecois faith and trust work in opposite directions. And there is an irony here. Religious people may be less trusting, but they are more likely to participate in all sorts of voluntary associations, many of which have decidedly secular purposes (such as Third World development, peace, and community activism).

This would be a puzzle, were it not for the weak relationship in Canada between trust and civic engagement. Interpersonal trust is not everywhere a requirement for participation in voluntary associations. In some cultures, there is no “virtuous circle” of mutually reinforcing values, social networks, and civic participation (cf. Putnam, 1993, 180). There are many pathways to civic engagement and not all of them--in all cultures--require a store of social capital (or trust). A society that is internally divided may develop an infrastructure of civic organizations that do not cross the dividing lines of ethnic (or linguistic) conflict even without trust in strangers. Anglophone Canada and Quebec don’t fall into a war of each against all because their worlds are largely separate. Interpersonal trust may be important in holding the country together, but it may have little impact on civic involvement in everyday life.

And we see a similar dynamic for African-Americans. For white Americans, interpersonal trust is an important determinant of overall activism ($r = .167$) and membership in secular
organizations \( (r = .161) \). It has a moderate relationship with religious organization membership \( (r = .087) \). But for blacks, there are only minuscule correlations between interpersonal trust and overall membership, secular associations, or church memberships \( (r = .036, .034, \text{ and } .020, \) respectively). While African-Americans are more exposed to white society than Quebecois are to Anglophones, most civic life for blacks occurs within their own community. African-Americans largely join community-based organizations such as churches, educational and cultural organizations, youth groups, and community action associations. Whites too are found primarily in churches, but they are also join groups with more diverse clienteles such as professional associations, environmental groups, and women’s organizations.

It is easy to draw too many parallels between African-Americans and Quebecois. On the one hand, American blacks have far fewer resources than their white counterparts. While Quebecois have about half a year less education than Anglophones (from the WVS), their income is not significantly lower. But there is not the chasm in national identification between races in the United States as there is between linguistic groups in Canada. Forty-seven percent of Anglophones think of themselves primarily as Canadians (rather than as a member of any ethnic group), compared to just ten percent of Quebecois \( (\gamma = .769) \). Only 30 percent of white Americans think of themselves primarily in terms of national identity, compared to 18 percent of blacks \( (\gamma = .303) \).

These differences suggest limits to the analogy between American blacks and Quebecois. Quebecois have more resources to help them engage in collective action and it is easy for them not to worry about trusting people who are different from themselves. They may not come into contact with many Anglophones in their daily lives. So mistrust may not have many consequences
for Quebecois. For American blacks, trust and national identity will have greater effects on which types of groups they will join than whether they are mobilized or not. Blacks who trust “most people” are more likely to participate in voluntary associations that will bring them into contact with many whites (political parties, animal rights organizations, and health associations), while mistrusters will work for groups that are more likely to be based in their own communities (especially youth organizations).

Overall, I have found support for key aspects of a revised social capital model. Trust and religious values play central roles in mobilizing people to get involved in their communities. Trust matters most in an individualistic society such as the United States. Religion is most important (also in the United States) where the churches and synagogues are most democratic and least hierarchical. Optimism and self-esteem are key components of trust, but again these are most important where they play a large role in a nation’s culture. These areas point to key differences between Canada and the United States in how social capital works.

The linkage between trust, religion, and civic engagement is not a simple equation that more of the first two lead to more participation. Canada has similar levels of trust and participation to the United States, once we adjust for religious-based memberships. But cultural differences lead to different patterns of interactions across the cultures. Some, but not all, of the distinctions come into clearer light when we compare American blacks to Quebecois, two minority groups that feel alienated from mainstream politics. But there remain key differences that go beyond social structural and resource issues and point to differences in culture between Canada and the United States.
# TABLE 1

## Determinants of Trust Among Canadians and Americans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Canadians</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Americans</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>Effect</td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>Effect</td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Particularized Trust</td>
<td>.172****</td>
<td>.036</td>
<td>.248</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Want Children to be Tolerant</td>
<td>.354****</td>
<td>.092</td>
<td>.128</td>
<td>.125*</td>
<td>.081</td>
<td>.045</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends Important</td>
<td>.177***</td>
<td>.059</td>
<td>.191</td>
<td>.207****</td>
<td>.059</td>
<td>.223</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attend Services</td>
<td>-.014</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>-.034</td>
<td>.050**</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>.127</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion Important</td>
<td>-.075*</td>
<td>.047</td>
<td>-.081</td>
<td>-.161</td>
<td>.051</td>
<td>-.170</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science Advances Life</td>
<td>.050</td>
<td>.050</td>
<td>.036</td>
<td>.120**</td>
<td>.047</td>
<td>.087</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Often Feel Lonely</td>
<td>-.161**</td>
<td>.098</td>
<td>-.058</td>
<td>-.213**</td>
<td>.094</td>
<td>-.077</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Things “Going My Way”</td>
<td>.196**</td>
<td>.084</td>
<td>.071</td>
<td>.178**</td>
<td>.083</td>
<td>.065</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feel Excited</td>
<td>.079</td>
<td>.086</td>
<td>.028</td>
<td>.185**</td>
<td>.080</td>
<td>.068</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.040**</td>
<td>.015</td>
<td>.129</td>
<td>.032*</td>
<td>.020</td>
<td>.104</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.012****</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.234</td>
<td>.010****</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.210</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.120****</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>.383</td>
<td>.074****</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>.242</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>-.633****</td>
<td>.134</td>
<td>-.229</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.501*</td>
<td>.377</td>
<td>-.404</td>
<td>.353</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Estimated R²          | .199       |          | .183     |          |          |          |          |          |

-2*Log Likelihood Ratio | 1643.390 | 1709.552 |          |          |          |          |          |          |

Percent Predicted Correctly: Probit: 65.8 64.2
Null: 54.5 53.0

N                      | 1316       | 1353     |          |          |          |          |          |          |

**** p < .10  *** p < .05 ** p < .001 * p < .0001
(All tests one-tailed except for constant)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>Effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Particularized Trust</td>
<td>.175****</td>
<td>.044</td>
<td>.250</td>
<td>.083*</td>
<td>.063</td>
<td>.109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Want Children to be Tolerant</td>
<td>.426****</td>
<td>.107</td>
<td>.152</td>
<td>.106</td>
<td>.196</td>
<td>.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends Important</td>
<td>.212***</td>
<td>.068</td>
<td>.314</td>
<td>.072</td>
<td>.128</td>
<td>.069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attend Services</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>.021</td>
<td>.023</td>
<td>-.053*</td>
<td>.040</td>
<td>-.124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion Important</td>
<td>.079*</td>
<td>.055</td>
<td>.081</td>
<td>-1.148*</td>
<td>.098</td>
<td>-.149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science Advances Life</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.059</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.150*</td>
<td>.101</td>
<td>.097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Often Feel Lonely</td>
<td>-.201**</td>
<td>.114</td>
<td>-.071</td>
<td>-.045</td>
<td>.208</td>
<td>-.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Things “Going My Way”</td>
<td>.146*</td>
<td>.097</td>
<td>.051</td>
<td>.478**</td>
<td>.188</td>
<td>.153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feel Excited</td>
<td>.163**</td>
<td>.098</td>
<td>.057</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>.192</td>
<td>.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.055***</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>.175</td>
<td>-.021</td>
<td>.032</td>
<td>-.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.012****</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.231</td>
<td>.011**</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.098****</td>
<td>.020</td>
<td>.314</td>
<td>.154****</td>
<td>.036</td>
<td>.409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.136</td>
<td>.444</td>
<td>-.184*</td>
<td>.787</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Estimated R²: .243
-2*Log Likelihood Ratio: 1190.138
Percent Predicted Correctly: Probit 67.1%
Null 61.2%
N: 982

**** p < .10  *** p < .05  ** p < .001 * p < .0001
(All tests one-tailed except for constant)
TABLE 3

Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates of Membership in Voluntary Associations for Canada and the United States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal Trust</td>
<td>.989** .461</td>
<td>1.302** .458</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attend Services</td>
<td>.160**** .022</td>
<td>.152**** .023</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does Respondent Pray</td>
<td>.232** .124</td>
<td>.123 .157</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count on Success in Life</td>
<td>.155* .106</td>
<td>.238** .112</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve as Role Model</td>
<td>.756**** .129</td>
<td>.397*** .127</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helpless to Change Unjust Law</td>
<td>-.083** .041</td>
<td>.025 .446</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discuss Politics</td>
<td>.308**** .087</td>
<td>.414**** .089</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persuade Friends</td>
<td>.194*** .059</td>
<td>.145** .063</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.076**** .022</td>
<td>.134*** .031</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.118**** .029</td>
<td>.154**** .031</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.006** .004</td>
<td>.010**** .002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.574**** .489</td>
<td>2.329*** .511</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adjusted R²  
N

1281 1315

**** p < .10  *** p < .05  ** p < .001 * p < .0001
(All tests one-tailed except for constant)
TABLE 4

Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates of Membership in Voluntary Associations for Anglophones and Quebecois Canada

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anglophones</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal Trust</td>
<td>.771*</td>
<td>.493</td>
<td>1.528*</td>
<td>1.079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attend Services</td>
<td>.141****</td>
<td>.024</td>
<td>.244****</td>
<td>.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does Respondent Pray</td>
<td>.221*</td>
<td>.142</td>
<td>.107</td>
<td>.256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count on Success in Life</td>
<td>.048</td>
<td>.119</td>
<td>.473**</td>
<td>.240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve as Role Model</td>
<td>.806****</td>
<td>.139</td>
<td>.481*</td>
<td>.315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helpless to Change Unjust Law</td>
<td>-.067*</td>
<td>.046</td>
<td>-.092</td>
<td>.086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discuss Politics</td>
<td>.353****</td>
<td>.098</td>
<td>.247*</td>
<td>.177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persuade Friends</td>
<td>.182**</td>
<td>.069</td>
<td>.208**</td>
<td>.118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.075**</td>
<td>.026</td>
<td>.098**</td>
<td>.042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.175****</td>
<td>.033</td>
<td>-.032</td>
<td>.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.009**</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>-.003</td>
<td>.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.013****</td>
<td>.567</td>
<td>4.721****</td>
<td>1.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebecois</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>.196</td>
<td></td>
<td>.014</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>957</td>
<td></td>
<td>324</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**** p < .10   *** p < .05   ** p < .001   * p < .0001
(All tests one-tailed except for constant)
REFERENCES


Erikson, Bonnie H. And T.A. Nosanchuk. 1990 “How an Apolitical Association Politicizes,”


Quinn, Herbert F. 1979. The Union Nationale: Quebec Nationalism from Duplessis to Levesque, second enlarged ed. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.


35


NOTES

* I gratefully acknowledge the support of the General Research Board of the University of Maryland--College Park and the Embassy of Canada’s Faculty Research Award program. The data I employ were obtained from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, which is absolved from any responsibility for my claims. On the larger project from which this is drawn, I have benefitted from the comments of John Brehm, Sue E.S. Crawford, Keith Dougherty, Morris P. Fiorina, James Gimpel, Mark Graber, Diddy Hitchens, Jennifer Hochschild, Virginia Hodgkinson, Ted Jelen, Margaret Levi, Joe Oppenheimer, Anita Plotinsky, Edward Queen II, Wendy Rahn, Tara Santmire, Kay Lehman Schlozman, Karol Soltan, Raymond Wolfinger, Yael Yishai, and conversations with Jane Mansbridge, John Mueller, and Russell Hardin and from the clerical assistance of Anne Marie Clark and Yolanda Rich. Matthew Farrelly gave tremendous technical assistance.

1. Both my results and those of Brehm and Rahn (1997) are based on simultaneous-equation models (I use two- and three-stage least squares and they use structural equation modeling). But the differences in results are most likely to how we specify our models--what we control for and why.

2. Religion may preach a philosophy of caring and may lead people to participate. It may promote a concern for the wider world. But it may also lead people to concentrate on their own kind. See Uslaner (in press a) for a discussion of this issue.

3. Thus average Canadian membership is 96.9 percent of the average American level.
4. The figure for the United States is considerably higher than other surveys show. For 1990, the General Social Survey shows that 39.8 percent of Americans say “most people can be trusted” and for 1991 40.5 percent agreed. In the 1992 American National Election Study, 45 percent gave a trusting answer.

5. Once again, the relationship is not linear. Baby boomers (born 1946-1955) are the most trusting cohort (cf. Uslaner, in press, c).

6. The gamma between religiosity and trust is -.209 for Quebeçois Catholics and -.146 for Anglophone Catholics.