Table 1-1

Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2005 and
Corruption Perceptions Global Corruption Barometer 2004: Correlations

Global Corruption Barometer Variables	**TI Corruption Perceptions Index**	**Bribed Last Year Global Barometer**	**Corruption Affects Own Life Global Barometer**
Grand corruption a problem	-.809	.430	.731
Petty corruption a problem	-.862	.512	.767
Corruption affects business environment	-.584	.359	.661
Corruption affects political life	-.512	.294	.572
Business corrupt	-.666	.388	.547
Political parties corrupt	-.622	.325	.633
Parliament corrupt	-.716	.388	.702
Military corrupt	-.610	.389	.600
Tax system corrupt	-.797	.495	.733
Customs officials corrupt	-.892	.670	.740
Education system corrupt	-.799	.475	.793
Legal system corrupt	-.858	.553	.739
Medical system corrupt	-.774	.454	.673
Police corrupt	-.847	.618	.767
Registry corrupt	-.852	.504	.715
Utilities corrupt	-.658	.341	.763
Media corrupt	-.165	.032	.302
NGOs corrupt	-.477	.164	.540
Religion corrupt	-.078	.172	.305

N = 61

Figure 1-1


Lowess Plot of Corruption Perceptions
TI Corruption Perceptions Index & ICVS Measures of Bribery
TI Corruption Index 2005
ICVS Bribery Share
bandwith = .2 r2 = .547 N = 35 r2 with quadratic term added .683
DEN
SWE
FIN
HOL
USA
BEL
FRA
POR
EST
SLO
BOT
HUN
LIT
SKR
SAF
CZK
LAT
BUL
COL
CRO
PAN
POL
PHL
ARG
UKR
ROM
RUS
NIG
UGA

Figure 1-2


Lowess Plot of TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2005
And TI Global Corruption Barometer 2005 Grand Corruption Perceptions
TI Corruption Index 2005
10
8
6
4
2
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
Grand Corruption Problem TI Global Corruption Barometer
r2 = .655 N = 55
ICE
DEN
SWZ
UK
NOR
CAN
WGR
LUX
HOL
IRE
USA
FRA
SPN
POR
URU
ISR
EST
TAI
MAL
CZK
GRE
LAT
CRO
BOS
ARG
NIC
INS
VNZ
GUA
PAK

Figure 1-3


Petty Corruption Factor Score
by Bloc
west bloc
no bloc
east bloc
-1
-.5
0
.5
1
Petty Corruption Factor Score TI Global Corruption Barometer 2004
r2 = .638 N= 53

Figure A2-1



W = Western bloc E= former and present Communist countries * In neither bloc

Figure A2-2


Lowess Plot of Corruption and Inequality
TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2004
2
4
6
8
10
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
Gini index economic inequality
bandwidth = .2
DEN
NZ
FIN
SWE
SWZ
SNG
HOL
NOR
CAN
LUX
AUS
UK
AST
WGR
BEL
USA
IRE
CHL
SPN
FRA
ISR
JPN
POR
URU
EST
BOT
SLO
CYP
TAI
JOR
CRI
MAL
SAF
SLV
CZK
HUN
ITA
GRE
TUN
SKR
ELS
COL
MEX
LAT
BUL
SRI
POL
GHA
CHN
TUR
PRU
DOM
THA
PAN
BRZ
ROM
IND
EGY
BLR
SER
MOR
IRN
MOL
VTN
UGA
ARG
VNZ
HON
RUS
INS
ALG
PHL
NIC
ZIM
GUA
UKR
BNG
PAK
NIG
KEN

Figure A2-3


Lowess Plot of Corruption and Inequality
Former and Present Communist Nations Excluded
TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2004
2
4
6
8
10
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
Gini index economic inequality
bandwidth = .2
DEN
NZ
FIN
SWZ
SNG
SWE
HOL
NOR
CAN
LUX
AUS
UK
WGR
AST
BEL
USA
IRE
CHL
SPN
FRA
ISR
POR
URU
BOT
CYP
TAI
JOR
CRI
MAL
SAF
ITA
GRE
TUN
SKR
ELS
COL
MEX
SRI
GHA
UR
PRU
DOM
THA
PAN
BRZ
IND
EGY
MOR
IRN
UGA
ARG
VNZ
HON
INS
ALG
PHL
NIC
ZIM
GUA
BNG
PAK
NIG
KEN

Figure A2-4


TI Corruption Perceptions Index
by EIU Fairness of Legal System
Least Fair
2
3
4
Most Fair
2.82
3.04167
3.99231
6.76429
8.78182
0
2
4
6
8
TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2003
r2 = .733 for 86 cases with imputation r2 = .722 for 55 cases without imputation

Figure A2-5


Corruption by Generalized Trust [Imputed]
TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2003
2
4
6
8
10
0
.2
.4
.6
Most People Can Be Trusted [Imputed]
r2 = .420 N = 83
ICE
NZ
FIN
DEN
SWE
SNG
LUX
SWZ
AUS
UK
HOL
CAN
NOR
AST
BEL
USA
WGR
IRE
CHL
FRA
ISR
SPN
JPN
POR
CYP
SLO
BOT
TAI
MAL
ITA
TUN
LIT
HUN
SAU
GRE
CRI
SAF
SKR
BLR
BRZ
PRU
COL
POL
MEX
THA
MOR
SEN
BOS
TUR
ROM
IND
RUS
PHL
MAC
VNZ
ARG
HON
UGA
KEN
AZR
GEO
INS
NIG
BNG

Figure A2-6


TI Corruption Perceptions Index and
Uneven Economic Development Failed States 2006
TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2005
Uneven Economic Development
r2 = .636 N = 139

Figure A2-7



r2 = .636 N = 139

Figure A3-1

Government Effectivness Factor Scores (World Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey 2004)



Figure A3-2


Pickpocketing and Economic Inequality
Former and Present Communist Countries Excluded
Pickpocketing Frequency (ICVS)
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
TUN
COL
BRZ
EGY
UGA
ARG
PHL
SAF
ITA
INS
POR
IND
JPN
SPN
CRI
BOT
AST
BEL
DEN
FRA
WGR FIN
HOL
SWZ
UK
NOR
USA
AUS
SWE
NZ
CAN
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
Gini Index of Economic Inequality
r2 = .244 N = 31 excluding present and former Communist nations r2 = .023 N = 48 for all countries

Figure A3-3


Pickpocketing and Police Peformance
ICVS Surveys
Pickpocketing Frequency (ICVS)
Police Performance (ICVS)
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
UKR
COL
BUL
SLV
SER
BRZ
LAT
TUN
GEO
HUN
EGY
UGA
RUS
LIT
ARG
BLR
ROM
POL
SAF
ITA
INS
JPN
PHL
POR
CRO
IND
CRI
CZK
SPN
BOT
AST
BEL
DEN
FIN
FRA
WGR
SWZ
EST
HOL
UK
NOR
SLO
NIR
USA
SWE
AUS
CAN
NZ
r2 = .653 N = 48 excluding China

Figure A3-4


Pickpocketing and Corruption
Pickpocketing Frequency (ICVS)
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
2
4
6
8
10
TI Corruption Perceptions 2005
UKR
CHN
SLV
TUN
BUL
GEO
COL
LAT
HUN
SER
BLR
EGY
UGA
BRZ
RUS
ARG
ROM
POL
LIT
PHL
SAF
INS
POR
IND
CRO
ITA
JPN
SPN
CRI
AST
CZK
BOT
FIN
BEL
FRA
EST
WGR
DEN
UK
SWZ
HOL
NOR
SLO
USA
SWE
AUS
CAN
NZ
r2 = .659 N = 48

Figure A3-5


Frequency of Assault and Corruption
TI Index and ICVS Surveys
Frequency of Assaults
0
.05
.1
.15
2
4
6
8
10
TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2005
r2 = .000 N = 48
COL
SAF
BRZ
UGA
SER
ROM
RUS.
ARG
BOT
EST
USA
AUS
NZ
CAN
UK
FIN
SWE
NOR
BLR
UKR
CRO
POL
BUL
SLO
HOL
WGR
CRI
SLV
LAT
LIT
CZK
SPN
BEL
FRA
DEN
SWZ
AST
IND
EGY
GEO
INS
PHL
CHN
HUN
POR
TUN
ITA
JPN

Table A3-1

Factor Analysis of Government Effectiveness Measures:

World Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey 2004

Variable	**Loading**	**Communality**
Judicial independence	.919	.908
Efficiency of legal system	.976	.971
Efficiency of legislative system	.913	.852
Wastefulness of government spending	.876	.801
Favoritism of government decision making	.942	.901
Transparency of government decision making	.934	.883

Table A3-2

Correlations of Corruption, Effective Government, and Failed State Indicators (2006)*

Indicator	**Corruption TI 2005**	**Corruption TI 2005 full sample**	**Effective Government**
Overall Failed States Index	-.867	-.869	-.672
Uneven Economic Development among Groups	-.801	-.797	-.620
Mouting Demographic Pressures	-.798	-.786	-.585
Massive Movement of Refugees	-.617	-.554	-.404
Legacy of Vengeance: Seeking Group Grievance	-.699	-.675	-.527
Sharp or Severe Economic Decline	-.728	-.751	-.669
Criminalization/Delegitimization of State	-.863	-.874	-.670
Progressive Deterioriation of Public Services	-.859	-.861	-.650
Widespread Violation of Human Rights	-.783	-.797	-.577
Security Apparatus as "State within a State"	-.777	-.792	-.620
Rise of Factionalized Elites	-.755	-.760	-.580
Intervention of Other States/External Actors	-.733	-.735	-.617
N	87	139	80

*Failed state indicators from http://www.fundforpeace.org/programs/fsi/fsindicators.php, Accessed May 15, 2006.

Table A3-3

Hierarchical Linear Model of Perceived Corruption:

Gallup Millennium Survey 2000

Variable	**Coefficient**	**Std. Error**	**z Ratio**
Country governed by the will of the people	-.212****	.006	-36.55
All are equal under the law	-.051****	.004	13.57
Government does good job handling crime	-.091****	.003	26.85
Having a job matters most in life	.003	.006	.50
Standard of living matters most in life	.007	.008	.88
Discrimination on political beliefs common	.025****	.003	9.10
One true religion	.007**	.004	1.77
Age	-.008	.002	-4.80
Attended college/university	-.010**	.006	-1.69
Constant (individual-level)	.237****	.030	8.01
Random Effects Parameters			
TI Corruption Index	.025****	.006	4.02
Gini Index Western countries	.0002	.005	.04
Gini Index (Former) Communist countries	.0005	.004	.14
Gini Index Other Countries	.002**	.001	1.81
Constant (aggregate-level)	.080*	.045	1.77

Number of countries: 42, Number of observations: 28,692

Wald Chi Square: 3528.67, Log restricted likelihood = -16434.59

* p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01 **** p < .0001 (all tests one tailed except for constants)

Table A3-4

Hierarchical Linear Models of Grand and Petty Corruption a Problem: Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 2004

	Grand Corruption			Petty Corruption		
Variable	**Coefficient**	**S. E.**	**z**	**Coefficient**	**S.E.**	**z**
Corruption Affects Own Life	.077****	.004	20.27	.080****	.004	19.48
Offered bribe in last 12 months	.018*	.012	1.41	.036***	.013	2.67
Poverty big problem	.207****	.006	32.86	.149****	.007	21.99
Human rights big problem	.183****	.005	37.40	.219****	.005	41.60
Family income	-.005*	.003	-1.56	.004	.003	1.25
Education	-.013**	.006	-2.06	-.029****	.007	-4.45
Age	.025****	.005	-5.48	.016***	.049	3.23
Gender	-.011*	.008	-1.44	.003	.008	.37
Employed	-.001	.004	-.18	-.007**	.004	-1.72
Muslim	.028*	.020	1.44	-.017	.021	-.80
Catholic	.005	.012	.41	.015	.012	1.24
Jewish	.119	.063	1.89	.067	.068	.99
Constant (individual)	1.063****	.035	30.31	1.238****	.042	29.74
Random effects parameters						
Gini Index Western Countries	.017****	.003	5.88	.020****	.004	5.47
Gini Index (Former) Communist Countries	.007****	.001	4.40	.0003	.004	.07
Gini Index Other Countries	.003****	.001	5.39	.006****	.001	4.37
Constant (aggregate)	.004	.063	.06	.119****	.030	3.92

* p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01 **** p < .0001 (all tests one tailed except for constants)

Table A3-4 (continued)

Summary of Diagnostics for TI Global Corruption Barometer Models

	Grand Corruption	**Petty Corruption**
Number of observations	29743	29983
Number of countries	47	47
Wald Chi Square	4583.95	4063.17
Log restricted likelihood	-28911.669	-31411.71

Table A3-5

Hierarchical Linear Model of Corruption Affects Own Life
Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 2004

Variable	**Coefficient**	**Std. Error**	**z Ratio**
Offered bribe in last 12 months	.226****	.018	12.23
Poverty big problem	.061****	.009	6.55
Human rights big problem	.118****	.007	15.84
Medical system corrupt	.062****	.006	10.35
Education system corrupt	.080****	.006	13.23
Legal system corrupt	.042****	.005	6.96
Business corrupt	.051****	.006	9.25
Age	.015**	.007	2.12
Employed	-.021****	.005	-3.89
Family income	-.005	.005	-1.09
Education	-.015**	.009	-1.65
East bloc country	-.203	.111	-1.83
Constant (individual-level)	1.955****	.079	24.78
Random Effects Parameters			
Average Gini (You data)	.008***	.003	2.74
Legal fairness	.074**	.034	2.16
Constant (aggregate-level)	.017	.237	.07

Number of countries: 48, Number of observations: 28,081

Wald Chi Square: 2137.03, Log restricted likelihood = -38020.71

* p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01 **** p < .0001 (all tests one tailed except for constants)

Table A3-6

Aggregate Model of Corruption Affects Own Life:
Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 2004

Variable	**Coefficient**	**Standard Error**	**t Ratio**
Average Gini (You data)	.011**	.006	1.82
Trust (imputed)	-.981**	.469	-2.09
Regulation of business (World Bank)	-.173*	.106	-1.64
Informal sector (Executive Opinion Survey)	.097*	.068	1.43
Constant	1.947****	.399	4.88

$N = 51$, $R^2 = .635$, RMSE = .348

* $p < .10$ ** $p < .05$ *** $p < .01$ **** $p < .0001$ (all tests one tailed except for constants)

Figure A4-1

Changes in Economic Inequality (WIDER Measures) from 1989 to 1999:
Transition Countries



Figure A4-2


Shadow Economy 2000
Slovakia
Czech
Hungary
Slovenia
Poland
Lithuania
Albania
Croatia
Bosnia
Uzbekistan
Romania
Bulgaria
Latvia
Kazakhstan
Moldova
Russia
Armenia
Belarus
Ukraine
Azerbaijan
Georgia
0
.2
.4
.6
.8

Figure A4-3


Change in ShadowEconomy 1989-2000
Hungary
Slovenia
Poland
Croatia
Slovakia
Czech
Bulgaria
Romania
Lithuania
Uzbekistan
Kazakhstan
Moldova
Latvia
Russia
Belarus
Ukraine
Azerbaijan
Georgia
0
.1
.2
.3
.4

Figure A4-4


TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2004 Transition Countries
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Ukraine
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Uzbekistan
Albania
Macedonia
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Romania
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Bosnia
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Figure A4-5


Change in TI Corruption Index 1998-2004
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Romania
Latvia
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Belarus
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Poland
Czech
Hungary
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Figure A4-6


Corruption and Change in Economic Inequality Transition Countries
(Transparency International and WIDER Estimates)
TI Corruption Perceptions Index
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Gini Index of Inequality Change (WIDER)
r2 = .231 N = 21

Figure A4-7


Generalized Trust 1995
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Romania
Slovenia
Poland
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Estonia
Lithuania
Moldova
Georgia
Slovakia
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Armenia
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Figure A4-8


Courts Not Fair BEEPS 2002 Survey
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Uzbekistan
Slovenia
Poland
Hungary
Armenia
Slovakia
Czech
Latvia
Romania
Belarus
Serbia
Lithuania
Croatia
Bosnia
Albania
Tajikistan
Macedonia
Moldova
Bulgaria
Ukraine
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Russia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
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Figure A4-9


Corruption and Economic Inequality Transition Countries
(Transparency International and Dutta/Misra Estimates)
TI Corruption Perceptions Index
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Gini Index of Inequality (Dutta/Mishra)
r2 = .349 N = 22

Figure A4-10


Corruption and Change in Economic Inequality Transition Countries
(Transparency International and WIDER Estimates)
TI Corruption Perceptions Index
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Gini Index of Inequality Change (WIDER)
r2 = .231 N = 21

Figure A4-11


Economic Inequality and Size of Shadow Economy Transition Countries
Dutta/Mishra Estimates and Schneider Estimates
Economic Inequality Dutta/Mishra Estimates
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Size of the Shadow Economy 2000
r2 = .509 N = 19

Figure A4-12


Changes in Economic Inequality and Shadow Economy Transition Countries
(WIDER Estimates and Schneider Estimates)
Change in Economic Inequality WIDER Estimates
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1.2
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1.8
MOL
RUS
UKR
AZR
GEO
BUL
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Change in Shadow Economy 1989-2000
r2 = .503 N = 16

Figure A4-13


Size of Shadow Economy and Belief Courts Not Fair Transition Countries
(Schneider Estimates and 2002 BEEPS Survey of Business People)
Size of the Shadow Economy 2000
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(Courts Not Fair BEEPS 2002)
r2 = .616 N = 21

Figure A4-14


Change in Shadow Economy and Belief Courts Not Fair Transition Countries
(Schneider Estimates and 2002 BEEPS Survey of Business People)
Change in Shadow Economy 1989-2000
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(Courts Not Fair BEEPS 2002)
r2 = .580 N = 18

Figure A4-15


Corruption and Size of Shadow Economy Transition Countries
Transparency International 2004 and Schneider Estimates
TI Corruption Perceptions Index
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UKR
AZR
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Size of the Shadow Economy 2000
r2 = .504 N = 21

Figure A4-16


Corruption and Change in Shadow Economy Transition Countries
Transparency International 2004 and Schneider Estimates
TI Corruption Perceptions Index
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Change in Shadow Economy 1989-2000
r2 = .643 N = 18

Figure A4-17


Change in Corruption and in Shadow Economy Transition Countries
Transparency International 2004 and Schneider Estimates
Change in TI Corruption Perceptions Index
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HUN
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Change in Shadow Economy 1989-2000
r2 = .659 N = 10

Figure A4-18


Corruption and Perception that Courts Are Not Fair Transition Countries
(Transparency International and 2002 BEEPS Survey of Business People)
TI Corruption Perceptions Index
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(Courts Not Fair BEEPS 2002)
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HUN
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CZE
BUL
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CRO
BLR
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TAJ
AZR
GEO
r2 = .464 N = 25

Figure A4-19


Failed States Index and TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2005
Transition Countries
Failed States Index 2006
100
80
60
40
20
UZB
KGZ
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BOS
TUR
BLR
SER
AZE
GEO
MOL
MAC
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HUN
POL
CZE
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TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2005
r2 = .722 N = 27 r2 with Wider Change in Economic Inequality = .429 N = 21

Figure A4-20


Public Service Deterioration Failed States and
TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2005 Transition Countries
Public Service Deterioration Failed States 2006
TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2005
r2 = .693 N = 27 r2 with Change in Inequality = .475 N = 21
TAJ
BLR
KGZ
TUR
UZB
MOL
KAZ
AZR
ARM
GEO
BOS
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BUL
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POL
SLO
HUN
CRO
LIT
LAT
CZE
EST
SLV

Table A4-1

Determinants of State Failure and Public Service Deterioration in Transition Countries

	State Failure			Public Service Deterioriation		
Variable	**Coefficient**	**Standard Error**	**t Ratio**	**Coefficient**	**Standard Error**	**t Ratio**
Corruption (TI 2005)	-7.019****	1.589	-4.42	-.418***	.130	-3.22
Change in Inequality (WIDER)	17.683**	7.578	2.33	1.473**	.620	2.38
Democratization (Freedom House 2003)	-7.151**	3.068	-2.33	-.777***	.251	-3.09
Constant	66.884	11.775	5.68	4.973****	.964	5.16
R^2	.900			.896		
S.E.E.	5.866			.480		

N = 21 * p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01 **** p < .0001

Table A4-2

Determinants of Service Interruption in Transition:

Aggregate Models from BEEPS 2005 (Robust Standard Errors)

	Low Water Supply			**Lack of phone service**			**Power outages**		
Variable	**b**	**S.E.**	**t Ratio**	**b**	**S.E.**	**t Ratio**	**b**	**S.E.**	**t Ratio**
Change in Gini index (WIDER) 1989-1999	5.84****	1.371	4.25	1.520***	.619	2.45	15.220**	7.211	2.11
Confident legal system enforce contracts & property rights	3.026**	1.79	1.69	.476	.824	.58	19.893**	8.459	2.35
TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2004	-1.577****	.357	-4.20	-.484***	,199	-2.43	-5.998***	2.029	-2.96
Constant	-13.368**	6.308	-2.12	-1.497	3.054	-.49	-72.787**	30.177	-2.41
R^2		.684			.424			.535	
RMSE		2.030			.981			10.526	

* p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01 **** p < .0001 N = 21

Table A4-3

Determinants of Shares of Business Sales on Credit in Transition

BEEPS 2005 Aggregate Model (With Robust Standard Errors)

Variable	**Coefficient**	**Std. Error**	**t Ratio**
Change in Gini index (WIDER) 1989-1999	-18.551***	8.897	-2.53
Corruption Perceptions Index (TI)	6.695****	1.504	4.45
Chamber of commerce membership	28.374****	8.897	3.19
Constant	37.423**	13.206	2.83

RMSE = 6.16 R^2 = .866 N = 21

* p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01 **** p < .0001

Table A5-1

Rankings on Transition Indicators for Romania

Measure	Value	Transition Rank	# Ranked	Overall Rank	# Ranked
TI Corruption Index 2004	1.4	13	26	88/90	146
TI Corruption Index 2005	3	11	27	85/87	160
Change in Corruption TI 1998-2004	-1.6	8	11	28/32	85
Change in Corruption 1996-2004 World Bank	-.11	11	26	84/86	151
Trust	.16	19/20	21	82	94
Shadow economy share*	.34	10	21	47/48	90
Change in share of shadow economy 1989-2000*	.164	8	18	--	--
Gini index (WIDER) 1999*	.299	5	16	29	60
Gini index (Dutta / Mishra)*	.311	8	22	--	--
Change in Gini index (WIDER) 1989-1999*	1.261	6	21	6	44
Change in Gini index (Rosser/Rosser/Ahmed)*	.048	7	16	--	--
Courts not fair (BEEPS 2002)*	.38	10	26	--	--
Rule of Law (Nations in Transition) 2004*	4.38	10	27	--	--
Democratization (Nations in Transition) 2004*	3.25	10	27	--	--
GDP per capita Penn World Tables 2000	5023	17	23	77	136
GDP growth 1975-2003 UNDP	-.8	6	14	69	76
UN Human Development Index (1990)	.772	12	18	46/47	82
Uneven economic development (Failed States)*	6	6/8	27	33/39	146
Failed States Index*	62.6	11	27	102	146
Internal Conflicts (ICRG)	10.5	14	20	32/56	154
Ethnic Tensions (ICRG)	3.5	13/14	20	87/97	141

* Low values indicate better performance.

Rankings based upon number of transition countries rated. Multiple rankings indicate countries tied.

-- Data not available or only transition countries ranked.

Table A5-2

Perceptions of Romanians on Inequality, Corruption, Government Performance, Democracy, the Market, Fellow Citizens, their Government, Connections, and Gift Payments

Attitude	**Percent Agreeing**
Inequality has increased	91.6
Satisfied with the way democracy works	33.5
Satisfied with the way the market works	13.4
Most people can be trusted	34.1
Trust government	24.5
Is the current government fighting corruption	17.9
Corruption decreased in current government	8.1
Satisfied with government efforts to reduce corruption	10.1
Satisfied with government performance in fighting corruption	23. 3
Government measures to fight corruption good	37.7
Satisfied with police fighting corruption	26.9
Satisfied with courts fighting corruption	21.9
Satisfied with media fighting corruption	64.4
Most members of parliament are corrupt	85.0
Most government ministers are corrupt	79.0
Most business people are corrupt	75.0
Most politicians are corrupt	74.0
Most politicians are corrupt	69.0
Most members of local council are corrupt	58.0
Most teachers are corrupt	57.0
Most government functionaries are corrupt	56.0
Most professors are corrupt	36.0
Most journalists are corrupt	26.0

Table A5-2

Perceptions of Romanians on Inequality, Corruption, Government Performance, Democracy, the Market, Fellow Citizens, their Government, Connections, and Gift Payments (continued)

Attitude	**Percent Agreeing**
Satisfied with government performance on the quality of life	25.0
Satisfied with government performance on public safety	14.0
Satisfied with government performance on privatization	19.0
Have connections for medical treatment	35.1
Trust President	38.5
Trust Parliament	15.1
Trust city hall	43.9
Trust justice system	22.0
Trust police	36.7
Trust army	66.3
Trust political parties	9.9
Have connections for finding job	11.1
Have connections to rely on in the business world	6.6
Have connections for problem at city hall	20.7
Have connections to help get loan from bank	10.0
Have connections for problem with county government	5.4
Have connections to deal with courts/lawyers	11.6
Have connections to deal with police	15.6
Have connections to rely on in foreign country	11.2
Made “extra” payments to doctor	25.0
Made “extra” payments to bank in getting loan	.7
Made “extra” payments to police	1.4
Made “extra” payments to courts	3.2
Made “extra” payments to city officials	2.5
Made “extra” payments to county officials	.3

Table A5-3

Likelihood that Romanians Would Pay an *Atentie* (Gift/Bribe) for Public Service:

World Bank Corruption Diagnostic Survey 2000

Public Service	Paying "Gift"	Paying "Gift" Voluntarily
Hospital stay	66	37
Emergency	62	29
Dentist	56	39
Medical specialist	52	33
Gas installation/ repair	40	31
Power connection or repair	33	28
General practitioner	32	17
Building permit	29	19
Driving license	27	17
Vocational school	27	8
Elementary school	25	9
Real estate registration	22	16
Telephone connection / repair	22	16
Courts	22	16
High school	21	10
Loan application	19	8
Water connection / repair	18	15
University	17	9
Employment office	16	9
Passport	15	12
Unemployment benefits	11	7
Identity card	8	4
Police (crime victims only)	4	3

Source: Anderson et al. (2000, 13)

Table A5-4

Simultaneous Equation Model of Optimism for the Future
and Perceptions of Government Handling Corruption Well from Aggregated Surveys

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t Ratio
Optimism for the future			
Government success in controlling corruption	1.848****	.327	5.65
GDP growth rate (Penn World Tables)	2.838***	.890	3.19
Constant	39.894****	6.218	6.42
RMSE = 14.411 R^2 = .591 N = 17			
Government success in controlling corruption			
Optimism for the future	1.036****	.206	5.04
Informal market (Heritage Foundation)	-23.952***	8.401	-2.85
Constant	30.822	19.826	1.55
RMSE = 9.145 R^2 = .702 N= 17			

* p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01 **** p < .0001

Endogenous variables in **bold;** endogenous dependent variables in ***bold italics*.**

Exogenous variables: Trust in justice, quality of life next year.

Growth rate in gross domestic product for the year taken from Penn World Tables from 1996-2000 and from http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/fs/roum.pdf for 2001-2003. Informal market estimate and wage and price controls taken from Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/downloads/PastScores.xls .

Table A5-5
Satisfaction with Democracy in Romania: Ordered Probit

Independent Variable	**Coefficient**	**Std. Error**	**t ratio**
Quality of life next year	.086**	.047	1.85
State of national economy in three years	.246****	.045	5.49
Life satisfaction	.187****	.054	3.44
Wealth (can afford consumer goods)	-.022	.012	-1.75
Performance of government on quality of life	.249***	.104	2.44
Performance of government in enhancing public safety	.364***	.124	2.94
Performance of government in reducing corruption	.238****	.049	4.89
Romania needs a strong leader	-.112***	.043	-2.62
State should control media and political parties	-.043**	.025	-1.75
Supporter of PSD (former Communist party)	.140****	.028	4.90
Age	-.003*	.002	-1.44
Made "extra" payments when visiting doctor	*-.108**	*-.080*	*-1.35*
Made "extra" payments to court	*-.324**	*.200*	*-1.62*
Made "extra" payments to city officials	*-.030*	*.225*	*-.13*
Made "extra" payments to county officials	*1.804*	*.797*	*1.36*
Made "extra" payments to police	*-.189*	*.259*	*-.73*
Made "extra" payments to bank	*-.021*	*.399*	*-.53*
Have any connections to rely upon+	**.069****	**.034**	**2.07**
Have connections to rely on for medical treatment+	**.102**	**.070**	**1.46**
Have any connections to rely upon in court/lawyer+	**.116**	**.100**	**1.16**
Have any connections to rely upon at city hall+	**.116**	**.078**	**1.46**
Have any connections to rely on dealing with county+	**.091**	**.131**	**.69**
Have any connections to rely on for police problem+	**.181****	**.078**	**2.06**
Have any connections to rely upon for bank loan+	**.198****	**.103**	**1.93**
Have any connections to rely upon for finding job+	**.157***	**.102**	**1.54**
Have any connections to rely upon in business world+	**.013**	**.121**	**.11**
Have any connections to rely upon in foreign country	**-.249****	**.099**	**-2.51**

* p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01 **** p < .0001
-2*Log Likelihood Ratio = 2560.94 N = 1082

Coefficients for variables other than "connections" are for "any connections." Cutpoints omitted.
+ Two-tailed test of significance (all other tests one-tailed)

Table A5-6

Satisfaction with Market Economy in Romania: Ordered Probit

Independent Variable	**Coefficient**	**Standard Error**	**t ratio**
Quality of life next year	.125***	.045	2.79
Satisfaction with income	.085**	.051	1.68
Life satisfaction	.108**	.058	1.87
Wealth (can afford consumer goods)	-.020	.013	-1.56
Performance of government on quality of life	.424***	.103	4.10
Performance of government in enhancing public safety	.188*	.124	1.52
Performance of government in reducing corruption	.254****	.048	5.33
Most business people are corrupt	-.086**	.04	-2.13
Trust in private firms	.178****	.036	5.01
Age	.001	.002	.69
Made "extra" payments when visiting doctor	*-.069*	*.078*	*-.89*
Made "extra" payments to court	*.068*	*.177*	*.39*
Made "extra" payments to city officials	*.249*	*.206*	*1.21*
Made "extra" payments to county officials	*.134*	*.804*	*.17*
Made "extra" payments to police	*-.226*	*.277*	*-.82*
Made "extra" payments to bank	*-.090*	*.399*	*-.23*
Have any connections to rely upon	**-.044***	**.034**	**-1.30**
Have connections to rely on for medical treatment	**.006**	**.071**	**.09**
Have any connections to rely upon in court/lawyer	**-.106**	**.102**	**-1.03**
Have any connections to rely upon at city hall	**-.051**	**.081**	**-.63**
Have any connections to rely on dealing with county	**-.151**	**.139**	**-1.08**
Have any connections to rely on for police problem	**-.047**	**.088**	**-.05**
Have any connections to rely upon for bank loan	**-.129**	**.105**	**-1.22**
Have any connections to rely upon for finding job	**-.132**	**.102**	**-1.29**
Have any connections to rely upon in business world	**.185**	**.805**	**.23**
Have any connections to rely upon in foreign country	**-.351*****	**.102**	**-3.45**

* p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01 **** p < .0001
-2*Log Likelihood Ratio = 2462.92 N = 1086

Coefficients for variables other than "connections" are for "any connections." Cutpoints omitted.

Table A5-7

Trust in Government Scale in Romania: Regression Analysis

Independent Variable	**Coefficient**	**Std. Error**	**t ratio**
Generalized trust	.213****	.048	4.41
Direction of country right or wrong	.237***	.051	4.65
Inequality change	-.097**	.035	2.78
Wealth (can afford consumer goods)	.000	.007	.02
Performance of government on quality of life	.103*	.065	1.58
Performance of government in enhancing public safety	.588****	.080	7.37
Performance of government in reducing corruption	.231****	.032	7.14
Supporter of PSD (reformed Communist party now in power)	.237****	.019	12.73
State should control media and political parties	-.031**	.017	-1.89
Live in Bucharest (capital)	-.284****	.069	-4.14
Frequency attendance at religious services	.027*	.018	1.50
Frequency of contact with officials	.049***	.019	2.57
Made "extra" payments when visiting doctor	*.025*	*.055*	*.45*
Made "extra" payments to court	*-.049*	*.136*	*-.36*
Made "extra" payments to city officials	*.245*	*.144*	*1.70*
Made "extra" payments to county officials	*-.174*	*.364*	*-.48*
Made "extra" payments to police	*-.051*	*.176*	*-.29*
Made "extra" payments to bank	*.053*	*.239*	*.22*
Have any connections to rely upon	**-.00003**	**.176**	**-.29**
Have connections to rely on for medical treatment	**-.002**	**.048**	**-.04**
Have any connections to rely upon in court/lawyer	**.046**	**.068**	**.69**
Have any connections to rely upon at city hall	**.053**	**.057**	**.92**
Have any connections to rely on dealing with county	**.005**	**.094**	**.05**
Have any connections to rely on for police problem	**.027**	**.060**	**.45**
Have any connections to rely upon for bank loan	**.008**	**.073**	**.12**
Have any connections to rely upon for finding job	**-.119****	**.067**	**-1.79**
Have any connections to rely upon in business world	**-.046**	**.082**	**-.56**
Have any connections to rely upon in foreign country	**-.158****	**.068**	**-2.30**

* p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01 **** p < .0001

R^2 = .481 RMSE = .708 N = 1052

Coefficients for variables other than "connections" are for "any connections."

Table 6-1
Rankings on Transition Indicators for for Estonia and Slovakia

	Estonia			Slovakia				
Measure	**Value**	**Transition Rank**	**Total Rank**	**Value**	**Transition Rank**	**Total Rank**	**# Ranked Transition**	**# Ranked Total**
TI Corruption Index 2004	4.0	1	31/33	2.5	6	57/58	27	146
TI Corruption Index 2005	6.4	1	27	4.3	5	47/50	27	160
Change in Corruption TI 1998-2004	-1.7	4	33/35	-1.4	2	20/23	11	85
Change in Corruption 1996-2004 World Bank	.79	2	6	-.09	14	83	26	151
Trust	.22	12/13	62/68	.23	15/16	58/61	21	94
Shadow economy share*	--	--	--	.189	1	83	21	151
Change in share of shadow economy 1989-2000*	--	--	--	.12	5	--	18	--
Gini index (WIDER) 1999*	.401	12	36	.249	1	1	16	60
Gini index (Dutta / Mishra)*	.376	15	--	.262	4	--	22	--
Change in Gini index (WIDER) 1989-1999*	1.585	13	33	1.245	4	28/29	21	44
Change in Gini index (Rosser/Rosser/Ahmed)*	.127	14	--	0	1	--	16	--
Courts not fair (BEEPS 2002)*	.276	1	--	.347	7	--	26	--
Rule of Law (Nations in Transition) 2004*	2.13	3	--	2.63	5/6	--	27	--
Democratization (Nations in Transition) 2004*	1.94	6	--	1.81	3/4	--	27	--
GDP per capita Penn World Tables 2000	10873	5	40	12619	3	36	23	136
GDP growth 1975-2003 UNDP	.4	3	54/56	.5	2	53	14	76
UN Human Development Index (1990)	.812	6	37	.831	3	31	18	82
Uneven economic development (Failed States)*	5	3	20/27	6.5	13	47/48	27	146
Failed States Index*	51	7	111	49.9	6	112	27	146
Internal Conflicts (ICRG)	11.5	1/4	4/17	11	5/8	4/17	20	154
Ethnic Tensions (ICRG)	2.5	19	118/125	3.5	13/14	87/97	20	141

Notes to Table 6-1:

* Low values indicate better performance.

Rankings based upon number of transition countries rated. Rankings based upon number of transition countries rated. Multiple rankings indicate countries tied.

-- Data not available or only transition countries ranked.

Table A6-2

Perceptions of the Consequences of Corruption:
World Bank Corruption Diagnostic Surveys of the Romanian and Slovakian Publics and Elites

Proportion Naming Each Consequence as First or Second Most Important

	Romania		Slovakia		
Consequence	**Public**	**Entrepreneurs**	**Public**	**Entrepreneurs**	**Officials**
Increase inequality	.53	.37	.37	.31	.43
Lowers income	.53	.41	.20	.22	.25
Infringes on human rights	.17	.07	.17	.20	.35
Contributes to dishonesty	.11	.14	.15	.32	.36
Leads to increased crime	.12	.09	.15	.28	.32
Contributes to moral decline	.15	.23	.38	.20	.32
Hurts transition	.05	.09	.25	.22	.25
Lose confidence in one's own abilities	NA	NA	.27	.31	.27
Hurts private enterprise	.04	.18	.09	.21	.20
Leads to loss of foreign investment	.12	.26	.29	.38	.27
Endangers security of state	.18	.14	.20	.10	.31

Table A6-3

Probit Analysis of Perceptions of How Corruption Increases Economic Inequality:
World Bank Corruption Diagnostic Survey of the Slovkian Public

Variable	**Coefficient**	**Std. Error**	**MLE/SE**	**Effect**
Corruption causes crime	-1.273****	.111	-11.47	-.376
Corruption causes human rights violations	-1.469****	.182	-8.08	-.356
Corruption hurts development of private sector	-.484***	.163	-2.96	-.133
Corruption hurts transition	-1.124****	.206	-5.45	-.279
Must bribe courts because courts not fair	-.040	.041	-.99	-.046
Bribe part of everyday life	-.009	.047	-.20	-.008
Social class	.017	.038	.43	.033
Constant	.427*	.253	1.68	

* p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01 **** p < .0001

Estimated R^2 = .520 -2*Log Likelihood Ratio = 912.178 N = 903

Percent predicted correctly: 75.4 (model) 62.1 (null)

Table A6-4

Probit Analysis of Perceptions of How Corruption Increases Economic Inequality:
World Bank Corruption Diagnostic Survey of the Romanian Entrepreneurs

Variable	**Coefficient**	**Std. Error**	**MLE/SE**	**Effect**
Corruption is abuse of position	.264*	.163	1.62	.080
Corruption leads investors to lose confidence in Romania	-.562***	.190	-2.96	-.165
Corruption leads to moral decline in society	-.969****	.206	-4.71	-.275
Corruption slows development of private sector	-1.210****	.243	-4.97	-.320
Competitors don't pay fair share of taxes	.096**	.047	2.03	.117
Low pay major cause of corruption	.286**	.161	1.77	.088
Government has greatest responsibility for fighting corruption	.982***	.397	2.48	.307
Political instability hinders my company	.188**	.110	1.71	.212
Member business association	-.347**	.187	-1.85	-.103
Constant	-1.120*	.468	-2.39	

* $p < .10$ ** $p < .05$ *** $p < .01$ **** $p < .0001$

Estimated $R^2 = .422$ -2*Log Likelihood Ratio = 331.66 N = 309

Percent predicted correctly: 71.2 (model) 63.8 (null)

Table A6-5

Probit Analysis of Perceptions of How Corruption Increases Economic Inequality:
World Bank Corruption Diagnostic Survey of Slovkian Entrepreneurs

Variable	**Coefficient**	**Std. Error**	**MLE/SE**	**Effect**
Corruption is abuse of position	-.464	.222	-2.09	-.099
Corruption causes human rights violations	-2.088****	.599	-3.49	-.261
Corruption hurts transition	-1.098****	.322	-3.41	-.195
Corruption hurts development of private sector	-.792***	.281	-2.82	-.148
Corruption caused by ordinary citizens	.485**	.275	1.76	.111
Deputies really want to solve corruption	-.204*	.144	-1.42	-.127
Gift payments obstacle to business development	.917****	.231	3.98	.210
Income change in business from 1998 to 1999	-.007***	.003	-2.36	-.392
Constant	-1.120*	.468	-2.39	

* $p < .10$ ** $p < .05$ *** $p < .01$ **** $p < .0001$

Estimated $R^2 = .723$ -2*Log Likelihood Ratio = 186.241 N = 244

Percent predicted correctly: 81.2 (model) 78.3 (null)

Table A6-6

Probit Analysis of Perceptions of How Corruption Increases Economic Inequality:
World Bank Corruption Diagnostic Survey of Slovkian Offiicials

Variable	**Coefficient**	**Std. Error**	**MLE/SE**	**Effect**
Corruption is abuse of position	.298**	.176	-1.69	-.088
Corruption causes human rights violations	-1.202****	.275	-4.38	-.286
Corruption causes increase in crime	-1.235****	.208	-5.94	-.318
Corruption endangers security of state	-1.075***	.334	-3.22	-.282
Corruption hurts transition	-1.047****	.242	-4.33	-.286
Corruption leads foreign investors to lose confidence	-.742****	.203	-3.67	-.213
Corruption caused by weak legal system	-.200	.270	-.74	-.058
Corruption increased over past three years	.010	.089	.11	.012
Is there corruption in education system	.053	.113	.05	.031
Education	-.354**	.158	-2.23	-.211
Constant	2.154**	.702	3.07	

* $p < .10$ ** $p < .05$ *** $p < .01$ **** $p < .0001$

Estimated $R^2 = .444$ -2*Log Likelihood Ratio = 285.154 N = 271

Percent predicted correctly: 72.7 (model) 57.2 (null)

Table A6-7

Ordered Probit Analysis of Trust in Government:
World Bank Corruption Diagnostic Survey of Slovkian Entrepreneurs

Variable	**Coefficient**	**Std. Error**	**MLE/SE**	**Effect**
Corruption causes inequality	.070	.201	.035	.010
Corruption increased in past three years	-.236**	.114	-2.07	-.065
Parliament is corrupt	-.282***	.084	-3.27	-.157
Bureaucracy obstacle to business development	-.227**	.098	-2.32	-.117
Clientelism obstacle to business development	-.010	.088	-.01	-.006
Infrastructure obstacle to business development	-.147**	.075	-1.96	-.085
Quality of services traffic police	.188***	.077	2.44	.103
Quality of services energy	.161**	.089	1.82	.094

Cut points not reported. Effects are average changes in probabilities across the five categories of trust in government. The effects represent the changes from each value to *the next higher value*.

* $p < .10$ ** $p < .05$ *** $p < .01$ **** $p < .0001$

Estimated $R^2 = .105$ -2*Log Likelihood Ratio = 487.604 N = 202

Table A6-8

Ordered Probit Analysis of Trust in Government:
World Bank Corruption Diagnostic Survey of Slovkian Officials

Variable	**Coefficient**	**Std. Error**	**MLE/SE**	**Effect**
Corruption causes inequality	.226	.195	1.16	.033
Corruption increased in past three years	-.271***	.100	-2.70	-.151
Corruption caused by weak court	-.039	.305	-.13	-.006
Ministries are corrupt	-.238**	.138	-1.72	-.068
Education system is corrupt	-.022	.126	-.17	-.006
Traffic courts are corrupt	-.032	.128	-.25	-.009
Health system is corrupt	-.172*	.131	-1.32	-.045
Central administration takes bribes for influencing decisions	-.266**	.137	-1.94	-.139
Embezzlement in central administration	-.252**	.137	-1.83	-.068
Offered small gift in past two years	-.054	-.120	-.45	-.067
Gift payments for services common	-.333*	.232	-1.44	-.050
Central administration: poor quality	-.013	.195	-1.16	-.008
Social class	-.045	.110	-.41	-.026

Cut points not reported. Effects are average changes in probabilities across the five categories of trust in government. The effects represent the changes from each value to *the next higher value*.

* p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01 **** p < .0001

Estimated R^2 = .151 -2*Log Likelihood Ratio = 313.386 N = 141

Table A7-1

Ordered Probit Analysis of Corruption Increasing Since Period of One-Party Rule:
2002 Afrobarometer in Mali

Variable	**Coefficient**	**Std. Error**	**MLE/SE**	**Effect**
Equal treatment for all: better now than under military	-.120***	.039	-3.10	-.091
Government policies hurt or help most people	-.084**	.037	-2.24	-.063
President favors own region in providing services	.080**	.045	1.76	.045
Electricity difficult to get because of high cost	.393****	.097	4.05	.074
Elected leaders corrupt	.162***	.055	2.96	.089
Police corrupt	.230***	.079	2.91	.125
Civil servants corrupt	.120**	.061	1.97	.066
Business people corrupt	.066	.073	.91	.037
Teachers corrupt	-.023	.043	-.55	-.013
Customs officers corrupt	-.109	.084	-1.30	-.063
Bribery is rare among public officials	-.086**	.047	-1.82	-.048
Need to bribe to get services entitled to	-.044	.049	-.89	-.025
Can get cash through illicit sources	.301***	.094	3.22	.056
How often Malians get services without paying	.095**	.037	2.02	.054
Trust courts	.036	.039	.92	.020
Generalized trust	.024	.133	.18	.005

Cut points not reported. Effects are average changes in probabilities across the five categories of trust in government. The effects represent the changes from each value to *the next higher value*.

* p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01 **** p < .0001

Estimated R^2 = .100 -2*Log Likelihood Ratio = 1512.49 N = 618

Table A7-2

Ordered Probit Analysis of Limiting Incomes of the Wealthy: 2002 Afrobarometer in Mali

Variable	**Coefficient**	**Std. Error**	**MLE/SE**	**Effect**
Government manages reducing income gap well	-.077**	.037	-2.06	-.035
Equal treatment for all: better now than under military	-.047*	.033	-1.43	-.029
Important education provided free for everyone	.162***	.052	3.14	.075
Individuals / community should own land	.077***	.032	2.42	.047
Government / people responsible for economy	.081****	.024	3.39	.049
Bribery is rare among public officials	-.069**	.041	-1.70	.032
Need to bribe to get services entitled to	-.044	.042	-1.05	-.020
Government handles corruption well	-.090**	.038	-2.34	-.042
Teachers are corrupt	-.013	.037	-.35	-.006
Elected leaders corrupt	.020	.049	.42	.009
Police corrupt	.064	.055	.98	.029
Civil servants corrupt	.027	.053	.50	.012
Foreign businesspeople corrupt	-.119	.056	-2.10	-.035
How often do Malians evade taxes	-.060	.054	-1.11	-.028
How often Malians get services without paying	.151***	.056	2.68	.069
Trust courts	.011	.035	.32	.005
Trust members of other tribes	-.105***	.036	2.91	-.049
How safe walking alone	-.066**	.030	-2.19	-.041
Self, family member, or friend attacked in year	.068	.082	.84	.010
How satisfied with life expectations next year	-.027	.036	-.76	-.017

Cut points not reported. Effects are average changes in probabilities across the five categories of trust in government. The effects represent the changes from each value to *the next higher value*.

* $p < .10$ ** $p < .05$ *** $p < .01$ **** $p < .0001$

Estimated $R^2 = .050$ -2*Log Likelihood Ratio = 2153.83 N = 842

Table A7-3

Selected Institutional and Demographic Comparisons: Sweden, Singapore, and Hong Kong

Indicator	**Mean**	**Sweden**	**Singapore**	**Hong Kong**
UNDP Human Development 1975	.600	.864	.761	.725
UNDP Human Development 1995	.680	.958	.882	.861
GDP per capita 1989 (PennWorld Tables)	6022.92	17717.14	13730.89	17389.74
GDP per capita 2000 (PennWorld Tables)	9520.86	24628.44	28643.59	27892.50
Openness of economy 1989 (PennWorld Tables)	69.09	57.01	291.63	182.67
Openness of economy 2000 (PennWorld Tables)	87.36	91.15	---	309.58
Overall risk rating (ICRG)	70.35	87.8	87.8	83.5
Democratic accountability (ICRG)	4.02	6.0	2.0	2.5
Real GDP growth (ICRG)	8.67	8.5	9.0	9.0
Ethnic tensions (ICRG)	4.02	5.0	6.0	5.0
Judicial independence (freetheworld.com)	6.27	8.68	7.35	7.68
Legal/property rights (freetheworld.com)	5.84	9.02	8.53	7.23
Impartial courts (freetheworld.com)	5.90	8.35	7.68	8.85
Tariffs (freetheworld.com)	7.20	9.25	9.94	9.93
Country is corrupt (Gallup Millennium 2000)	.39	.11	.01	.07
Country run by will of the people (Gallup Millennium 2000)	.35	.40	.61	.40
Hidden trade barriers (World Economic Forum)	4.53	6.3	6.3	5.8
Bureaucratic red tape (World Economic Forum)	2.73	2.4	2.3	2.3
Effective lawmaking (World Economic Forum)	3.43	5.0	6.0	3.6
Ethical firms (World Economic Forum)	4.35	6.1	5.9	5.1
ChariTable involvement (World Economic Forum)	4.53	3.9	5.4	5.5

Measures come from the United Nations Human Development Program, the Penn World Tables, Free the World (http:www.freetheworld.com), the Gallup Millennium Survey (2000), the World Economic Forum's Executive Opinion Survey (2004); and the InterCountry Risk Group (2005). See Chapter 3 for the specific citations.

Figure A7-1

Lowess Plots for Real GDP Per Capita Over Time: Singapore and Hong Kong





Data from Penn World Tables.

Figure 8-2

Proportions Agreeing that You Must Be Corrupt to Reach the Top and Income Differences Are Too Large, 1999 ISSP

Corrupt to Reach Top



Income Differences Too Large