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The Responsible Congressional Electorate: Watergate, the Economy, and Vote Choice in 1974

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Most analyses of the 1974 congressional elections have failed to find significant effects for either Watergate or personal financial conditions, despite the prominence of both of these issues in the campaign. An alternative thesis argues that the effect was indirect, through the selection of better-than-usual Democratic candidates and weaker Republican contestants for House seats. Reanalyzing campaign finance data, we challenge this thesis and then move on to a different type of analysis from that which traditionally has been done in retrospective voting studies. With the use of the 1972-1974 panel of the Center for Political Studies, we examine separately the voting behavior of what V. O. Key, Jr. called "standpaters" and "switchers." The former are motivated primarily by party identification, with small Watergate effects. Our probit analysis for switchers, on the other hand, finds much weaker party identification effects, but, interestingly, much more pronounced Watergate and economic impacts. Furthermore, an analysis of the sample compared to the population of districts in 1974 suggests that a more representative sample would lead to even more pronounced impacts for Watergate and the economy than even we have found.

Richard M. Nixon resigned the presidency on August 9, 1974 and was succeeded by the nation's first unelected chief executive, Gerald R. Ford, who then pardoned Nixon for his role in the Watergate scandal. After the oil price shock that accompanied the Yom Kippur War in the Middle East, inflation hovered close to 11% while unemployment rose to 5%. Americans were clearly up in arms over the state of the economy: 50.2% of the respondents to the 1974 Center for Political Studies election survey cited inflation as the most important national economic problem, a 2.5-fold increase over just two years earlier (Kiewiet, 1983,

p. 84). At no time since these questions were first asked in 1958 had more than 20% of those surveyed been so concerned about inflation. Furthermore, 30.2% saw inflation as their most important personal economic problem in 1974, and an additional 7.1% referred to "declining real income." These two figures, when added together, represent a virtual doubling of such concerns from 1972 (cf. Kiewiet, 1983, p. 55). Indeed, the decline in real disposable per-capita income in 1974 (-2.3%) was the largest for any off-year since 1946 (Tuft, 1978, p. 25), when Democrats lost 56 House and 13 Senate seats and ceded control of the Congress to the Republicans.

It is hardly surprising, then, that the Democrats gained 49 House and four Senate seats in the off-year contests. Not since 1958, in the midst of a deep recession, had the president's party lost so many seats in the House; indeed, one has to go back to 1948, when the Democrats recaptured the Congress, to find greater Democratic gains than in 1974. The *New York Times* (1974) referred to the political terrain within its largest circulation area (New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut) as "wall-to-wall Democrats."

It would seem, then, that the 1974 midterm election would be easy to explain. Armed with the combined conventional wisdom of journalists and politicians, students of voting behavior also sought to demonstrate the effects of Watergate and the economy on the Republican debacle. But, with a single exception, these studies found either no effects or impacts so minimal that they were overwhelmed by traditional variables such as

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party identification. One study tried to put the intellectual carnage that the various survey-based analyses had wrought in some sort of order by proposing a novel thesis: It was the candidates, not the voters, who reacted strategically to the Watergate and economy syndrome (Jacobson & Kernell, 1981). We examine the claims of the journalists and politicians and assess the findings of the studies of the 1974 election. After critically analyzing the "strategic politicians" thesis, we develop a reconceptualization of the retrospective voting argument and then show that there were, after all, Watergate and economic effects in 1974.¹ Our approach is to study not only the vote itself, but also vote changes from 1972 to 1974, using the Center for Political Studies panel survey. Our findings should be reassuring because they no longer lead to a schism between voting studies and conventional wisdom: 1974 was marked by retrospective voting.

Watergate and the Economy

The conventional wisdom about the 1974 elections was summarized well by *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* (1974b, p. 3122) in its election post-mortem:

Old-fashioned economic issues, centering around inflation and unemployment, emerged as the major topic of debate. Close behind was another warhorse of political rhetoric—corruption, focusing on the Watergate scandals, President Ford's pardon of former President Nixon and alleged violations of campaign contribution and spending laws.

The punishment of Republicans was selective: "Nearly every House Republican beaten . . . was counted among the conservatives; the liberal and moderate Republicans generally had little trouble winning reelection" (*Congressional Quarterly*, 1974a, p. 3065). Republican members of the House Judiciary Committee who voted against impeaching Nixon were significantly more likely to be defeated in 1974 than those who voted for impeachment, even controlling for the members' ideology (Wright, 1977). Republican Senator Charles Percy (IL), who was not up for reelection in 1974, and Democrat Wendell Ford (KY), who

defeated Marlow Cook in that contest, both attributed GOP losses to the twin demons of Watergate and inflation. Republican National Committee chairman Mary Louise Smith also stated that "Watergate and the economy have combined to influence voters" (Cannon, 1974).

It thus appears that no great new theoretical insight is required to explain the outcome of the 1974 Congressional elections. Yet most of the attempts to assess the effects of Watergate and inflation have rung up "no sale." We are thus faced with a puzzle: How do we reconcile conventional wisdom with survey research?

Most systematic analyses of the 1974 midterm election, both those employing survey research and those using aggregate data, have produced no support for this scenario. Two analyses using the 1974 CPS surveys found virtually no Watergate effects and only small amounts of economic retrospective voting (Conway & Wyckoff, 1980; Miller & Glass, 1977). A Wisconsin study (McLeod *et al.*, 1977) also detected no Watergate effects. Kinder and Kiewiet (1979) found that personal economic grievances had little impact on vote choice in 1974, because most people attribute such complaints to their personal circumstances and not to governmental action. National business conditions, a form of collective judgment, also failed to yield significant coefficients. Only collective judgments of party competence, as Fiorina (1981) found, had a measurable impact on voters' decisions. Kiewiet's (1983, p. 105) more elaborate model of economic retrospective voting failed to yield any significant coefficients for either personal or national economic assessments for 1974; indeed, the coefficient for concern about inflation was precisely .00! Owens and Olson (1980), using aggregate data on vote shares for 1974 for 138 districts for which party registration figures could be obtained, found very little support for the supposed effects of either inflation or change in real per-capita income for the vote shares (or changes in vote shares) for incumbents of the president's party.

One might be tempted to respond that the most sophisticated study of retrospective voting in 1974 did find significant and large effects for both disapproval of the Nixon pardon and expectations about which party would best handle future economic problems in the congressional voting decisions for electors (Fiorina, 1981, pp. 164-167). Furthermore, attitudes toward the pardon clearly affected the voters' choice of party identifications in 1974, although alternative specifications yielded different conclusions about whether personal economic conditions or collective judgments on the state of the economy had a measurable impact on party identification choice that year (Fiorina, 1981, pp. 98-102).

¹To those who might doubt the roles of the economy and Watergate in the minds of the voters, it seems appropriate to recall the remarks of Rep. William Hungate (D, MO) of the Judiciary Committee during the impeachment hearings addressed to those who did not admit Nixon's implication in the scandal: "Some will say that it's not an elephant. It's a mouse with a glandular condition."

Strategic Voters or Strategic Politicians?

One might simply choose up sides and prefer Fiorina's specification. This would hardly be unreasonable.² However, Jacobson and Kernell (1981) have offered a "revised theory" of the effects of Watergate and the economy. Their thesis is that when a party's electoral fortunes appear to be bleak, it will have difficulty attracting good candidates to run for office. On the other hand, in anticipation of an electoral sweep, the opposition will be able to attract challengers with previous elective office to run against the presidential party's incumbents. In turn, these candidates will be able to attract more campaign contributions. Because it is the challenger's spending that makes the difference in the outcomes of congressional races and not the incumbent's, the combination of a well-funded campaign and highly visible challengers makes the incumbent's task in winning reelection much more difficult. The chief advantage that House incumbents have over their Senate counterparts is that they are so much better known than their challengers (Hinckley, 1980; Mann & Wolfinger, 1980). Jacobson and Kernell (1981, p. 31) demonstrate that the average vote received by both Democratic and Republican challengers without prior elective office has been from 4 to 11% lower than those who have held office from 1972 to 1978. Furthermore (p. 32), the percentage of Democratic challengers with experience for both Republican-incumbent and open seats in 1974 was considerably greater than it was for any other recent election, whereas the share of GOP challengers with prior office was markedly lower in 1974. Additionally, Jacobson and Kernell argue:

In the normal years, Democratic incumbents spent between 57 and 63 percent more than Democratic challengers; in 1974, they spent 22 percent less. Republican incumbents spent between 62 and 90 percent more than Republican challengers in the normal years, 293 percent

²There remains another possibility. Kramer (1983) presents an elegant argument that individual-level models of retrospective voting are misspecified and seeks to reconcile them with aggregate analyses. The latter studies consistently show much stronger retrospective voting patterns than do the microlevel ones, of which the 1974 results are but a special case. Kramer reviews many, but not all, of the conflicting findings. Much of Kramer's argument focuses on the difference between cross-sectional analysis of survey data and the time-series component of aggregate models. Our emphasis on vote change rather than the simple vote is consistent with Kramer's thesis, even if we do not use his elaborate model. (We are not aware of any attempt to apply his complex estimation procedure.)

more in 1974. . . . Campaign contributions—and therefore expenditures—were sharply responsive to perceived political trends in 1974. (1981, pp. 41-42)

A simple five-variable model including the party of the challenger, challenger expenditures, incumbent expenditures, the prior strength of the challenger's party in the district, and whether the challenger has held prior elective office accounts for 66% of the variance in aggregate vote shares in 320 congressional districts in 1974 (Jacobson & Kernell, 1981, p. 46). This thesis provides an alternative account of what went wrong for the GOP in 1974. It seems commonsensical, elegantly simple, and well supported.

However, a somewhat closer look at the evidence suggests that this explanation cannot fully account for the Republican debacle in 1974. First, the supposedly most important variable in the model, whether the challenger has held elective office, has the lowest standardized coefficient (.07) of the five variables. The variable with the highest *t*-ratio is whether the challenger is a Democrat. One does not need a very elaborate theory of voter responses to external conditions to predict that Democratic challengers would do well in 1974. Second, the campaign expenditure data can be given more than one interpretation. The comparisons made by Jacobson and Kernell and cited above are between Democratic incumbents and Democratic challengers, on the one hand, and GOP incumbents and hopefuls on the other. This assumes that only challengers' expenditures matter.³ However, the regression presented by Jacobson and Kernell shows that challengers' vote shares are significantly related to both their own expenditures *and* those of the incumbents they run against. Furthermore, both Jacobson (1978, pp. 114-134) and Ragsdale and Cook (1984) demonstrate that incumbents react to challengers' fundraising by seeking more of their own resources. Whereas Jacobson argues that challengers simply raise all the money they can and it is incumbents who must react, Ragsdale and Cook provide evidence that challenger expenditures are strongly influenced by incumbent resources in the previous election. Even if the direction of causality were clearly as Jacobson posits, this still would not imply that incumbents' resources can be discounted completely in evaluating the strategic politicians thesis. Thus, we believe that a reasonable approach is to com-

³This is the argument implicit in Jacobson and Kernell (1981, pp. 41-42). Even though it is not explicitly stated, the context of the comparison was elucidated to us by Jacobson.

Table 1. Ratios of Democratic to Republican Average Campaign Expenditures for the House of Representatives, 1972-1978

	Democratic Incumbent/ Republican Challenger	Open Seat	Republican Incumbent/ Democratic Challenger
1972	.603	.514	.366
1974	.691	.563	.421
1976	.588	.596	.331
1978	.604	.524	.338

Source: Computed from Jacobson and Kernell (1981, p. 41).

pare spending levels of candidates who run against each other: Democratic (Republican) incumbents with Republican (Democratic) challengers. We have recalculated Table 4.1 in Jacobson and Kernell (1981, p. 41) and report the results in Table 1.

At first glance the figures appear to be supportive of the Jacobson-Kernell thesis. Spending ratios for Democrats in 1974 jumped substantially across the board. Indeed, Democratic challengers running against GOP incumbents finally appeared to be somewhat competitive with respect to financial resources. The largest percentage increase from 1972 to 1974 came among Democratic incumbents. The ratio of 1974 to 1972 advantages for that group is 1.15. The corresponding figures for open seats and for races with GOP incumbents are 1.10 and 1.09. The Jacobson-Kernell thesis would lead us to expect a sharp rise in funding primarily for Democratic challengers facing Republican incumbents, but in fact the increase was across the board, which suggests that Democratic races were viewed as good investments by contributors regardless of the incumbency status in a particular district.

Ratios calculated for 1976 versus 1974 indicate that the Democratic advantage for 1976 was of roughly similar magnitude for seats with Democratic and Republican incumbents (1.18 and 1.16). The Democrats actually did comparatively better in their funding of open-seat races in 1976 than they did in 1974. Finally, if the Jacobson-Kernell thesis were correct, we would expect that the ratio of Democratic to Republican funding would decline from 1976 to 1978, when the incumbent party was considerably less popular. This happened only for open seat races, as Democratic incumbents actually increased their advantage over GOP challengers while Republican incumbents had proportionately fewer resources (albeit by a minuscule amount) than they did in 1976.

If voters responded only to the quality of challengers, well-funded Republican incumbents

and challengers with experience would have done as well in 1974 as they did in 1972, so that "Republican losses . . . would have been entirely self-inflicted. Presumably this would not happen very many times before politicians, who are not in the business of getting these things wrong, would discover that such strategies are badly flawed" (Kiewiet, 1983, p. 128). To corroborate the Jacobson and Kernell thesis, one would also need data on the prior background of state legislative candidates, because the Democratic sweep of 1974 was deep as well as wide. The Democrats took control of 15 additional state legislative chambers, losing only the Colorado Senate to the Republicans. One could also extend this argument all the way down the line—to city councils, even to sheriffs. Sooner or later, one has to reach a level of office for which there could be no conceivable prior elective position.

Yet, contrary to Kiewiet's argument, the alternative thesis that voters do respond to the economy (and to Watergate) is not quite so firmly established. Most of the evidence, including his own, is mixed. We suggest that the reason various studies have yielded conflicting assessments is because they are not asking the appropriate question. Studies of retrospective voting have almost all focused on cross-sectional analyses of why people vote the way they do. Did people vote Democratic in 1974 because they were concerned about either Watergate or the economy, on the one hand, or because they identified with the Democratic party, liked (disliked) Democratic (Republican) incumbents generally, or were closer to one party's candidate on the issues, on the other hand? These are interesting questions in their own right, but they do not address the issue of why the Democrats gained so many votes (and seats) from the Republicans in 1974 compared to 1972.

Put another way, why did so many people who either voted Republican for Congress or did not vote at all in 1972 vote Democratic two years

later? The focus of retrospective voting studies has been the 1974 vote, but the central question should be the vote change. Consider voters who had cast a ballot for a Democratic congressional candidate in 1972. Clearly they were a numerous group since the Democrats took 52.7% of the two-party House vote that year. Furthermore, they were very likely to be Democratic party identifiers as well, as most Republicans and independents (particularly those who also voted for Nixon) supported GOP congressional candidates (Jacobson, 1983, p. 137). How could such a voter punish the Republican administration for the twin devils of Watergate and inflation? Only by voting Democratic again in 1974! But because most of these voters are Democrats anyway, it would hardly be surprising to find that party identification would swamp the effects of such retrospective factors, as it does even in Fiorina's analysis.

The appropriate way to examine the impact of Watergate and the economy is to consider voting changes from 1972 to 1974. Fortunately, there is a panel conducted by the Center for Political Studies which can be used to examine just such questions. Key (1966) pioneered the study of vote changes, but his analyses depended upon people's recall of their previous ballot choices. Nevertheless, he found the electorate quite "rational" in presidential elections. Weatherford (1978) used the 1956-1958-1960 panel and found significant effects for vote changes from 1956 to 1958, controlling for party, at least for the working class.⁴ Only Brody (1977) has analyzed the panel for comparisons between 1972 and 1974, but his emphasis was solely on change in party identification.

He and Fiorina maintain that there is considerable variation in partisanship even with the use of contemporaneous expressions of party identification at various waves of the panel. Indeed, 10 to 15% of respondents reported shifts in party identification from 1972 to 1974 and "party identification responds to short-term electoral forces" (Brody, 1977, p. 30). Specifically, he found that people who were dissatisfied with either Nixon (as measured by the feeling thermometer) or with their family income were more likely than the doubly satisfied to change party identification—and the doubly dissatisfied were three times as likely to change identification as the doubly satisfied. But Brody neither examines the

impact of party-identification change on the vote nor presents a multivariate model, as does Fiorina (1981, chap. 5). We examine changes in the vote from 1972 to 1974 in the context of a more fully specified model. Whenever possible, our independent variables are not simply demographic or political constructs believed to affect the vote *direction*. Instead of examining voting change as a function of trust in government (or as a function of the Nixon feeling thermometer or voters' perceptions of the economy), we look at changes in trust in government, and the other relevant variables whenever possible. Some variables are simply not available in 1972 (the Nixon pardon question), whereas others do not need to be considered over time (party of incumbent in 1974). In general, however, to explain change, we believe that we must focus on change. We turn now to a specification of the models to be estimated.

Data Analysis

The data base, as indicated, is the panel survey of the Center for Political Studies taken in 1972 and 1974. We use four dependent variables. The first is a measure of movement toward the Democrats in 1974, coded from 1 (people who either voted Democratic or for an independent minor party candidate or did not vote in 1972, and who voted Republican in 1974) to 4 (people who either voted Republican, voted for an independent or minor party candidate, or did not vote in 1972, and who voted for Democratic congressional candidates in 1974). The two intermediate categories encompass voters who cast GOP ballots or Democratic ones in both elections (cf. Weatherford, 1978). We also include a simpler measure for all voters in the panel: congressional voting behavior in 1974. This is the traditional variable used in retrospective voting studies, and it will thus provide a benchmark for comparisons with the change variables. We do, however, restrict the number of cases to the 467 for which we have complete data for the first dependent variable. The third dependent variable, encompassing switchers and new voters,⁵ is derived from the first, taking only the two extreme values. The fourth, also derived from the first, includes only standpaters. The 229 cases in the sample residing

⁴The coefficient for the middle class was not significant. The coefficient for the full sample is not designated as significant in Table 3 (p. 930), but it has an *F*-ratio of 3.8, equal to a *t*-ratio of 1.95, marginally different from the conventional 1.96 used for the .05 level for a two-tailed test.

⁵Results only for switchers (excluding new voters) were virtually identical, so we opted for the slightly larger sample sizes obtained by including 1972 nonvoters. There was no theoretical reason to presume that the factors that mobilized 1972 nonvoters to select Democratic congressional candidates in 1974 were different from those that induced people who voted for the GOP in 1972 to switch.

in congressional districts in which there was no challenger are excluded.

Because regression analysis is not appropriate for categorical dependent variables, we use probit analysis (cf. Aldrich & Cnudde, 1975; Fiorina, 1981). However, in contrast to regression analysis, one cannot interpret probit coefficients in terms of amount of change in the dependent variable given a unit change in a predictor. Thus we must rely upon two alternative criteria. First, we can compare the z-scores for the predictors. Second, we use a technique developed by Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1981) which converts the estimated values of the dependent variable into probabilities for each case.⁶

The variables included in the analysis are discussed in the appendix. First, however, we discuss predictors that are not used. Although the literature on retrospective voting strongly suggests that collective economic judgments are far more important in individual voting decisions than is personal financial status (see especially Kiewiet, 1983), we were limited in the case of 1974 because only a post-election survey was conducted, and in 1972 the questions on government performance in managing the economy were asked of only half the sample. The results, however, indicate miniscule coefficients that fail to meet any reasonable significance level. None of the traditional demographic variables used in voting research (age, race, sex, occupation, income, education, marital status) reached acceptable levels of significance (at least .10). Finally, we wanted to examine changes in perceived change in financial conditions from 1972 to 1974 but were unable to do so because the overwhelming majority of respondents gave the same answer to the personal economic considerations in both years.⁷

The variables selected for analysis include: 1) the traditional party identification question,

measured in 1974, and encompassing only the three-point scale recommended by Brody (1977) and Fiorina (1981); 2) change in strength of party identification from 1972 to 1974; 3) change in trust in government from 1972 to 1974; 4) change in one's placement of Nixon on the feeling thermometer from 1972 to 1974; 5) expenditures for 1974 by Republican challengers; 6) whether the incumbent in the congressional district was a Democrat (cf. Fiorina, 1981); and 7) a dummy variable scored at 1 if a respondent either perceived his or her financial situation to be worse in 1974 or who disapproved of the Nixon pardon *or* both and at 0 only for people whose personal finances were not perceived as worse and who also approved of Ford's pardon of Nixon. Neither condition alone produced very many changes in partisan affiliation, and our initial work confirmed that there were only modest effects for either variable on vote changes. We thus followed Brody's lead and hypothesized that the relationship was more complex. Brody (1977) noted that changes in party identification were enhanced among people who both disapproved of the pardon and who had financial grievances. This variable should have positive coefficients. We expect negative signs for the two party-identification variables. Initially, negative coefficients were anticipated for the change in trust variable, because the events of Watergate might lead to a decline in trust in government. A similar direction is hypothesized for the change in the Nixon feeling thermometer and for GOP challenger expenditures. Finally, a positive sign was hypothesized for the variable "incumbent Democrat." Most straightforwardly, people who were already represented by a Democrat in 1974 would boost that member's vote share. Curiously, as would be predicted by the Jacobson-Kernell model, there was no significant effect for a similar variable for the Republicans *in any direction*.⁸

We are particularly interested in comparing the behavior of switchers and standpatters, as Key (1966) did. The equations for all voters is of some interest since it helps to uncover similarities be-

⁶Operationally, we take the estimated probit equation and derive predicted values for the dependent variable for each case, setting the variable(s) of particular interest first at the minimum value(s) observed. Then we use a routine provided by Steven Rosenstone to convert these predicted values (or z-scores) into probabilities for each case. The second step repeated the first except that the variable(s) of interest are set at the maximum observed value(s). The two probabilities are aggregated, and means are computed. The difference between the means for the maximum values and the minimum values indicates the net impact of the variable in terms of the probability of the direction of the vote (change).

⁷Similarly, we attempted to create two variables for the change in Nixon feeling thermometers from 1972 to 1974 to control for those whose earlier placements were above and below 50 respectively. However, the number of zero values was again extremely large.

⁸Unlike some of the other variables, incumbent Republican was not so strongly correlated with other variables that it should have been deleted on that basis alone. Our criterion for multicollinearity is that suggested by Farrar and Glauber (1967): the multiple correlation for any predictor with the remaining independent variables must be no higher than the multiple correlation between the dependent variable and the entire set of independent variables. On the other hand, money spent by Democratic challengers was highly correlated with the variable "incumbent Democrat." Yet it failed to be significant, even in models without the latter predictor.

Table 2. Probit Analyses for 1974 Voters on Congressional Elections

Predictor	All Voters (Four Category Rank Order)	All Voters (Dichotomy)
Party ID	-.409*** (-7.041)	-.857*** (-11.118)
Party ID change	-.042 (-.687)	.050 (.579)
Change in trust	.042 (1.265)	.057 (1.207)
Change in Nixon feeling thermometer	-.002 (-1.020)	-.0002 (.062)
Republican challenger expenditures	-.103*** (-3.742)	-.169*** (-4.464)
Pardon disapproval/finances worse	.243** (1.968)	.583** (3.329)
Incumbent democrat	.449*** (3.831)	1.026*** (5.935)
Constant	1.7603*** (8.927)	1.105*** (4.602)
\hat{R}^2	.21	.54
Percent predicted correctly		
Probit	81.1	81.1
Null	-	56.1
Spearman's rho	.42	-
N	467	467

Entries are unstandardized probit coefficients; z-scores in parentheses.

* $p < .10$.

** $p < .05$.

*** $p < .01$.

tween these groups. Traditional voting research has stressed continuity, primarily through the prism of party identification. We would expect, however, that switchers would be far less influenced by the simple force of party—and thus also more likely to be affected by short-term factors such as Watergate and economic grievances.

Results of the Analysis

The estimated coefficients in the probit analyses are presented for all voters in Table 2, measured as both simple vote choice and as a ranked indicator, with the categories in the latter being 1 for new voters who voted Republican or for 1972 nonvoters or Democratic voters who voted Republican in 1974, 2 for consistent Republican voters, 3 for consistent Democratic voters, and 4 for new voters and for previous nonvoters or Republican voters in 1972 who voted Democratic in 1974. The results for switchers and standpaters are presented in Table 3. Despite some evidence that the four-category variable for all voters is not

strictly ordinal,⁹ the pattern of significance levels for the dependent variables in Table 2 is quite similar. Because the variables have different scales, however, the probit coefficients cannot be compared. What we find is that both sets of equations are heavily driven by party identification.

⁹Because we were not sure that the four-category vote change variable for all voters was strictly ordinal, we also ran a logit model (which does not assume ordinality) for this variable. Logit, however, is more difficult to interpret because it yields $(k-1)$ sets of coefficients where k is the number of categories in the dependent variable. Hence, instead of eight probit coefficients, we have 24 logit estimates. Briefly, the logit results suggested that only party identification and spending by GOP challengers were significant for all groups. Most errors in prediction occurred among switchers, not surprisingly. But the logit model yielded a much higher rank order correlation (.7) than the probit analysis did, which suggests that the variable is not strictly ordinal. However, the similarity in results for the two constructs for all voters in Table 2 suggests that comparisons can be made, if with some caution.

Contrary to what we expected, there are no significant effects found for party identification change, change in trust, or change in the Nixon feeling thermometer.

The Jacobson and Kernell thesis argues that campaign expenditures, particularly by challengers, would play a major role in vote choice. Republican challenger expenditures were strongly related to both variables, as was incumbent Democrat. The more money Republican challengers spent, the more votes they received. Thus, whereas Democratic incumbents had a larger advantage over their Republican challengers in 1974 than in other recent years (cf. Table 1), what money GOP upstarts did have apparently was put to good use.

However, this result runs directly counter to the Jacobson-Kernell thesis. *If anyone should have been more advantaged in 1974, it should have been Democratic challengers.* Yet spending by Democratic challengers did not yield significant coefficients for any of our four dependent variables, either in combination with expenditures by Republican candidates or when estimated by itself. Another variable designed to test the

Jacobson-Kernell thesis measures the change from 1972 to 1974 of Democratic to all expenditures for contested races in the sample. The logic of this formulation is straightforward. The variable measures the relative improvement in Democratic candidates' financial resources from one election to the next. Thus, linking it to vote change provides a measure of the elasticity of campaign expenditures by Democrats. The surge in Democratic coffers in 1974, as indicated by the Jacobson-Kernell data, should have a pay-off among voters. The variable did yield significant coefficients when considered alone, but not when expenditures of Republican challengers were also entered. When each was entered separately, the GOP challenger expenditure coefficient had consistently higher z scores.

The variable for Watergate and inflation does yield significant coefficients for both equations for all voters in the panel. In contrast to previous researchers, then, we have found that Watergate and the economy affected vote choice in 1974, whether we consider the simple congressional vote (as has traditionally been done) or a more complex vote change variable. Overall, the equation

Table 3. Probit Analyses for 1974 Voters on Congressional Elections: Standpatters and Switchers

Predictor	Switchers	Standpatters
Party ID	-.278** (-2.178)	-1.212*** (-10.956)
Party ID change	-.186* (-1.389)	-.167 (1.326)
Change in trust	.165** (2.116)	-.027 (-.399)
Change in Nixon feeling thermometer	-.004 (-.985)	.003 (.817)
Republican challenger expenditures	-.173*** (-3.478)	-.131** (-1.833)
Pardon disapproval/finances worse	.532** (1.835)	.623*** (2.495)
Incumbent Democrat	.657*** (2.357)	1.314*** (5.176)
Constant	.177 (.447)	1.677*** (5.073)
\hat{R}^2	.25	.70
Percent predicted correctly		
Probit	69.3	87.8
Null	57.9	55.4
N	140	327

Entries are unstandardized probit coefficients; z-scores in parentheses.

*p < .10.
 **p < .05.
 ***p < .01.

for the 1974 vote performs much better than that for the four-category vote change variable. The latter equation has an \hat{R}^2 of only .21 with a rank order correlation between actual and predicted votes of .42. For the simple congressional vote, the \hat{R}^2 is .54; 81.1% of the cases are predicted correctly, compared to a benchmark of 56.1% for a null model based upon assuming all voters would cast Democratic ballots. The estimated coefficient of determination is only .07 lower than Fiorina's (1981, p. 165) for the same dependent variable with a similar number of cases (454), but which uses 17 predictors instead of our seven. Indeed, our percent predicted correctly is even marginally higher than Fiorina's (80.6).

The greatest vote surge for the Democrats for both conceptualizations of all voters, other than party identification, came not for Democratic challengers but for Democratic incumbents. This result seems both partly reasonable and partly anomalous. On the one hand, it is very plausible that Democratic incumbents did do better in 1974 than in 1972. On the other hand, the failure to find corresponding gains for Democratic challengers (but cf. Fiorina, 1981, p. 162) leads us to inquire precisely where the votes that gave the Democrats 49 additional seats came from. There are three possibilities. First, we could find very different effects for switchers and standpatters. Second, it might be argued that the combined effects of Watergate and inflation, together with change in party identification as a mediating force, produced all the change needed to account for the behavior of switchers to Democratic challengers. Third, there is the possibility that these results tell us something about the nature of the sample. We shall investigate these possibilities after considering the results for switchers and standpatters.

The equations comparing switchers and standpatters in Table 3 suggest that there are some different patterns for these voters. The coefficients for longer-term party-related variables are much stronger, as might be expected, for standpatters. Party identification overwhelms all other predictors for standpatters, based upon the z-scores for the coefficients. It remains important for switchers, but far less so. This is not surprising, because standpatters voted the same way in 1972 and 1974 and presumably have more durable long-term party ties. Similarly, incumbent Democrat has stronger z-scores for standpatters than for switchers. On the other hand, change in party identification has the wrong sign for standpatters, but is significant for switchers at the .10 level. Republican challenger expenditures is another short-term party effect which is stronger for switchers, although it is significant for standpatters as well.

The pattern for Watergate-related variables from the probit equations is mixed. Initially, it appears that the pardon-disapproval and finances-worse construct has a stronger effect for standpatters. It is not surprising to find that traditional Democrats who stayed with their party in 1972 and 1974 would be affected by such concerns, but we would expect switchers to be motivated at least as much by these short-term issues which were so central to the public debate in 1974. When we examine the probabilities of voting Democratic in 1974, we shall find more support for this thesis. There are no significant coefficients for changes in the Nixon feeling thermometer. However, for switchers in particular there is a moderate correlation between this variable and the pardon-disapproval and finances-worse one; a coefficient significant at .10 is found when the latter is dropped in the equation for switchers. Finally, an insignificant negative coefficient is found for change in trust for standpatters, following the results for all voters. For switchers, a significant positive coefficient is obtained. A positive coefficient, however, should not be all that surprising, because trends in trust follow short-term political situations (Miller, 1974). Positive evaluations of the government ("the system worked") might well have emerged from the long trauma of Watergate. It seems eminently reasonable that voters would reward the Democrats, particularly those running for the institution that had forced Nixon from office, for their renewed faith in the system. Those voters who tossed out GOP incumbents for supporting Nixon may have very well thought that their Representatives were far more antisystem than the electorate (cf. Wright, 1977). Overall, the results for standpatters are stronger than for switchers. The respective \hat{R}^2 values are .70 and .25, with 87.8% and 69.3% of the cases predicted correctly. The difference in explanatory power of the equations is accounted for by the differential impact of party identification.¹⁰

All Voters, Switchers, and Standpatters

Because the probit coefficients have no ready interpretation, we need another way of comparing the results obtained for all voters, switchers, and standpatters. We begin with the fact that the predicted probit scores for each case are z-scores which can be converted into probabilities. For each voter, we obtain probabilities at the two extreme situations and these probabilities are ag-

¹⁰Unfortunately, the variables that allow us to assess dimensions of incumbency were not included in the National Election Studies until 1978.

Table 4. Probabilities for Predictors for the 1974 Congressional Vote for Democratic Candidates^a

Predictor	All Voters	Switchers	Standpatters
Party ID	.809/.265/ <u>.541</u>	.666/.471/ <u>.195</u>	.868/.191/ <u>.677</u>
Party ID change	.525/.586/ <u>-.061</u>	.754/.450/ <u>.304</u>	.496/.609/ <u>-.140</u>
Change in trust	.637/.497/ <u>.140</u>	.718/.386/ <u>.332</u>	.506/.552/ <u>-.046</u>
Change in Nixon feeling thermometer	.567/.564/ <u>.003</u>	.667/.457/ <u>.210</u>	.515/.600/ <u>-.085</u>
Pardon disapproval/finances worse	.598/.446/ <u>.152</u>	.622/.437/ <u>.185</u>	.581/.464/ <u>.117</u>
Incumbent Democrat	.693/.430/ <u>.263</u>	.676/.461/ <u>.215</u>	.683/.467/ <u>.216</u>
Republican challenger expenditures	.604/.064/ <u>.540</u>	.671/.029/ <u>.642</u>	.570/.198/ <u>.372</u>
Republican challenger expenditures--adjusted	.604/.257/ <u>.347</u>	.671/.204/ <u>.467</u>	.570/.410/ <u>.160</u>
Republican challenger expenditures--doubly adjusted/incumbent Democrat controlled	.727/.365/ <u>.362</u>	.755/.275/ <u>.480</u>	.696/.536/ <u>.160</u>
Four Watergate variables	.686/.470/ <u>.216</u>	.972/.205/ <u>.767</u>	.498/.581/ <u>-.083</u>

^aFirst entries reflect signs of probit coefficients for switchers and reflect predicted greater likelihoods of voting Democratic in 1974; the third entries are changes in probabilities and are underlined.

gregated and averaged across all voters in the (sub-) sample(s), as described in note 6 above. The results are displayed in Table 4. We use the signs of the coefficients for switchers to determine the direction of the impact of the probabilities. The entries in each column in the table are: 1) the average probability, given the values for each case on uncontrolled variables, that the voter would cast a Democratic ballot when the predictor is posited to be favorable to a Democratic vote; 2) a similar measure for the situation when the predictor is posited to be favorable to a Republican vote; and 3) the difference between 1) and 2), which is the marginal effect of the variable(s) in question on 1974 voting behavior.

The critical differences are found between switchers and standpatters. For the latter group, party identification clearly overwhelms all of the other predictors. Controlling for all of the other variables, a Democratic standpatter has a .868 probability of voting for that party in 1974, whereas a GOP standpatter has only a .191 probability of casting a Democratic ballot, for a difference in probabilities of .677. In contrast, a Republican switcher has a .471 probability of voting Democratic and the difference in probabilities, or the marginal impact of party identification on switchers, is only .195, less than a third of that found for standpatters. The variable incumbent Democrat has similar effects for the two subsamples, however. What is most fascinating is the pattern of the four short-term Watergate-related variables: change in party identification, change in trust, change in the Nixon feeling thermometer, and the combined pardon-disapproval and finances-worse construct. For switchers, the marginal impact of the first two variables is over

30%. A switcher who moved from strongly Republican to strongly Democratic will thus be 30.4% more likely to vote Democratic in 1974 than one who moved the other way. But a standpatter whose party identification shifted strongly toward the Democrats would actually be 14% more likely to vote Republican than a standpatter whose allegiance shifted toward the GOP! The change in probability for the trust variable also moves in a contrary direction to that for standpatters, although the value is quite small (-.046).

Change in the Nixon feeling thermometer yields a marginal impact of over 20% for switchers, compared to a small negative change for standpatters. The pardon-disapproval and finances-worse variable does, as expected, yield positive impacts for both switchers and standpatters. Although the .185 values for changes in probabilities is the smallest impact observed for any of the seven predictors for switchers, it is still almost 7% greater than the change for standpatters. When the four short-term Watergate variables are considered together, their joint marginal impact on standpatters is barely negative (-.083), but strongly positive (.767) for switchers. A switcher with pro-Democratic values on all four variables will have .972 probability of casting a Democratic ballot in 1974, compared to a .204 probability for a switcher with pro-Republican values on all four variables—controlling for the effects of party identification and spending by Republican challengers. What is important here is not the magnitude of the effects for switchers, but rather the great difference in results for the two samples. The estimated joint impacts are “too high” for switchers because there are very few voters in the sample who have either uniformly pro-

Democratic or pro-Republican values on all variables: the highest zero-order correlation across any of the samples between any pair of Watergate variables is $-.22$ for the relationship between change in the Nixon feeling thermometer and the pardon and finances-worse variable for switchers. The results for standpatters must be tempered slightly because it simply goes against all logic to maintain that Democrats who were incensed at Nixon in 1974 took out their rage by being slightly more likely to vote for Republican candidates for Congress. Note first that the "reverse" Watergate effects for standpatters are small anyway and that they are certainly overwhelmed by an even deeper-seated dislike for Nixon encapsulated in the power of one's party identification.

Even as the many other factors of the Watergate year worked against Republicans, those minority party challengers who were well funded scored quite well among both standpatters and particularly switchers. Money may well have been the difference between simply losing, as did almost all Republican challengers, and humiliation. Standpatters in districts with well-funded challengers were 37.2% more likely to vote Republican than they were if the challengers spent nothing, whereas the difference was 64.2% for switchers. But the construction of this variable can readily lead to erroneous conclusions. First, there was one district in the sample in which a Republican challenger spent \$155,580; both a switcher and a standpatter resided in that constituency. But the next highest spending total was \$85,050 for switchers and \$68,040 for standpatters. The highest value, then, was clearly an outlier, and to simulate an outcome based upon every GOP challenger spending that amount of money is little more than an exercise of wishful thinking for the Republican congressional campaign committee in 1974. When we adjust the figures at the upper extremes, more reasonable results are found: $.467$ for switchers, still the largest marginal impact for this subsample, and $.160$ for standpatters.

However, there is an additional problem with this simulation. The lower bound of the variable is zero, which occurs whenever the race is not between a Republican challenger and a Democratic incumbent. Thus, to get a more accurate measure of the impact of Republican challenger expenditures, we must treat each race as if it involved such a contest. To do so, we first set the variable incumbent Democrat equal to one for all cases. Then, we must derive an alternative lower bound for expenditures. The data indicate that \$2000 is such a floor, because more than just a handful of candidates were bedeviled with this low level of money in 1974. Doubly adjusting the bounds and

controlling for incumbent Democrat only serves to show how robust the results are. The differences in probabilities barely change at all. However, the probabilities obtained at each bound do show a greater propensity for Democratic voting than the earlier constructs for this variable.

The results for all voters, which would be most directly comparable to previous studies, are once again generally a mixture of the findings for the two subsamples, but mostly closer to the standpatters. The two variables with the greatest marginal impact are party identification and Republican challenger expenditures. Close behind is incumbent Democrat. Nevertheless, our specification does yield noticeable effects for Watergate and the economy: the pardon-disapproval and finances-worse variable and change in trust each increase the probability that a voter will cast a Democratic ballot by approximately 15%. The joint impact of the four Watergate variables is a change in probability of $.216$. Only change in the Nixon feeling thermometer and change in party identification yield no measurable pro-Democratic impact.

The failure to find Watergate effects in previous studies can be traced largely but not exclusively to the failure to analyze switchers and standpatters separately. There are such effects for all voters, however, and this suggests that the question cannot be reduced entirely to differences in the subsamples. Specification is also a key issue, as are methods of analysis. The separate analyses for switchers and standpatters do not establish simply that there are Watergate effects, but rather that for some voters these effects may be much longer than for others—and, indeed, that for these variables the results for all voters may be driven by a relatively small subsample of voters.

The Nature of the Sample

Most of our results make sense in light of the conventional wisdom about the 1974 elections. However, in battles which seemed to highlight the success rate of Democratic *challengers*, we find that the variable "incumbent Democrat" was quite significant and had a considerable marginal impact as well. Did we miss something important about the 1974 elections, or is there another explanation for these findings? Earlier, we offered three possible explanations for how this variable might have considerable effects on voting behavior. First, there is the possibility that the voting behavior of standpatters and switchers was asymmetric with respect to incumbents and challengers. The probit equations suggested that this might indeed be the case, because standpatters

Table 5. District Outcomes and Panel Voters for Races Involving Incumbents with Major Party Challengers in 1974: Democrats

Incumbent's Percentage of Two-Party Vote	Percent of Contested Races with Democratic Incumbent			Percent of All Contested Races		
	All Districts	Panel Voters	Switchers	All Districts	Panel Voters	Switchers
60+	85.9	66.5	56.3	33.8	33.5	30.2
55-59.9	7.0	11.9	16.5	2.8	6.0	8.9
50-54.9	5.3	7.3	12.6	2.1	3.7	6.8
45-49.5	1.2	7.9	6.8	0.5	4.0	3.6
Below 45	0.6	6.3	7.8	0.2	3.2	4.2
Total (%)	100.0	99.9	100.0	39.4	50.4	53.7
N	171	302	103	171	600	192

Sources: Center for Political Studies, National Election Studies 1972-1974 Panel; *Congressional Quarterly Almanac* 1974, pp. 857-864.

had a much higher z -score for this variable than did switchers. However, our analysis of the marginal impact of "incumbent Democrat" yielded virtually identical changes in probabilities for the two subsamples. Our second explanation was that the equation for switchers might fully account for the surge for challengers. The \hat{R}^2 value for the switchers' equation certainly seems capable of improvement. Thus, we must consider the third explanation: The nature of the sample led to the strong coefficients for incumbent Democrat.

Tables 5 and 6 report breakdowns of the distribution of the sample and the corresponding population (in terms of congressional districts) by incumbents' percentages of the two-party vote in 1974. Again, uncontested districts are eliminated; all 56 had Democratic incumbents. The remaining districts left as sampling possibilities numbered

171 with Democratic incumbents, 166 with Republican incumbents, and 42 open seats. However, the sample greatly overrepresented constituencies with Democratic incumbents: there were 302 voters residing in districts with Democratic incumbents compared to 191 represented by GOP incumbents and 107 in open-seat districts. The ratio of respondents residing in contested districts with Democratic incumbents to those with GOP members was 1.32 in the sample compared to 1.03 in the population.¹¹

¹¹These respondents (in Tables 5 and 6) include only voters. The N s vary from those in the equations estimated in Table 2 because we employed listwise deletion of missing data. It should also be noted that the congressional district was *not* the primary sampling unit in 1974. However, that does not obviate our claims. For

Table 6. District Outcomes and Panel Voters for Races Involving Incumbents with Major Party Challengers in 1974: Republicans

Incumbent's Percentage of Two-Party Vote	Percent of Contested Races with Democratic Incumbent			Percent of All Contested Races		
	All Districts	Panel Voters	Switchers	All Districts	Panel Voters	Switchers
60+	33.7	38.2	43.9	12.9	12.2	13.0
55-59.9	20.5	28.3	33.3	7.8	9.0	9.9
50-54.9	23.5	18.3	15.8	9.0	5.8	4.7
45-49.5	16.3	13.6	7.0	6.2	4.3	2.1
Below 45	6.0	1.6	0.0	2.3	0.5	0.0
Total (%)	100.0	100.0	100.0	38.2	31.8	29.7
N	166	191	57	166	600	192

Sources: See Table 5.

Not only did the sample include proportionately too many voters from districts with Democratic incumbents, but it also overrepresented districts with marginal Democratic incumbents and of the three majority party members who lost. The relevant data are in Table 5. Only 1.8% of Democratic incumbents lost in 1974, but 14.2% of the panel voters and 14.6% of the switchers were from such districts. When we shift our focus to *all* districts, Democratic incumbents who were defeated constitute a miniscule 0.7% of the population, but 7.2% of all panel voters and 7.8% of all switchers reside in these constituencies. In contrast, voters in Republican districts with incumbents who scraped by with less than 55% of the vote or who were defeated are underrepresented by substantial margins. The data are presented in Table 6. Although 22.3% of districts with GOP incumbents fell to the Democrats in 1974, voters in those constituencies constituted only 15.2% of the panel and just 7% of the switchers. Republican members who lost were four times as numerous across all districts as the percentage of switchers in those constituencies. There were, then, just four people interviewed who switched votes from 1972 to 1974 and resided in districts that tossed out Republican incumbents!

Given these sample biases, it is straightforward to understand why "incumbent Democrat" has significant coefficients in all equations estimated in Tables 2 and 3. There may be some attraction to bring even more votes to already successful Democrats, but the strength of the coefficients is surely overestimated. If this is the case, then it is likely that spending by Republican challengers, which would limit the vote-gathering possibilities by incumbent Democrats, is also estimated to be stronger than it should be.

The bias in the sample undoubtedly attenuates the coefficients for Watergate and economic grievances. Almost twice as many of the switchers (103 to 57) lived in districts with Democratic incumbents rather than Republican members. Thus, the sample underestimates the impact of throwing the rascals out. Someone who voted for a Republican challenger to a Democratic incumbent in 1972 and then cast a ballot for the incumbent two years later contributed less to the shock value of the 1974 election than did another voter who helped bring down a Republican incumbent he or

she supported just one election ago. Because the punishment of Republican incumbents tended to be somewhat selective—toward the more pro-Nixon, conservative members (cf. Wright, 1977), one can make a good case that the sample bias will seriously underestimate the effects of Watergate and economic complaints for switchers.

Conclusion

The politicians and the pundits did not miss the message of the 1974 congressional elections, as well as those for lesser offices. But it would be a mistake to argue that those contests were nothing more than a referendum on Watergate and the economy. For most voters, those who traditionally rely upon party identification and who cast ballots for the same party or candidate election after election, voting is a ritual. That ritual may very well have policy content and is likely to have some retrospective component as well. To paraphrase Key, standpatters are not fools either. But their voting behavior is driven by loyalties to party and candidate which stem from either deep-seated policy agreement or a more general affect that transcends most national political trends. The importance of such loyalties was never more apparent than in 1972, when Nixon scored a massive landslide but the Democrats retained control of the Congress.

Periodically, however, there are vote swings of such a magnitude that they change the balance of power in the halls of Congress. These are often, although not exclusively, mid-term contests (1946, 1958, 1966, 1974). The ripple effects of the 1974 election, like all landslides, occurred because of changes at the margin by voters (cf. Fiorina, 1977). The Democratic share of the two-party congressional vote rose just under 6% from 1972 to 1974. It is this change that commands our attention and that politicians and pundits follow. As they know, retrospective voting didn't start with Watergate. But neither did it terminate with the escalation of the Vietnam War in 1966.

The "uncovering" of Watergate and economy effects does not suffice to undermine the Jacobson-Kernell thesis about strategic politicians. If the coefficients on "incumbent Democrat" and expenditures by Republican challengers were more robust, they would effectively put that formulation to rest. At the least, one must now argue that there was an identifiable Watergate-economy effect in 1974 that, if anything, was underestimated. Given the reinterpretation of the Jacobson-Kernell expenditure data in Table 1 above and the identification of such effects for switchers, there is probably no need to reject the conventional wisdom about what the 1974 elections settled. The scope of the

an argument about the 1978 sample, the first to use the congressional district as the primary sampling unit, and its biases for analyzing Senate races, see Mann and Wolfinger (1980). The pro-incumbent bias on CPS samples is discussed by Eubank and Gow (1983) and Gow and Eubank (1984).

landslide was too broad and deep to require that strategic politicians be available everywhere to exploit Democratic victory hopes. However, it does seem very plausible to argue that such enhanced prospects did bring out the Democrats' best and brightest; we cannot divorce the argument about strategic politicians from their political environment. Just as Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia of New York claimed that he could win reelection "on a laundry ticket," many far lesser candidates even in 1974 benefited from their simple identification with the Democratic Party. Much of the evidence is anecdotal, but the "Watergate babies" who entered the Congress in 1975 included many amateurs (Granat, 1984).

Altogether, our results indicate that the Democratic surge in 1974 can be explained by a framework that recognizes vote switchers, contributors, and candidates as making strategic investment decisions. Switchers whose trust in government increased as a result of the Democrats forcing Nixon from office but who had either Watergate or economic grievances against the Republicans moved toward the Democrats in 1974. To the extent that the results for the variable "incumbent Democrat" are robust (cf. Fiorina, 1981, pp. 164-167), such voting behavior primarily rewarded sitting members of the majority party in Congress for opposition to administration policies. Because there were substantially more Democratic than Republican incumbents, this voting pattern merely reflects the opportunity structure available to voters. Democratic candidates across the board fared better relative to their Republican opponents in terms of campaign expenditures in 1974 compared to 1972. But this does not imply that contributors simply poured money into the campaign coffers of Democratic incumbents in 1974. Indeed, the average dollar amount available to those incumbents, not even adjusted for inflation, declined from 1972 to 1974 (Jacobson & Kernell, 1981, p. 41)! However, the decline in contributions to Republican challengers was much more precipitous, so that Democratic incumbents scored the largest percentage gain in funds expended from 1972 to 1974. Simply put, contributors realized that most Democratic incumbents did not need substantial sums to win, even to win big, in 1974, and that money given to their GOP challengers might increase Republican vote totals but would not save such challengers from defeat.

On the other hand, Republican incumbents averaged almost \$30,000 more in expenditures in 1974 compared to 1972 and still far outdistanced their Democratic challengers in terms of funds available (Jacobson & Kernell, 1981, p. 41). But, relatively, Democratic challengers had far more funds in 1974 than two years earlier. Yet the

failure of Democratic challenger expenditures to reach significance in our equations suggests that there were larger macropolitical factors at work in accounting for vote change in 1974; if anything, the investment decisions of contributors reflected the perception that money would not suffice to counter national trends. Being a strategic politician in 1974 meant being a Democrat; a Democrat with widespread name recognition, either as an incumbent or a challenger with prior elective office, only compounded the difficulties faced by Republican opponents.

The task ahead is to determine whether party identification change can be modelled as an instrumental variable in the same way that Fiorina (1981) has conceptualized lagged identification in his formulation of retrospective voting. Brody (1977) has suggested that this ought to be the case, but the correlations we have uncovered so far between party identification change and other variables are all very modest. We shall pursue this issue in other articles.

There are larger theoretical issues raised by our analysis, ones that are not confined to the interesting but limited question of what drove voters in 1974. Are standpatters and switchers motivated by different factors in other elections as well? If so, which seems likely, what does this imply for the much-heralded decline in the effect of party identification on the vote? Might party identification be alive and well for standpatters (habitual partisans) but weakening for switchers? Might the weakening of party identification be tied to a larger number of switchers in recent years than in the past? The impact of change in party identification upon 1974 vote choice for switchers was quite strong and suggestive of how simple party identification might, for some segments of the electorate, be a reflection of short-term rather than long-term attachments. It might not be surprising to find that switchers behave differently from standpatters, but the magnitudes of the differences we have found suggest that it is inappropriate to use the same models to account for the voting behavior of these two very different groups.

Appendix

Change in trust. Ranges from -5 to +5. It is the difference between two summed indices based on V570 to V574 (1972) and V2229 to V2233 (1974).

Democratic incumbent in 1974. Incumbent Democratic representative in the district = 1; otherwise = 0. (Coded from Gary Jacobson's data.)

Change in Nixon evaluation. Difference between thermometer ratings in 1974 and 1972. Ranges

- from -98 to +60. Computed from V2354 (1974) to V702 (1972).
- Change in party identification.* Change in the strength of party identification between 1972 and 1974. (Computed from V140, V2204. Ranges from +3 to -3.)
- Party identification in 1974.* 1 = Democrat; 2 = Independent, 3 = Republican (V2204).
- Evaluation of Nixon's pardon.* 1 = disapproval, 0 = approval (V2166).
- Joint evaluation of personal financial condition and Nixon pardon.* 0 = approve of pardon and personal financial situation same or better; otherwise = 1. (Computed from V2166, V2313).
- Republican challenger expenditures in 1974.* Reported campaign expenditures by Republican challengers to Democratic incumbents in 1974. 0 if Republican incumbent or open seat. (Jacobson data).

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