“Religion and Civic Engagement in Canada and the United States”*

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Religion is the source of much civic engagement. The great theorist of American civic engagement, Alexis de Tocqueville, saw religious values as the reason why people could put self-interest aside in favor of communitarian sentiments that lead people to get involved in their communities (Tocqueville, 1945, 126-127). The history of good deeds is replete with beneficence based upon faith: Mother Teresa's hospices and soup kitchens run by people of faith stand out. So do religious leaders pressing for social reform and civil rights,

Half of charitable contributions in the United States and almost 40 percent of volunteering are based in religious organizations (Bakal, 1979, 10; Hayge, 1991, 21). Clergy mobilize people into political and social action (Verba et al., 1993a, 457). Active membership in a church or a synagogue lets people develop and practice skills (letter writing, organizing) that easily translate into civic engagement (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995). Donors to charity and volunteers believe that there is a moral responsibility to help others, reject the notion that we should look out for ourselves first, and tie their beliefs to religious ideals (Hodgkinson et al., 1992, 203, 206, 218-219; Wilson and Musick, 1997, 708-709; Wuthnow, 1991, 51).

Yet, religion may also lead people away from civic engagement. Some churches may encourage people to get involved in civic life, others may discourage participation. Some churches may encourage people to take an active role in their faith communities, but not in the larger society. Putnam (1993, 107) argues that the Catholic Church in Italy traditionally discouraged participation in civic affairs. The church, he argued, was "an alternative to the civic community, not a part of it." The Catholic Church is a hierarchical institution and its leadership saw citizen engagement as a potential threat to its privileged role in Italian political and social life.

Religion may mobilize people to take part in their communities, but perhaps only among their own kind. Religious values tap "something within" so that people feel obligated to help others (Harris, 1994). Some of the faithful may feel a need to reach out to help (and perhaps save) those who don't believe. They may also feel comfortable working with people whose religious principles differ from their own. Yet, religious beliefs may also lead people to distinguish more sharply between their own kind and others. They may be more wary of engagement with others who don't share their principles.

Many fundamentalist Protestants withdraw from contact with "sinners" and retreat into their own communities. Throughout American history, they have been active in "nativist" organizations that sought to restrict immigration and immigrants' rights. More recently, they have led the fight to bring religious practices and instruction back to public schools and to fight the teaching of evolution in the science curriculum. They fear that people who don't believe as they do are trying to deny them their fundamental rights. So they generally withdraw into their own communities. If they volunteer or join civic organizations, it will only be with their own kind.

Religion, then, has complex relationships to civic engagement. Members of liberal (or non-fundamentalist) denominations are likely to reach out beyond their own faith community to work with others and to help people in need who are different from themselves (Greenberg, 1999). Fundamentalists will respond to the spiritual demands to do good works, but will focus their efforts on people like themselves. And Catholics may, if Putnam is correct, be less likely to participate in civic affairs altogether.

North America offers a good laboratory for testing the impact of religion on civic engagement. Americans and Canadians are religious peoples–considerably more so than are Europeans. Seventy percent of Americans and 51 percent of Canadians agreed that "God is important" in their lives in 1990, compared to 35 percent of Europeans (Nevitte, 1996, 210).[1] And Francophone Canadians (Quebecois) are even more likely than Anglophones (by 60 to 47 percent) to say that God plays a big role in their lives. Americans are more religious than Canadians, but both countries stand out compared to others in the West.

There is great religious diversity across North America. Canadian churches are legitimized by the state and are organized more hierarchically than American churches (Lipset, 1990, 80). They are funded by the state, both directly and through state support of religious schools. The Catholic Church is legally responsible for the protection of all Catholic children under 16 years old in Ontario (DePalma, 2001). The Catholic Church long had a close relationship with the Quebec provincial government (McRoberts, 1993, 57, 138-139). The Church discouraged parishioners from deep involvement in civic affairs, for this was the responsibility of the church itself. American churches are more varied and thus more democratic. Many denominations compete for adherents and this marketplace of values means that churches–including the American Catholic Church--must be more responsive to their members (Greeley, 1991).

American churches have also been more likely to stress moral ideals–especially a view of America as the "new Jerusalem," chosen by God in a new covenant–and voluntarism, stemming from the individualism that has played such a large role in American political culture (Hartz, 1955). For Americans, religious people have a moral obligation to do good, for no one else will do so. For Canadians, the link between the church and good deeds is not so strong, for it is the

role of the state–working together with the church hierarchy–to solve social problems (Lipset, 1990, 76-82; McRoberts, 1993, 138-139).

Americans are more likely to be religious fundamentalists. Far fewer Canadians belong to to fundamentalist Protestant denominations or identify themselves as fundamentalists, while as many as a quarter of *all* Americans do (Lipset, 1990; see below).

My focus here is how different religious traditions affect one form of civic participation–volunteering. Volunteering is more demanding than simply joining a civic organization (or writing a check to a charity). It takes time and moral commitment (Hodgkinson et al., 1992). Voluntarism is central to the American democratic ethos (Lipset, 1990, 80). Yet, even with the much greater role for the state in providing social services, Canadians do volunteer a lot–more than in most other countries. In the World Values Survey, Americans and Canadians did unpaid voluntary work for an average of .79 and .75 organizations (of a possible 16 in total), while the next highest figure among democratic nations was just .51 in Sweden.

So the United States and Canada are more alike than distinct, but the differing religious traditions suggest that there might be very different modes of activism. The perspective I have outlined above suggests that: (1) Americans should be more likely to volunteer in religious settings than either Anglophone Canadians or Quebecois; (2) Anglophone Canadians should be more likely to volunteer in secular than in religious settings–and perhaps as likely to give their time to secular causes as Americans; (3) Quebecois Catholics should volunteer less often than either Anglophone Canadians or Americans; (4) fundamentalists should be less likely to give their time to secular causes (and more likely to volunteer for church groups) than mainline Protestants or Catholics; and (5) because there are more fundamentalists in the United States than in either

part of Canada, Americans should be more likely to devote their time *exclusively* to religious volunteering.

Not all of these assumptions are equally plausible. Most contentious is Putnam's argument about the linkage between Catholicism and civic engagement. The Catholic Church has a long tradition of charity and good works more generally. It would hardly be surprising to find that Catholics are at least as likely as other people to volunteer their time. Even if the Catholic Church does discourage civic engagement in Quebec as Putnam claimed it did in Italy, the waning attachment of Quebecois to the church suggests a less prominent role for religion in that province than we might have seen 30 to 40 years ago.

I shall examine these claims about the impact of religion on volunteering by analyzing a Queens University survey on "God and Society in North America" conducted in Canada and the United States in 1996.[2] The survey had 2700 respondents in Anglophone Canada, 700 in Quebec, and 3023 in the United States. It asked respondents about volunteering in 13 different arenas as well as a broad range of questions tapping religious values.

The Roots of Volunteering

Volunteering is a demanding form of civic engagement. Unlike giving to charity or simply joining an organization, volunteering takes time. In that sense, it does not discriminate between the rich and the poor as much as giving to charity does–since even the wealthiest people still have but 24 hours in their day (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995, ch. 10). But it does discriminate among people who are rich and poor in moral resources. Volunteering depends, first and foremost, on moral values–and this shapes how people divide up their time. Volunteers reject materialistic values in favor of ideals such as a world at peace, inner harmony, and true friendship

(Mahoney and Pechura, 1980, 1010). They don't expect anyone to repay their kindness (Gerard, 1985, 237). Volunteers often link their commitment to others to their religious faith Hodgkinson et al., 1992, 203, 218; Wilson and Musick, 1997, 708-709; Wuthnow, 1991, 51).

The most important determinant of volunteering, even beyond religious values, is the perception of a common bond with other people.[3] Trust in others–especially strangers who are likely to be different from yourself–makes people far more likely to give their time. Such faith in others is based upon the presumption that we are all part of the same moral community with obligations to each other. These imperatives come from within–from a moral code–rather than from expectations of reciprocity. People who help others by volunteering don't expect the folks they assist to help them–and they don't volunteer because they expect *others* to help them either. Nor are they paying society back for good deeds that others have done for them.

Instead, people who trust others see the world as a beneficent place and believe that they have an obligation to make it better. Some people have less, but they are part of the same moral community as those who have more. Trusters thus see a moral obligation to help people with less.

Generalized trust–the belief that most people share your fundamental moral values, even if they have different religions or ideologies–may be essential to the most demanding forms of civic engagement such as volunteering. Yet it is *not* the dominant world view among either Americans. In the 1990s just over a third of Americans say that most people can be trusted (as opposed to "you can't be too careful in dealing with people"). Many people don't believe that *most* people can be trusted, but they do believe that *some* people –folks like themselves–can be trusted. These are *particularized trusters*, for whom the moral community is rather circumscribed. Fundamental-

ists are classic mistrusters. They do *not* believe that people unlike themselves share their fundamental values. Often they make precisely the opposite assumption: Non-believers are hostile to fundamentalism, and may even have values that threaten the moral fabric of society. Fundamentalists may withdraw from contact with "sinners" and retreat into their own communities. They will take part in civic life–but their volunteering will be limited to their own kind (Greenberg, 1999; Uslaner, 2001; Wuthnow, 1999).

The gentler Canadians *are* more trusting of each other and there is no sign of a waning of faith in others above the 49th parallel. In the 1981 and 1990 World Values Studies, just over 50 percent of Canadians believed that "most people can be trusted." Yet, the effects of trust–in producing civic engagement or in forging strong standards of moral behavior–are weaker in Canada than they are in the United States (Uslaner, 1997, 1999b). Trust is more plentiful in Canada (though not in Quebec, cf. Kornberg [1988, 20-21]), but it doesn't go as far as in the United States.

Trust is less important as a determinant of civic engagement because interpersonal trust is most important in individualistic societies. And Canada puts a heavier emphasis on group rights and identities than on the individual. We see this reflected in Canadian religious life. Almost 90 percent of Canadians belong to the three mainline Christian denominations (Catholicism, Anglicanism, and the United Church)–and these churches have had long-standing, if weakened, ties to the federal and provincial governments (Lipset, 1990, 80, 88). Canadian federal and provincial governments fund religious schools. This close relationship between church and state is part of the collectivist Canadian identity, where the state allocates rights and privileges to groups (including churches) rather than individuals (Lipset, 1990, ch. 3). Canadian history is a

tale of how to balance competing claims by different groups (Francophones versus Anglophones, the West versus Ontario and Atlantic Canada, the Inuit and other natives versus both Anglophones and Quebecois). American culture, in contrast, is a story of individual rights. There is a separation of church and state, with no religion enjoying privileged status. The American religious community is much more pluralistic–and, for many denominations, organized from the bottom up rather than the top down.

The individualistic culture of the United States provides the foundation for both interpersonal trust and fundamentalism. Civic engagement in a country with a weak state depends upon a set of moral values that unifies a diverse nation–and the core ideal that accomplishes this goal is interpersonal trust. But the populism and messianic fervor of American individualism provides fertile ground for the development of fundamentalism and other forms of particularized trust such as militia movements (Lipset, 1990, 30-32, 76-79). The United States, often seen as the land of political moderation, is also a country of social extremes. Mainline Protestants are far more likely to be both trusting and involved in groups with diverse memberships than are fundamentalists. The relationship is not so strong in collectivist Canada. There are fewer fundamentalists in Canada (22 percent of all Canadian Protestants and 24 percent of Anglophone Protestants in the Queens University survey). Overall, twice as many Americans as Canadians (23 percent compared to 12 percent) identify as fundamentalists.

Americans are famous for their participation in civic life, but the "big" American advantage in civic group membership stems *entirely* from their overwhelming edge in religious activity (Greeley, 1997, 590). When you volunteer at your church, you are not as likely to come into contact with people who are different from yourself as when you volunteer at a hospital or a

homeless shelter.[4] Fundamentalists, as particularized trusters, may volunteer a lot–but only with their own kind. Twenty-seven percent of Americans volunteer for their churches, compared to 19 percent of Anglophone Canadians. Almost identical shares (40 percent) of Americans and Anglophone Canadians volunteer for secular causes (defined below), but more Anglophone Canadians volunteer *only* for secular activities (24 percent compared to 19 percent for Americans).[5]

Anglophone Canadians volunteer less than Americans because they are not so ready to give their time to religious organizations. Quebecois participate much less in both secular *and* religious volunteering (23 percent and 8 percent respectively) than either Anglophone Canadians or Americans. Just 31 percent of Quebecois volunteer compared to 44 percent of Anglophone Canadians and 47 percent of Americans.

Putnam might argue that Quebecois are less likely to volunteer because Quebec is heavily Catholic. Two-thirds of the Queens Quebec sample identified as Catholic, compared to under a quarter in the United States and Anglophone Canada. The hierarchical structure of the Catholic Church in Quebec makes people less trusting of people who are different from themselves (Inglehart, 1999; LaPorta et al., 1997, 336) and less likely to participate in civic affairs. Handler (1988, 65) argues:

> ...the Church deliberately isolated its flock (to protect them from "Anglo-Saxon" values) and enforced the kind of homogenous, sacred worldview typical of folk and peasant societies.

The Church discouraged both popular participation and state intervention in doing good works. Both a corps of dedicated volunteers and a group of professional social workers threatened the

clergy's dominant role in providing social services–and constituted a threat to Church power and autonomy (McRoberts, 1993, 138, 155). Catholics in the United States, on this argument, might not withdraw from civic engagement because the Church has had to adapt to American culture and become more democratic and even populist (Greeley, 1991).

There are some big caution flags that suggest skepticism about this thesis. The Catholic Church is no longer the dominant power in the province. The Quiet Revolution, the great social transformation that began in the 1960s, was a mixture of French nationalism and economic and technical development. It was a frontal assault on the old clerical order that discouraged civic engagement and modernization. The Church was linked to an old political order that tolerated economic dominance by an Anglophone elite even while espousing its own brand of conservative nationalism. The Quiet Revolution's "most profound change" was "the radical decline in the Church's status and influence." While most Quebecois continued to call themselves Catholics, attendance at mass plummeted by more than half from 1961 to 1971 alone (McRoberts, 1993, 138-139). Quebecois not only deserted the pews, but also theocratic orthodoxy. By 1990, they were much more willing to accept homosexuality than either Americans or Anglophone Canadians and were more supportive of divorce and euthanasia than Americans, Anglophones, or even Europeans (Nevitte, 1996, 218).

On one view, Catholics in Quebec (though perhaps not in the United States or Anglophone Canada) will be less likely to volunteer in either the secular or religious arenas. Perhaps, alternatively (or additionally), Quebecois volunteer less because they are less trusting than Americans or Anglophone Canadians. As with the thesis on the Catholic Church, this is a plausible argument, but it too runs up against a counterargument: Interpersonal trust is less

central to civic life in collectivist societies as in individualistic cultures and Quebec, more so than Anglophone Canada, is a statist society.

The Models and the Data

I shall estimate models for three questions. First, what drives secular volunteering? Second, what drives religious volunteering? And, third, why do some people volunteer only for secular or only for religious activities? I expect that fundamentalists, especially in the United States, will be most likely to volunteer for religious causes. And they are very unlikely to volunteer *only* for secular activities.

The Queens University survey asks about 14 different arenas for volunteering. One, volunteering in your church or other religious organization, is a clear-cut measure of participation for a religious cause, most likely with and for people like yourself. Nine organizations appeared primarily secular, so I created a dummy variable for people who volunteered for any of them: professional organizations, environmental groups, neighborhood associations, health organizations, groups assisting the elderly, women's organizations, political associations, support groups, and cultural organizations. Three arenas might be either secular or religious (social service, youth, and recreation groups) and one is clearly secular, but seems too homogenous to incorporate into a general measure of secular volunteering–veterans' groups. So I exclude these four types of groups and concentrate on the dummy variables for religious and secular volunteering. I also constructed two variables that allow me to examine whether people volunteer only in the secular or religious realms: a trichotomy (religious/both or neither/secular) and a dichotomy (religious/secular, treating the both/neither categories as missing data).

There are straightforward measures of Catholic and fundamentalist Protestant identifica-

tion in the Queens University survey. Respondents were asked if they considered themselves fundamentalist but were only coded as such if they were Protestants. Yet, simple identification as a fundamentalist may not separate out people who hold their religious beliefs so strongly that they might view others with suspicion–and thus restrict their volunteering activities to their own circle.

I thus constructed a measure of fundamentalist values from a factor analysis of 12 questions in the survey. Strong fundamentalists agree that: they are very strongly committed to Christianity; the Bible is the literal word of God; the world will end like Armageddon; it is important for non-Christians to convert to Christianity; they consider themselves fundamentalists and evangelicals (separate questions); Christian values should shape politics; they feel very close to the Christian right; all great religions are *not* true; they would not vote for either an atheist or a Muslim (separate questions); and gays do not have the same rights as other people.[6] This composite index of fundamentalist values clearly distinguishes between people who see the world as us versus them and people with a more inclusive view of people unlike themselves.

This index encompasses viewpoints that go well beyond the definition of fundamentalism (which refers to biblical inerrancy). It includes some more specific political views that may not be shared by all who call themselves fundamentalists, as well as identification as an evangelical. Fundamentalists are more likely to stress the the idea of the Bible as the literal truth and to see themselves as a people apart from non-believers. Evangelicals see their mission as spreading the gospel, and they are more acceptant of those with different beliefs than are fundamentalists (Wilcox et al., 1993). However, in the Queens University survey, it makes little difference whether the evangelism identification question is included or excluded: the index with and without

the evangelism questions correlate at .995–and, perhaps surprisingly, evangelicals are somewhat *less* likely to volunteer for exclusively secular causes and *more* likely to volunteer in exclusively religious contexts.[7] Because only Christians answered some questions, the analysis below is confined to people who identified as Christians.

The final major variable is a measure of trust in other people. The Queens University survey did not ask the traditional trust in people question. Instead, it asked whether respondents trust others to do right on a four-point Likert (agree-disagree) scale. The absence of the alternative "you can't be too careful" led to overestimation in the level of trust: 66 percent of Anglophone Canadians, 56 percent of Quebecois, and 59 percent of Americans either moderately or strongly agreed that most people would do the right thing. Nevertheless, the question is the best available measure of trust.

Beyond these core variables, I include several other variables in the estimation to ensure the best possible specification. Voluntarism in the American mind is an *alternative* to state action on social welfare. So people who favor the free market over the government should be more willing to put their actions where their values are–by volunteering. At least this is what I would expect in the United States. In Canada, the direction of the relationship might not be so clear. In collectivist cultures the state and the voluntary sector are perceived as allies rather than competitors (Selle and Strømsnes, 2001). So, we might find that Canadians who favor governmental intervention might be more likely to volunteer their time. Or, because Canada is less collectivist than Europe–though less individualist than the United States, the result might be indeterminant.

For either country, people who say that it is important to be involved in your community will be more likely to take an active role by volunteering. And there are a variety of demographic

variables that shape volunteering. Higher status people generally do more volunteering (Jencks, 1987). Two measures of status are income and education and more of each should lead to higher probabilities of volunteering. Women have traditionally volunteered more than men–and homemakers more than employed women (since they have more flexibility managing their time). The unemployed may have plenty of free time as conventionally measured, but they will generally be preoccupied with other matters, such as finding a job, and thus will be less likely to give of their time.

While students may have less free time, they often get involved in civic or political activities through fraternities, sororities, service organizations, or clubs. So I expect students to volunteer more. But overall, younger people, who are less civically minded than their elders (Putnam, 1995; Uslaner, in press, chs. 4, 5) should be less likely to volunteer. Married people have developed stakes in their communities and will often have more opportunities to volunteer (through their childrens' schools, among other venues).

I shall estimate models for volunteering in secular and religious organizations. Not surprisingly, fundamentalist values have greater impacts on volunteering for religious organizations than for secular ones. But this doesn't allow me to say that the particularized trust that marks fundamentalists leads them to withdraw from secular civic life. Over 80 percent of people who volunteer for religious causes in the United States in Anglophone Canada also give their time to secular groups. The relationship is somewhat weaker in Quebec, but still two-thirds of people who are engaged in religious volunteering also give time to secular organizations. To see whether there are distinct types of volunteering, I then focus on two polar cases–people who volunteer *only* for religious causes and folks who take part *only* in secular organizations. I separate out

respondents who fit either profile to see the impact of religion on volunteering in one domain *or* the other.

I estimate these models by probit analysis, which is appropriate when the variable is a dichotomy. For the probits, the measure of impact is what Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) call the "effect" of an independent variable, the difference in estimated probabilities from the predictor's highest and lowest values, letting the other independent variables take their "natural" values. The "effect" of a variable gives the change in probability that someone will volunteer as we go from the lowest to the highest value of the independent variable in question. Since the effects are changes in probabilities, they can be compared across equations with a straightfoward interpretation, unlike the probit coefficients. So it is easy to test the predictions about the impact of religion in Anglophone Canada, Quebec, or the United States.

The equations for people who volunteer for only religious or secular organizations exclude a large number of cases–the people who either volunteer in both arenas or who don't give of their time at all. For each case, the no-shows are the dominant group, ranging from 54-56 percent in the United States and Anglophone Canada to 74 percent in Quebec. In both parts of Canada, the next most frequent response is volunteering only for secular causes, but in the United States religious activism ranks second. Nevertheless, for each locale, between 75 and 80 percent of all respondents either take part in both realms or in neither. The sample sizes for these analyses are thus much smaller: 375 in the United States, 309 in Anglophone Canada, and just 84 in Quebec.

These small N's make inferences from the probits risky, so I estimate multinomial logits that lets me take advantage of the full sample (minus the cases with missing data on some variables). The multinomial logit estimates equations with a common set of predictors for three of

the four categories of volunteering in the variable I have constructed: religious volunteering only, secular volunteering only, participation in both, and activism in neither venue. The fourth category is the base. No category is a theoretically meaningful base, so I estimated multinomial logits using each category as the base. As with the simple probits, I focus on the effects of the multinomial logit coefficients.

When I use only religious volunteering as the base, the equation for only secular volunteering gives us estimates of the impact of each variable when we compare participation only in secular activities to involvement exclusively in religious activities. These pairwise comparisons will provide a more systematic analysis of how fundamentalism, Catholicism, and especially fundamentalist values shape different forms of civic engagement. If my argument so far is correct, fundamentalist attitudes should lead people away from secular activities (and even away from participation in both the religious *and* secular worlds) and toward a self-segregation in church-related volunteering. Fundamentalists and Catholics might also be less likely to take part in secular organizations, although the impacts should be less than for fundamentalist religious values.

Results

I present the probits for volunteering in secular and religious organizations in Tables 1 and 2 respectively. While I present the results for all of the independent variables in the tables, I focus the discussion in the text on the variables of greatest interest here: fundamentalist values, identification as a fundamentalist, being Catholic, and generalized trust.

Tables 1, 2 about here

Across the United States and Canada, there are relatively modest, yet surprising, effects for religious values on secular volunteering. In all three locales, fundamentalist values seem to make people *more* likely to take part in secular causes. In the United States, the coefficient is even marginally significant ($p < .10$). In the United States and Anglophone Canada, fundamentalist identification also leads people to be more likely to give their time to secular groups.[8] In the United States, people with deeply held fundamentalist values are 7 percent *more* likely to take part in secular volunteering–while self-identified fundamentalists are (additionally) 7 percent *more* likely to give their time to secular causes. Somewhat ironically, people who may be wary of folks who are different from themselves, are likely to venture out into the secular realm, at least in the United States.

As expected, however, fundamentalism is much less important in Canada. In Quebec, there are so few fundamentalist Protestants that I must drop them from the equation. And self identified fundamentalists are not significantly less (or more) likely to take part in secular volunteering in Anglophone Canada either. Fundamentalism has not taken root in Canada as it has in the United States. And Catholics are no less likely to volunteer for secular causes in Quebec than non-Catholics. This is not simply because Catholics have less income or less education. Indeed, Quebec Catholics are marginally more likely to take a role in secular organizations–by 24 to 23 percent ($p < .738$, two-tailed). While on the surface–in bivariate comparisons–there is little difference between Catholic and non-Catholic Anglophone Canadians (39 percent of each take part in secular causes), the multivariate analysis suggests that Anglophone Catholics do take part less–by 9 percent.

Generalized trust is moderately important in the United States (effect = .064, $p < .05$), but

is insignificant in the more collectivist cultures of Anglophone Canada and Quebec. Indeed, in Quebec, people who trust others are *less* likely to be involved in secular volunteering (by as much as 16 percent). I have no ready explanation for this result..

Religious values are not the key to understanding secular volunteering anywhere. As I expected, Americans who put their faith in the free market are *more* likely (by five percent) to volunteer, while Anglophone Canadians who put their faith in government are four percent more disposed to give of their time. In all three locales, the highly educated and people who say that is important to be involved volunteer more, but aside from that, there are no consistent results across demographic variables.

Fundamentalist values have modest effects for secular volunteering, but they have powerful impacts on giving time to religious causes. And here we have a surprise: The powerful effects of fundamentalist values are just as strong in Anglophone Canada (effect = .421) as in the United States (effect = .450). Fundamentalist values have less effect in Quebec, where religious conservatives are 19 percent more likely to give their time to their churches. Quebecois Catholics are no more (or less) likely to take part in religious causes–but again Anglophone Catholics in Canada are *less* disposed (by 8 percent) to give their time to their churches.

Let me reiterate that I have not simply demonstrated that more religious people spend more time volunteering for their faiths. That should be obvious and we know that religious people (who attend services frequently, who pray a lot, etc.) are more likely to give their time to faith-based causes. My analysis here shows something very different: Christians who hold conservative religious values, who see themselves as apart from people with different traditions and ideals, are much more likely to give their time to their churches than people whose values are

more mainline (or even secular).

Some of the variations across locales reflect differing religious values. Quebecois are less fundamentalist than either Anglophone Canadians or Americans (cf. Nevitte, 1996, 218). I conducted the factor analysis of fundamentalist values for all three locales, so the scores are standardized around a common mean. Quebecois are the most religiously liberal–by a lot. Higher scores on the fundamentalist values factor indicate greater religious conservatism. The mean for the United States is .323–so the average American tilts toward the fundamentalist end of the scale. The average Anglophone is about as liberal religiously as Americans are conservative, with a mean score of -.279. And the average Quebecois is *much* more liberal, with a mean of -.546. Moreover, the range in Quebec is much smaller: 95 percent of Quebecois have scores of less than .66, while about 60 percent of Americans score below .66.

So there aren't as many as religious conservatives in Quebec to set them apart. And Quebec Catholics are not so exclusive in their patterns of engagement. Neither group simply burrows itself into church activities. Quebecois volunteer less than either Anglophone Canadians or Americans, but they are particularly less likely to give their time to faith-based causes. Only 8 percent of Quebecois compared to 23 percent of Anglophones in the United States and the rest of Canada give their time to religious volunteering. So the estimate in Table 2 for the impact of fundamentalist values is way too high. People with strong conservative values, this equation tells us, are 19 percent more likely to volunteer in their churches–but this is 11 percent more than the share of volunteers. So in Quebec, religious conservatives *do* withdraw, but there aren't enough of them to make the same sort of difference as in Anglophone Canada and the United States. In both Anglophone Canada and the United States, the estimate is also too high: 19 percent of

Anglophone Canadians volunteer for religious causes, but the estimate would expect that strong religious values would boost faith-based volunteering by 42 percent. For the United States, the comparable figures are 27 and 45 percent. These estimates point to the powerful effects of fundamentalist values in getting people involved in religious volunteering.

In contrast, we don't see generalized trusters fleeing from faith-based volunteering. Trust is not significant in either part of Canada, and generalized trust seems to lead people to give more of their time to their houses of worship (by about 11 percent). We should not jump to the conclusion that people with faith in strangers simply burrow themselves into their own faith-based communities, paying little heed to their ideals. When I break the data down more finely, the impact of trust becomes clearer: There is a moderate correlation between religious volunteering and trust in others only for religious liberals (factor scores less than zero) in the United States.

Beyond these core variables, there is little that is common across all three venues. Education is important in the two Anglophone locales. Marriage increases the chances of religious volunteering in these two places. Women volunteer more for their houses of worship in Anglophone Canada and the United States. In all three venues, older people give more time--although the relationship is not strong except in Quebec. Here we see the effects of the Quiet Revolution: Older people are more attached to the church and have more conservative values. They are thus more likely to give their time to religious causes. A 75 year-old is 22 percent more likely to give time than an 18 year old (again noting that only 8 percent of Quebecois volunteer for religious causes at all).[9]

Fundamentalist values are more important to religious volunteering than to giving time to secular causes. Yet, we find little evidence that either Catholics or self-identified fundamentalists

withdraw from civic affairs. Nor is there much evidence here that generalized trusters give of their time in one venue and not the other. Indeed, in the more group-oriented Canadian culture, generalized trust doesn't seem to matter much for either form of civic engagement. And there remains the counterintuitive finding that American fundamentalists are more likely to give their time to secular causes. This seems somewhat ironic because Americans are *more* fundamentalist than either Anglophone Canadians or Quebecois. So we would expect that the strongest religious conservatives might restrict their activities to their own communities even more than religious liberals.

We cannot dismiss this hypothesis. Neither the Queens survey nor any other gives details about whom one volunteers with or who benefits from the good works. So fundamentalists might join secular organizations composed of other fundamentalists. There is a tad of evidence that this might be true in the United States. People with liberal theological views dominate most of secular volunteering, especially for professional, environmental, neighborhood, and cultural groups. Religious conservatives hold their own only for womens' assocations, support groups and organizations helping the elderly and participating in politics. So religious conservatives are most active in the least encompassing, least diverse of the secular organizations.

Nevertheless, we still don't have convincing evidence that fundamentalists participate primarily in their own organizations and shy away from the groups in the larger society. There is no direct way to test this hypothesis, but we can gain some leverage about who volunteers for what by focusing on people who give their time only for religious or only for secular causes. I estimate probits for this dichotomy–excluding people who volunteer for both or neither cause–in Table 3.

Table 3 about here

In the United States, 72 percent of people who choose only religious or secular volunteering opt for secular engagement, compared to 85 percent in Anglophone Canada and 87 percent in Quebec. In all three venues, fundamentalist values are by far the strongest predictor of secular versus religious volunteering. Americans with the most conservative religious values are 74 percent less likely than people with the most liberal views to engage in exclusively secular activities. In other words, they completely withdraw from exclusively secular activities. The effects are less for Anglophone Canada and Quebec–which is what we would expect since fewer people restrict their activities to the religious realm and Canadians are simply less religiously doctrinaire than are Americans. In all three venues, no other variable consistently separates people who volunteer exclusively in one realm or another. Highly educated people are more likely to focus their attention on the secular realm in the United States (but not elsewhere) and Quebecois women (but not those elsewhere) are more likely to stay within the confines of their churches for volunteering.

These results are telling, but the sample sizes are smaller than desirable, especially in Quebec. So I estimated the same models with multinomial logit and present the effects for the key variables tapping religion and trust in Table 4 below. The pattern in that table matches what we have seen so far: People who have strongly conservative values do take part in secular volunteering, but they are very unlikely to give their time *only* to worldly causes. Fudamentalists are also much more likely than anyone else to restrict their volunteering to church-based causes.[10]

Table 4 about here

In both the United States and Anglophone Canada, fundamentalism is defined by conservative religious values, not simple identification as a religious conservative. (There aren't enough self-identified fundamentalists in Quebec to include this variable in that equation). Conservative values have powerful effects in both locales–and, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the impacts are of roughly equal magnitude in Canada and the United States. Fundamentalist identification *per se* has no effect on where people volunteer. The multinomial logits provide powerful evidence that conservative Christians *do* participate in the secular world, but not *exclusively* in the secular world. These estimates also suggest that fundamentalists are much more likely to take part exclusively in religious volunteering. This is true even in Quebec–where the most religously conservative are 8 percent more likely to take part only in religious volunteering. While this is but half the effect I find for Anglophone Canada, Quebecois are much less conservative in their religious doctrine–indeed, the mean for Quebec is twice as liberal as it is for Anglophone Canada. While Anglophone Canadians may not be quite as doctrinaire as Americans, the religiously conservative north of the 49th parallel seem to be as strongly affected by fundamentalist values as Americans are. There is one way in which conservative Christians are distinctive. Many particularized trusters shy away from civic engagement altogether (Uslaner, in press, ch. 5). But conservative religious beliefs *don't* demobilize people at all. Fundamentalist values have minimal effects in the equation for volunteering in neither arena.

Catholics don't participate less, except in Anglophone Canada. American and Quebecois Catholics are just as likely to volunteer for both religious and secular causes as non-Catholics. The hierarchical structure of the Catholic Church is not a dominant force in shaping Quebecois

civic engagement. In Anglophone Canada, Catholics are not more likely to take part just in religious volunteering or less likely to volunteer only for secular causes. Insteaed, they are more likely to withdraw from civic engagement altogether. Why Catholics should shy away from volunteering in Anglophone Canada but not in the United States or Quebec is puzzling.

There are also but modest effects for trust in other people–perhaps owing to the unusual question wording in the Queens University survey. Trust has very small effects in Anglophone Canada–and leads people to give their time to both secular *and* religious causes in the United States (and to be less likely to withdraw from civic engagement altogether). Surprisingly, generalized trust promotes secular volunteering *only in Quebec*, the most collectivist of the three societies. People who trust others are 11 percent more likely to give their time to only secular causes there–and almost 10 percent less likely to withdraw from civic engagement altogether.

Reprise

There is some modest support for the distinction between generalized and particularized trusters in this study. Generalized trust has at best modest effects on volunteering in both Canada and the United States. Particularized trusters should, according to the framework I outlined, take part in civic affairs only with their own kind. Yet, conservative Christians, who often don't have faith in people different from themselve, don't relegate their volunteering activities to religious causes. They *are* more likely (in both the United States and Canada) than liberal Christians to give their time exclusively to faith-based volunteering, but they are also more likely to give of themselves in both the religious and secular realms. The missing element is whom they associate with when they give of themselves–and there is simply no way to tell this from the available data. There is some indication that fundamentalists are less likely to volunteer for the more hetero-

genous organizations.

Yet, there is little indication that the structure of churches makes a great deal of difference. If it did, the more hierarchical Canadian churches should demobilize people more–but they don't. Catholics don't participate any less in Quebec than non-Catholics. The structures of the churches in the United States and Canada are rather different, yet conservative values have similar effects in both countries.

Overall, the differences between Anglophone Canada and the United States pale in comparison to the similarities. Similar cultures seem to overwhelm differences in the institutional structures of the churches. And while Quebec seems to be a distinct culture of voluntarism, we cannot trace the lower level of voluntarism in both secular and especially the religious arena to the hierarchical structure of the Catholic.

We need to get a better idea with whom people associate when they give of themselves–so that we can better understand their motivations for giving to others.

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TABLE 1
Probit Models of Secular Volunteering

	United States			Anglophone Canada			Quebec		
	Coefficient	**Standard Error**	**Effect**	**Coefficient**	**Standard Error**	**Effect**	**Coefficient**	**Standard Error**	**Effect**
Fundamentalist Values	.074*	.045	***.073***	.032	.054	***.033***	.004	.128	***.002***
Fundamentalist ID	.199**	.093	***.068***	.037	.129	***.014***			
Catholic	-.032	.080	***-.011***	-.251***	.090	***-.091***	-.044	.201	***-.012***
Trust	.063**	.034	***.064***	.003	.043	***.004***	-.182	.080	***-.155***
Favor free market over govt.	.139**	.070	***.048***	-.116*	.086	***-.042***	.008	.167	***.002***
Important to be involved	.127****	.034	***.130***	.115***	.045	***.124***	.150*	.093	***.115***
Gender	-.232***	.072	***-.079***	-.119*	.085	***-.043***	-.028	.144	***-.008***
Education	.260****	.026	***.376***	.223****	.031	***.329***	.136***	.055	***.162***
Married	-.026	.075	***-.009***	.269***	.093	***.099***	.005	.157	***.001***
Student	-.081	.173	***-.027***	-.500***	.190	***-.174***	.198	.372	***.059***
Homemaker	-.034	.133	***-.012***	.389***	.158	***.142***			
Unemployed	-.282*	.213	***-.093***	-.130	.229	***-.047***	-.822*	.555	***-.166***
Income	.193****	.032	***.273***	.006	.035	***.009***	.044	.070	***.050***
Age	.001	.002	***.271***	-.0003	.003	***-.006***	.014***	.005	***.232***
Constant	-1.244****	.186		-.329**	.248		-1.034***	.450	
Estimated R^2			.262			.169			.451
Percent Predicted Correctly (Model)			68.2			62.5			77.2
Percent Predicted Correctly (Null)			56.0			52.9			

77.9			
N	1599	1059	411

**** p < .0001 *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .10

TABLE 2

Probit Models of Religious Volunteering

	United States			**Anglophone Canada**			**Quebec**		
	Coefficient	**Standard Error**	**Effect**	**Coefficient**	**Standard Error**	**Effect**	**Coefficient**	**Standard Error**	**Effect**
Fundamentalist Values	.495****	.049	***.450***	.505****	.060	***.421***	.657****	.180	***.185***
Fundamentalist ID	-.001	.094	***-.003***	.136	.135	***.038***			
Catholic	-.066	.083	***-.021***	-.309***	.104	***-.083***	.075	.289	***.009***
Trust	.117***	.035	***.111***	.005	.049	***.004***	.042	.112	***.015***
Favor free market over govt.	.075	.072	***.024***	-.088	.097	***-.024***	-.024	.251	***-.003***
Important to be involved	.081**	.034	***.076***	.048	.051	***.038***	.195*	.135	***.058***
Gender	-.230***	.074	***-.073***	-.219**	.096	***-.059***	-.092	.210	***-.011***
Education	.193****	.028	***.250***	.173****	.034	***.193***	.045	.081	***.023***
Married	.126*	.077	***.400***	.386***	.106	***.103***	.194	.234	***.023***
Student	-.060	.183	***-.019***	-.212	.239	***-.054***	1.397**	.534	***.298***
Homemaker	.086	.133	***.028***	.303**	.165	***.088***			
Unemployed	-.041	.206	***-.013***	-.492**	.294	***-.114***	.120	.629	***.015***
Income	.115****	.033	***.149***	.007	.040	***.008***	.150*	.107	***.077***
Age	.003*	.002	***.051***	.005*	.003	***.073***	.030***	.009	***.221***
Constant	-1.649****	.194		-1.112****	.280		-2.978****	.723	
Estimated R^2			.352			.492			.778
Percent Predicted Correctly (Model)			71.5			77.5			92.0
Percent Predicted Correctly (Null)			66.2			73.2			92.9

N	1599	1059	411

**** p < .0001   *** p < .01   ** p < .05   * p < .10

TABLE 3
Probit Models of Only Secular or Religious Volunteering

	United States			Anglophone Canada			Quebec		
	Coefficient	**Standard Error**	**Effect**	**Coefficient**	**Standard Error**	**Effect**	**Coefficient**	**Standard Error**	**Effect**
Fundamentalist Values	-.992****	.135	***-.738***	-.745****	.133	***-.525***	-.966**	.503	***-.329***
Fundamentalist ID	.619	.232	***.129***	-.400*	.271	***-.083***			
Catholic	-.164	.207	***-.038***	.129	.235	***.023***	-.310	.734	***-.041***
Trust	-.213	.089	***-.147***	-.056	.112	***-.030***	-.867	.364	***-.342***
Favor free market over govt.	-.145	.174	***-.034***	-.186	.208	***-.034***	.128	.578	***.017***
Important to be involved	.043	.085	***.031***	.139	.111	***.081***	-.118	.389	***-.046***
Gender	-.089	.188	***-.021***	.183	.217	***.033***	-.871**	.512	***-.120***
Education	.159**	.062	***.153***	.071	.080	***.051***	-.043	.182	***-.024***
Married	-.198	.182	***-.046***	-.175	.249	***-.031***	-.354	.590	***-.049***
Student	-.030	.424	***-.007***	-.620	.507	***-.138***	-3.064**	1.104	***-.632***
Homemaker	-.323	.326	***-.080***	-.059	.358	***-.011***			
Unemployed	-1.190**	.506	***-.307***	.674	.674	***.093***			
Income	.123*	.076	***.117***	-.047	.089	***-.033***	-.168	.239	***-.705***
Age	-.007	.005	***-.092***	.002	.007	***.016***	-.020	-.023	***-.165***
Constant	1.472**	.510		1.422**	.636				
Estimated R^2		.635			.680			.821	
Percent Predicted Correctly (Model)		83.5			85.2			89.3	
Percent Predicted Correctly (Null)		71.7			84.8			86.9	

N	375	309	84

**** p < .0001 *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .10

TABLE 4

Summary of Multinomial Logit Effects

United States	Only religious	Only secular	Neither	Both
Fundamentalist Values	.111	-.262	-.018	.331
Fundamentalist ID	.022	.041	-.039	.019
Catholic	.002	.009	-.014	-.021
Trust Others	.032	-.012	-.099	.079
Anglophone Canada	**Only religious**	**Only secular**	**Neither**	**Both**
Fundamentalist Values	.150	-.292	-.005	.325
Fundamentalist ID	.029	.004	-.038	.005
Catholic	-.012	-.021	.106	-.072
Trust Others	.034	.042	-.041	.036
Quebec	**Only religious**	**Only secular**	**Neither**	**Both**
Fundamentalist Values	.079	-.113	-.005	.092
Catholic	.025	-.008	.015	.019
Trust Others	.045	.112	-.098	.026

NOTES

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1. Only people in Ireland, Northern Ireland, and Italy ranked above Canada (no European nationality ranked above the United States) in the 1990 World Values Study data (Nevitte, 1996, 210).

2. The surveys were conducted by the Angus Reid Group. Interested parties may download the survey and codebooks from the American Religious Data Archive at http://thearda.com/archive/QUEEN's2.html. There were only 6 Francophones living outside Quebec in the Canadian sample, so to prevent confusion, I excluded these cases. The references to Quebecois are, as in Canadian parlance, Francophone residents of Quebec.

3. This paragraph and the three that follow are based upon Uslaner (1999a) and (in press), chs. 2, 3, and especially 7.

4. Nor are you likely to come into contact with a heterogenous crowd when you volunteer at your child's school.

5. These results come from the Queens University survey. The percentage only involved in

secular volunteering is based upon a composite variable that includes people who do no volunteering, who volunteer only for their churches or religious organizations, and who volunteer for both secular and religious causes.

6. The lowest loadings are for gay rights, fundamentalism self-identification, and willingness to vote for a Muslim (ranging from .38 to .42 in absolute value). The highest loadings are for the necessity to convert non-Christians, the depth of your commitment to Christianity, and the Bible as the literal word of God (all above .7).

7. Of the 1376 who identified as either fundamentalist or evangelical (and who answered both questions), 16.9 percent who identified only as fundamentalists and 9.9 percent who identified only as evangelicals volunteered exclusively for secular groups. 5.8 percent of exclusive fundamentalists, compared to 8.3 percent of exclusive evangelicals, only volunteered for religious causes.

8. Normally I use one-tailed tests of significance throughout, except for constants, but here the tests are two-tailed, since the results run counter to my theoretical expectations. The effects are calculated at the minimum and maximum values of the independent variables except for age (where I restrict the maximum age to 75) and fundamentalist values (where I use the standardized scores at the 5th and 95th percentiles). In both cases, I want to be careful not to get very large effects that are attributable to extreme values on either variable (such as the handful of people over 80 in the sample and people at either extreme on the religiosity factor).

9. What seems puzzling is that Quebec students are almost 30 percent more likely to

volunteer in church than are non-students. This powerful effect stems from unbalanced marginals. Only two students in the Quebec sample give time to faith-based causes.

10. The effects in Table 4 do not have significance levels associated with them, because the multinomial logit analysis results in three estimations for each base category and altogether there are four base categories. However, many of these estimates duplicate each other (such as the equation for only secular volunteering with only religious as the base category and the equation for only religious volunteering with only secular as the base category). Altogether there are six distinctive patterns, producing up to six different significance levels for each independent variable. Overall, the coefficients for the United States and Anglophone Canada are significant at $p < .0001$ except for the both-only religious comparisons. For Quebec, the coefficients are significant at $p < .05$ except for the both-only religious and neither-only secular comparisons.